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COMETH THE REVOLUTION

INTRODUCTION
In Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education', a 1948
Supreme Court case, Justice Frankfurter stated that public education was
"the symbol of our democracy and the most pervasive means for
promoting our common destiny."2 This is an alarming statement. It
suggests that our common destiny is in the hands of the government, not
the people. Additionally, by using the word "destiny," Justice Frankfurter
raised a religious concept of a determined future, held in the hands of the
public school. Since religion has been expelled from the school house,
the statement suggests that a destiny and a culture can be achieved
without religion. Most alarming, this concept of a destiny and a culture
apart from religion is wrong; yet, it has become the cornerstone of the
Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence as applied to
elementary and secondary public schools.
This Article will address two ways in which the isolation of religion
from destiny and culture is fundamentally wrong. Part A will show that
culture, particularly American culture, and law, including the religion
clauses of the First Amendment, are dependent upon and actually stem
from religion. While the analysis in Part A is not presented as the only
possible understanding of the origins of culture and law in America, it is
a sufficient analysis to justify a place for religion in'the nurturing of
future generations. It suggests that religion is a crucial and perhaps
determining thread in the fabric of America, a thread. which, to use one
of Justice Frankfurter's metaphors, cannot be removed from the
educational process without unraveling the entire fabric.' Many will
deem this portion irrelevant, primarily because historical development and
the field of historical jurisprudence are presently considered of little
import. However, a religious analysis is essential to understanding the
development of American society, the American legal system, and the
very doctrine of religious liberty.
Part B will examine the basic premises4 underlying the Supreme

1. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
2. Id. at 231 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). See also Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584
(1986) ("The public school is at once the symbol of our democracy and the most pervasive means
for promoting our common destiny. In no activity of the State is it more vital to keep out divisive
forces than in its schools ....").
3. McCollum, 333 U.S. at 231.
4. The term "premises" is used throughout this Article in a broad sense to include the relevant
bases underlying the decisions discussed. These premises include the societal setting in which the
cases arose as well as the predispositions of the judges making the decisions. The basic thesis of this
Article that in 1948, when the McCollum decision was rendered, the public school system was
performing its function in a manner which allowed students to grow into responsible adults, thus
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Court decisions affecting religion in public elementary and secondary
schools; it will suggest that developments since the first Establishment
Clause cases have invalidated the educational premises upon which those
decisions rely. These changes include the now well known breakdown
of the family, a spiraling illegitimacy rate, and the pressures of a drug
culture. All of these combine to destroy the lives of millions of youths
in America, particularly those who are poor and most dependent on the
free public school system.
Our common destiny is becoming a nightmare for those dependent
upon the state. For the government to monopolize education without
providing a means for religious development is analogous to agreeing to
feed the people while eliminating vitamin C from the provisions supplied.
Value laden decisions by government bureaucrats are denying a vital
element to American society. The societal belief that the total removal
of religion from public schools is destructive to education is illustrated
graphically in the growth of Protestant Christian schools, home schooling,
and the present pressure for a constitutional amendment addressing school
prayer. The sensible approach suggested in this Article is educationally
sound and consistent with the Constitution and likely to lead to a slowing
of the segregation of civil society btween schools and religious citizens.
American society is rapidly segregating over religious issues. Strong
support by conservative Christians swept the Republicans to a landslide
victory in the November, 1994, Congressional elections.'
The
Republican-controlled Congress, through its "Contract with America,"6
seems duty bound to address the prospect of a constitutional amendment
authorizing prayer in the public schools.7 Whatever one may think of

producing relatively stable families upon which society depends for ordered liberty. By comparison,
moral conditions have deteriorated to the point that society today is losing its ability to generate
respect for the law and is reaching a saturation point in its ability to house its criminals.
Furthermore, McCollum, being one of the first cases in the Establishment Clause area, reflected an
aggressive separationist attitude which has proven unworkable in practice; this is being recognized
by current justices. Perhaps the term "conditioning factors," as used in 1 HAROLD LASSWELL &
MYRES S. McDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY: STUDIES IN LAW, SCIENCE AND

POLICY 277-296 (1992), would be a preferable term since it recognizes the broad multiplicity of
processes and value choices which lead up to, and determine, any particular decision.
5. See David S. Broder, Congress: To the Right, March, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 9, 1994,
at A13; Michael Shanahan, Religious Conservatives are Taking the Credit for Big Republican
Landslide, HOUSTCON CHRON., Nov. 19, 1994, at 3; Kurt Chandler, Christian Coalition Director
Revels in GOP Victory, STAR-TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Jan 28, 1995, at 5B; Jay Grant, Did
Attack on the Religious Right Backfire?, ORANGE COUNTY REG. (Cal.), Nov. 17, 1994, at B6.
6. On September 27, 1994, more than 300 Republican candidates signed the Contract with
America. Contractwith America Gingrich Rallies GOP to Take House, ATLANTA J.& CONST., Sept.
27, 1994, at A5.
7. While the Republican "Contract with America" does not call for a constitutional
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the wisdom of amending the Constitution for this purpose, the fact
remains that a large and passionate group of Americans has felt such an
amendment necessary for over thirty years! This group's frustration has
led to the perception that the federal government is insensitive to the
desires of the people. This sentiment was powerfully voiced on the
November 8th, 1994 ballot.
The United States Supreme Court, in McCollum9 and its progeny,
has erected an artificial "wall of separation" between church and state.
This wall, like the Berlin Wall, must fall of its own weight, either by
constitutional amendment or by fiat of the Supreme Court. This Article
will argue that the wall of separation fundamentally misconceives the role
of religion in the American social and legal systems, at its inception as
well as today. The Article will bring under close scrutiny the premises
on which leading cases rest, and will suggest a remedy that would bring
religion back into public schools, at parents' choice and under their
control.
Overturning the prayer decisions through a constitutional
amendment may have the effect of unraveling fifty years of constitutional
jurisprudence relating to the religion clauses. It should be noted that
these prayer decisions"° came after nearly fifteen years of constitutional
development in the First Amendment Religion Clause area. Perhaps the
few Establishment Clause decisions preceding the 1962 and 1963 prayer
decisions were only a preliminary exploration of the First Amendment;
the individual situations addressed were not of individual significance or
did not relate to the heart of the Establishment Clause objectives. These
pre-1963 cases could therefore be reviewed to determine whether changed

amendment authorizing prayer in public schools, the Republican leadership openly endorsed the
concept. However, as discussion on the contract has become more intense, social and cultural issues
such as the prayer amendment has been put on hold, See Stephen Green, Vote on School-Prayer
Issue Shelved, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. Jan. 7, 1995, at Al.
8. Steve McFarland, director of the Center for Law and Religious Freedom, a division of the
Christian Legal Society, has stated that the organization's position that, while state mandated prayer
should be avoided, the perceived hostility of government toward religion necessitates a constitutional
amendment to recognize and protect the right of religious students to express their views freely with
other persons. CLS Seeks Broader Protectionfor Student Religious Expression, 15 CHRISTIAN LEGAL
Soc'Y. Q., Winter 1994, at 16. Statistical support for prayer is tied to the way the survey question
is phrased. When the question is whether students should be allowed to pray in school, the result
is as high as 80%. When the question is whether students should be required to participate in prayer,
the result can be as low as 17%. Questions relating to moments of silence draw a 60% approval.
See ROBERT BOSTON, WHY THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT IS WRONG ABOUT SEPARATION OF CHURCH &
STATE 112-113 (1993).

9. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
10. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); School Dist. of Abington Township v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
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facts, circumstances, or understandings of facts have since rendered the
decisions obsolete and in need of reflection. One case on point is
McCollum," a 1948 decision dealing with a program allowing schools
to set aside a period of time each week for voluntary, parental sponsored
religious instruction. This practice was held unconstitutional because the
Court perceived that the state -was involved in coercing and regulating
attendance at the schools. 2
Reconsidering McCollum may simply be a recognition that, in an
increasingly pluralistic society, separating religious and secular influences
is impossible, and that keeping religion in a second class status is
equivalent to establishing non-religion. Citizens desire to pass their
culture on to their children; the institutions of society are established to
facilitate that desire. A large segment of American society views the
public school as a hindrance to that process. Many have left the publicsystem 3 for privately operated Christian schools,14 while others have
opted for home schooling.
Radical changes over the past forty years in the United States' social
structure have resulted in a need to review McCollum. One may go
further and charge that the social structure is breaking down or is in a
state of collapse. The family, which has been viewed as the building
block of society, is giving way to assaults from a variety of directions.
Today, unmarried women account for nearly 30% of all births. 5 More

I.
333 U.S. 203 (1948).
12. Id. at 209-10.
13. Regrettably, the superintendent of a highly progressive and well financed school system
in a planned community, when asked by the author whether the new community school system had
made any response to the religious needs of students, stated that they did not expect many
fundamentalist students because of the economics of the community. Personal discussion in
Columbus, Ohio, July 1993. In other words, housing costs and taxes would screen the community
from religious demands in the school system. The school authorities simply were not concerned with
losing religious students.
14. In 1991, 3.3 million school-age children (approximately 10% of all school-age children)
were being educated outside of public schools. These students included 2.5 million students in
Roman Catholic schools (down from 5.7 million students in 1964), 400,000 students in preparatory
schools, 300,000 students in home schooling, 50,000 students in Afrocentric schools, and 25,000
students in for-profit schools. Thomas Toch et al., The Exodus, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 9,
1991, at 66-77. See, Dennis P. Doyle, The Storm Before the Lull: The Future of Private Schooling
in America in CHALLENGE TO AMERICAN SCHOOLS, THE CASE FOR STANDARDS AND VALUES 147-69
(JOHN H. BUNZEL ED., 1985); JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS, THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE
AMERICA, 198-211 (1990) (discussing alternatives to public schools).
15.

WILLIAM J. BENNETT, THE INDEX OF LEADING CULTURAL INDICATORS: FACTS AND

46 (1994). Lee Rainwater of Harvard University
has predicted that the rate will be 40% by the year 2000. Congressional testimony of Lee Rainwater,
Harvard University, in George Will, The Tragedy ofIllegitimacy,WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 1993, at C7.
See also Himmelfarb, infra note 285 and accompanying text. See generally STATISTICAL RECORD
OF CHILDREN (Linda Schmittroth ed., 1994)
FIGURES ON THE STATE OF AMERICAN SOCIETY
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than 50% of all marriages end in divorce. 6 Arrest rates for juvenile
violent crimes increased from 137 per 100,000 in 1965 to 430.6 per
100,000 in 1990."7
Legal abortion terminated over 1,700,000
pregnancies in 1991." Suicide is the second leading cause of death
Social ills are exacerbated by the increasing
among teenagers."
disparity between rich and poor. These trends continue despite record
levels of social spending which leave more and more people in
poverty.2"
Schools are struggling with problems they are not equipped to
handle.2 Teachers in 1940, prior to McCollum, reported that talking out
of turn, chewing gum, making noise, running in the halls, cutting in line,
dress code violations, and littering were the top disciplinary problems.2 2
By 1990 the list had changed to include drug abuse, alcohol abuse,
pregnancy, suicide, rape, robbery, and assault.2 3 In his highly influential
1993 Wall Street Journal opinion piece,24 Charles Murray. commented
on the problem of illegitimate births. Murray noted that in the 1960s
Daniel Patrick Moynihan had predicted the emergence of a black
underclass as the result of an illegitimacy rate approaching 26%.5
Moynihan felt that the lack of fathers to rear and restrain children would
cause crime rates in black communities to skyrocket. By 1990, the
illegitimacy rate of blacks had increased in excess of 65%.26 Murray's
piece pointed out that white illegitimacy was approaching 23% and that

16. See BENNE~r, supra note 15, at 59 (citing National Commission on Children, Just the
Facts: A Summary of Recent Information on America's Children and Their Families (1993)).
17. Id. at 29.
18. Id. at 68. Eighty-one percent of all abortions are performed on women 29 years old and
under, and 81% are performed on women who are single, divorced, separated or widowed. Id. at
69.
19. Id. at 78. The rate of suicide increased from 3.6 per 100,000 in 1960 to 11.3 per 100,000
among teenagers between 15 and 19 years old. Id.
20. BENNETT, supra note 15, at 119-23.
21. For example, Education Secretary Richard Riley, Department of Health and Human
Services Secretary Donna E. Shalala, and national drug czar Lee Brown recently released a report
showing increasing drug use among school-age children. They reported that 13% of eighth grade
children acknowledged the use of marijuana in the last year. Graeme Zielinski, Drug Use Among
Students on Rise Again, Study Says, HOUSTON CHRON., Dec. 13, 1994, at Al. See also James Q.
Wilson, A New Approach to Welfare Reform: Humility, WALL ST. J., Dec. 29, 1994, at A10.
22. BENNETT, supra note 15, at 83.
23. Id.
24. Charles Murray, The Coming White Underclass,WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 1993, atA14. The
article is discussed in Charles Murray, Society Cannot Tolerate Illegitimacy, ST. Louis POSTDISPATCH, Dec. 20, 1993, at 7B.
25. Murray, supra note 24.
26. Id.
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the emergence of the white underclass would threaten the broader
community. 7
These serious social problems have undoubtedly contributed to a
deterioration in the performance of public school students. Over the last
thirty years American youths have exhibited a decline in SAT scores and
other standard measures of performance.2" During the same time, the
resources made available to public schools increased dramatically. 9 In
1960, the average per-student expenditure was $2,035 (in constant 1990
dollars); by 1990, the per-student expenditure had increased to $5,247." 0
As a result, the public system is under increasing criticism for its inability
to solve the numerous social ills affecting the young in society.
Many solutions have been posed for the problems. These range
from pragmatic suggestions of beginning sex education at the
kindergarten level, to distributing condoms in schools, to placing metal
detectors and police in the hallways. One solution that has not been
considered is to call for assistance from the religious institutions that have
traditionally provided the moral training of the community.3 Such a

27.

According to Murray:
[I] the proportion of fatherless boys in a given community were to reach such
levels, surely the culture must be "Lord of the Flies: writ large, the values of
unsocialized male adolescents made norms - physical violence, immediate gratification
and predatory sex. That is the culture now taking over the black inner city.
My proposition is that illegitimacy is the single most important social problem
of our time - more important than crime, drugs, poverty, illiteracy, welfare or
homelessness - because it drives everything else.
The ethical underpinning for the policies I am about to describe is this: Bringing
a child into the world is the most important thing most human beings ever do.
Bringing a child into the world when one is not emotionally or financially prepared to
be a parent is wrong. The child deserves society's support. The parent does not.
Murray, supra note 24, at AI4. In 1965, then Assistant Secretary of Labor Daniel Patrick Moynihan
(now U.S. Senator from New York) stated:
From the wild Irish slums of the 19th century Eastern seaboard to the riot-tom
suburbs of Los Angeles, there is one unmistakable lesson in American history: A
community that allows a large number of young men to grow up in broken families,
dominated by women, never acquiring any stable relationship to male authority, never
acquiring any rational expectations about the future--that community asks for and gets
chaos.... [In such a society] crime, violence, unrest, unrestrained lashing out at the
whole social structure--these are not only to be expected, they are very nearly
inevitable.
BENNETT, supra note 15, at 53.
28. BENNETr, supra note 15, at 83-84.
29. Id. at 90-91.
30. William J. Bennett, The Index of Leading CulturalIndicators, Mar. 1993, at 21
31. In Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988), the Supreme Court held that a statute
authorizing grants to nonprofit organizations, including religious organizations, for services and
research in the area of premarital adolescent sexual relations and pregnancy was not facially
unconstitutional. Id. at 593. However, use of the grants to promote religious doctrines would be
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solution would permit public schools to facilitate voluntary, parentally
supervised and controlled religious training as a part of the curriculum.
This training would provide a basic consistent value system which, at
least from the standpoint of those values shared by Christians, Jews,
Muslims and a number of other religions, emphasizes personal
responsibility, stable family structures, respect for parents, teachers, and
governmental authorities, respect for the person and property of others,
the sanctity of truth, and the value of work and commitment. That such
a solution has not been considered may be the result of authorities
concluding that religious training in a public school setting would cause
sectarian strife. Others would find that religious training might offend
children who do not share the belief system of the majority. Yet if this
is truly an age of diversity and respect for differing views and cultures,
how can diversity and respect for differing views be seriously taught if
religious views are kept away from the education process? Presently
those who strongly hold religious views are labeled fundamentalists;
anyone holding such views is suspect and a candidate for isolation. This
is not diversity.
The real hurdle to allowing religious training in public schools is the
interpretation of the First Amendment's Establishment Clause, which has
eliminated such training since the Supreme Court first addressed the issue
in 1948.32 At that point, the Supreme Court began its effort to remove
all traces of the Christian religion from the public school. Such decisive
action has created the impression that the Court was making a routine
application of the Establishment Clause. However, it is surprising that
the Establishment Clause was not recognized as applicable to state action
and to such practices until eighty years after the Fourteenth Amendment
was enacted. As a result, more than forty years after the Supreme Court
began applying the Establishment Clause to the states, it continues to
struggle in defining an Establishment Clause jurisprudence, convinced
only of its need to protect school children from any interaction with
religion at the school house.
While the Supreme Court has exhibited a zeal for eliminating
religion from public schools, it has asserted that the public school system
is the chief means by which culture is to be transmitted.
This

unconstitutional. Id. at 609. Both Justices O'Connor and Kennedy concurred in the opinion,
recognizing that participation by religious organizations, while presenting sensitive issues, does not
result in automatic violations of the Constitution. Id. at 623-24. Clearly, this was a more sensitive
participation than the traditional religious efforts in hospitals and soup kitchens as asserted by Justice
Blackmun in dissent. Id. at 640 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
32. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., .333 U.S. 203 (1948).
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combination of principles reflects a simple, but tragic, conclusion that
culture is not dependent on religion and can be developed and transmitted
from generation to generation without a religious basis. Such a
conclusion defies not only the history of civilization in general, but also
the history of the United States. The only major attempt to achieve a
society without religion, the Soviet Union, collapsed from cultural decay
in 1989. 3" If a public school system, totally devoid of religious training,
is viewed as the chief means by which American culture is transmitted
from generation to generation, as the Supreme Court supposes, then
Christians and Jews will have been proven wrong in their 4000 year old
claim that "man shall not live by bread alone, but by every word of
God. , 34
This Article will illustrate how current Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, which seeks to micro-manage the interaction of public
schools and religion, prevents the educational establishment from coming
to grips with American society's religious character and fosters disrespect
by denying the law's dependence on religion as a justification for its
authority. Indeed, the religious foundation of the doctrine of church-state
institutional separation and the support the religious community has given
that doctrine are generally ignored. Recognition of the historical
dependence of law on religion should preclude a jurisprudence that
permits government to monopolize education (an essentially parental
function which traditionally includes a strong religious component),
expels the religious component from education under the guise of
fulfilling a Constitutional mandate designed to protect religion, and then
claims that the public school is the chief means of fulfilling the nation's
destiny. This Article will suggest that permitting voluntary, parentally
controlled religious instruction, as was the case for fifty years preceding
McCollum, offers the promise of -releasing the religious expression
inherently present in the educational process, thus giving full respect to
the dignity and diversity of the cultural and religious heritages present in
American culture.

33. See Pope John Paul II's 1991 encyclical, CentesimusAnnus, in Origins: CNS Documentary
Service, May 16, 1991, Vol. 21: No. 1 at 1,in which he claims that communism's basic flaw was
that it denied the nature of persons reflected in the Christian belief that mankind was created in the
image of God and that an essential part of that image is a degree of economic freedom. The Pope
lived in communist Poland until his elevation to the papacy. Id. at 6.
34. Luke 4:4 (King James). See also Deuteronomy 8:3 (King James). Catholic scholar John
Courtney Murray reached a similar conclusion in 1948 regarding the Court's view of the public
school when he said, "It exists, supposedly, in order to promote democracy. Yet it is constitutionally
forbidden to promote those religious beliefs which are foundations of democracy." John Courtney
Murray, A Common Enemy, A Common Cause, FIRST THINGS, Oct. 1992, at 35.
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PART A: Law, Culture, and Religion
1. Introduction to PART A.
If American society is as overwhelmingly involved in religion as
many people have suggested,35 how has it come about that this society
is attempting to educate its children in an environment sanitized against
religion? To answer this question we must look to the ground from
which our culture and law developed.
Doctrines of government, culture, and law are more than the decision
of the lawgiver. They represent fundamental values, transmitted from
generation to generation, held by a people and reflected in their culture.
Whether the government should determine which values are transmitted
is, of course, an important question. However, it is largely a moot
question, since, by accepting responsibility. for the education of the
young, government dominates the institution that the Supreme Court
credits as being "the very foundation of good citizenship [and] a principal
instrument in awakening the child to cultural values.., and in helping
him to adjust normally to his environment."36 The wellsprings of our
legal system and culture must be explored to determine whether, and the
extent to which, religion can be shown to be a private or a public matter.
The education of the child will determine the future of the country, or in
the Supreme Court's parlance, "our common destiny." Whether that
future is prosperous and whether liberty is maintained will depend largely
upon how religion and government resolve the conflict involving the
nature of elementary and secondary school education. In the process of
examining these points, the following questions must be addressed:
1.. Can a democratic government. be maintained without the
support of a commonly acknowledged religious value system?
2.

Can a religious value system be established and maintained
without involving the educational system at the elementary and
secondary levels?

35. Tocqueville stated: "Upon my arrival in the United States, the religious aspect of the
country was the first thing that struck my attention; and the longer I stayed there the more did I
perceive the great political consequences resulting from this state of things, to which I was
unaccustomed." ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA in SYDNEY E. AHLSTROM, A
RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 386 (1972).

36.

Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
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Do the Supreme Court decisions under the First Amendment
Establishment Clause prevent the state and local governments
from accommodating the teaching of a religious value system
as part of the regular educational program in the elementary
and secondary schools?

While definitive answers to these questions are not possible, this
Article will argue that a general religious agreement as to the nature of
a moral and just society is necessary in order to support a democratic
government. Democratic government that is built on the consent of the
governed and that promotes individual freedom depends on a population
that voluntarily and continually submits to the law of the land; this
submission must be out of a personal conviction rather than out of a fear
of reprisal from the lawgiver. Further, the public school system, charged
with educating ninety percent of the school children in the United States
and built on the premise that religious training is unnecessary to the
educational process, cannot be expected to infuse the degree of
commitment and civic responsibility required to maintain a democratic
government. Finally, numerous Supreme Court decisions have sought to
enforce a strict separationist view of the Establishment Clause,
particularly with respect to situations involving elementary and secondary
schools, thereby promoting the secularization of the educational system.
2. Religion Determines Culture
The history of the United States is the history of a people struggling
to achieve religious aspirations. Therefore, an American culture void of
religious expression, as the school system is expected to transmit, is a
contradiction in terms. Tocqueville saw the United States as a county
where religion was a part of every public act.37 The culture of a society
underlies its law and structure of government, and law is only important
to the extent it relates to the people with which it interacts. "The words
culture and cultivate share the same root, cultus, and.., this Latin word

37. Tocqueville stated:
Religion in America takes no direct part in the government of society, but nevertheless
it must be regarded as the foremost of the political institutions of that country; for if
it does not impart a taste for freedom, it facilitates the use of free institutions. [i] am
certain that they hold it to be indispensable to the maintenance of republican
institutions. This opinion is not peculiar to a class of citizen or to a party, but it
belongs to the whole nation, and to every rank of society.
TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 35, at 386.
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derived from the verb, colere, that meant both to worship and to till the
soil."38 Russell Kirk notes that:
In the beginning culture arises from the cult: that is, people are joined
together in worship, and out of their religious association grows the
organized human community. Common cultivation of crops, common
defense, common laws, cooperation in much else--these are the
rudiments of a people's culture. If that culture succeeds, it may grow
into a civilization.3
To consider the impact of religion on American culture and law, the
work of well known sociologist Robert Bellah must be examined. In his
book, The Broken Covenant,4" Bellah explores the Puritan view of
"covenant," around which the cultural heritage of America developed.
Bellah is concerned with the implications of that concept on law; he
contrasts the original religious concept of government in the colonies with
the current utilitarian view of government. He concludes that the loss of
religious commitment has caused a crisis in identity:
[T]he liberal utilitarian model was not the fundamental religious and
moral conception of America, open as the latter was in certain
directions to the development of that model.
That original
conception, which has never ceased to be operative, was based on an
imaginative religious and moral conception of life that took account
of a much broader range of social, ethical, aesthetic, and religious
needs than the utilitarian model can deal with. 4
Bellah goes on to warn of the grave situation being faced at the end of
the twentieth century:
Without arguing for the literal revival of that earlier conception, I
hope to show that only a new imaginative, religious, moral, and social
context for science and technology will make it possible to weather
the storms that seem to be closing in on us in the late 20th century.
I am convinced that the continued and increased dominance of the
complex of capitalism, utilitarianism, and the belief that the only road
to truth is science will rapidly lead to the destruction of American

38. E.C. Beisner, The Double-Edged SwordofMulticulturalism,THE FREEMAN, Mar. 1994,
at 104. Beisner refers to T.S. Eliot, NOTES TOWARDS THE DEFINITION OF CULTURE (1949).
39. RUSSELL KiRK, AMERICA'S BRITISH CULTURE (1993), quoted in Beisner, supra note 38,
at 104.
40.

ROBERT N. BELLAH, THE BROKEN COVENANT (2d

relies heavily on this work.
41. Id. at xxi (emphasis added).

ed. 1992). The following discussion
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society, or possibly in an effort to stave off destruction, to a technical
tyranny of the "brave new world ' " variety.42
In colonial times, the culture, institutions, form of government, and
Constitution of the United States were deeply rooted in the religious
heritage.43 Adopting Rousseau's term "civil religion," Bellah traces the
history of the country from its first settlements. He develops the religious
(Biblical) motifs which have been used to shape the country's history and
bind its people together in a common destiny. From the standpoint of the
American myth, he considers the period from the Declaration of
Independence to the inauguration of George Washington as the "origin
time of the nation." He points out that our bicentennial celebration
commenced in 1976, commemorating the Declaration of Independence,
rather than in 1789, commemorating the adoption of the Constitution.
The adoption of the Declaration of Independence was the crucial date that
effectively bound the people together in the act of revolution. The
Declaration contains the following four direct religious references:
It refers to the "Laws of Nature and of Nature's God." '
It states that "all men are created equal, that they are endowed
by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights."45
It appeals to the "Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude
of our intentions. 4 6
It states a 47"firm reliance on the protection of divine
Providence.

1.
2.
3.
4.

This civil religion is strongly engraved on the American Conscience.
George Washington could be viewed as the American Moses leading the
American Israel through the wilderness of the revolutionary war. If such
a thought seems far-fetched, consider Jefferson's words in his second
inaugural address:
I shall need, too, the favor of that Being in whose hands we are, who
led our fathers, as Israel of old, from their native land and planted
them4 in a country flowing with all the necessaries and comforts of
life.

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
Id. at 3. See also supra note 50.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. I (U.S. 1776).
Id. at para. 2.
Id. at para. 23.
Id.
THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 414 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1943,) cited in BELLAH, supra note
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Or consider Lincoln's second inaugural address:
If we shall suppose that American slavery is one of those offenses
which, in the providence of God, must needs come, but which, having
continued through His appointed time, He now wills to remove, and
that He gives to both North and South this terrible war as the woe due
to those by whom the offense came, shall we discern therein any
departure from those divine attributes which believers in a living God
always ascribe to Him? Fondly do we hope, fervently do we pray,
that this mighty scourge of war may speedily pass away. Yet, if God
wills that it continue until all the wealth piled by the bondsman's two
hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and until
every drop of blood drawn with the lash shall be paid by another
drawn with the sword, as was said three thousand years ago, so still
it must be said "the judgments of the Lord are true and righteous
altogether." 49
The Biblical motifs still stir the nation even into the late twentieth
century, calling Americans to their highest vision. Recent examples
include Martin Luther King's speech in 1968, when he placed himself in
the character of Moses, seeing the Promised land from afar, yet knowing
King was convinced that African
he will not enter it personally.
join
hands
with white Americans in that
Americans would one day
land.' President Clinton tapped the Biblical motif with the phrase
"Where there is no vision, the people perish" 2 in his acceptance speech
at the Democratic National Convention in 1992."3 He began to develop
the theme of a "new covenant" for his campaign, which is also a common
Biblical theme. Furthermore, national holidays, such as Memorial Day,

40, at 24-25.
49. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, SPEECHES AND WRITINGS, 1859-1865, at 689 (Don E. Fehrenbacher
ed., 1989).
50. Rev. King stated:
Well, I don't know what will happen now .... Like anybody, I would like to have a long
life .... I just want to do God's will. And he's allowed me to go up to the mountain. And
I've looked over, and I've seen the promised land. I may not get there with you, but I want
you to know tonight that we as a people will get to the promised land. So I'm happy tonight.
I'm not worried about anything. I'm not fearing any man. Mine eyes have seen the glory of
the coming of the Lord.
Speech in Memphis, Apr. 3, 1968 (the day before King was assassinated), in N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4,
1968, at 24, reprinted in, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF MODERN QUOTATIONS 121 (Tony Augarde
ed., 1991). Compare Numbers 27:12-14 with Deuteronomy 34:1-6 (King James).
51. Martin Luther King (Aug. 23, 1963), reprinted in WILLIAM SAFIRE, GREAT SPEECHES IN
HISTORY 499 (1992).
52. Proverbs29:18 (King James). The President did not complete the parallel thought in the
same verse, "but he that keepeth the law, happy is he." Id.
53. Place Called Hope, L.A. TIMES, July 17, 1992, at AIO.
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remind the people to rededicate themselves to the national vision by
remembering the sacrifices that were made to establish freedom of the
country. Religion has had a profound, if not determining, effect on
American culture and, ultimately, its legal system.
Yet, the author Bellah is troubled.
He suggests that the
Constitutional aspirations of equality and justice have never been fully
achieved,5 4 and calls for a renewal of the efforts to achieve them."
Bellah warns that such aspirations are never achieved without strong
religious commitment and support.56 In the late twentieth century, the
disintegration of the religious influence in society has reached
uncontrollable proportions.57 As a result, he predicts a crisis in
America.58 The dimensions of that crisis will be discussed, but first the
subject of religion will be taken up. The question will be asked, is
religion important to law?
3. Religion and Law Interact
Religion is crucial to the ability of a free society to "establish
Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense,
promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to
ourselves and our Posterity."59 Government can be effective in only two
ways: government will enforce its decrees either by external force (i.e.
the force of reason or the sword) or by the internal control of the
conscience (i.e. enforcement by reliance on the good will and willingness
of the people to follow its mandates).6" But what does it take to
develop such good will and willingness, and how is it instilled in a
citizenry?
Prominent comparative law scholar and legal historian, Harold
Berman6 analyzes the historical context in which the Western legal
54. See BELLAH, supra note 40, at 100-104. As examples of areas in which inequality and
injustices still prevail, Bellah cites African-Americans, other minorities, and the poor. Id.
55. BELLAH, supra note 40, at 151.
56. Id.at 162.
57. Id.at 142 ("Today the American civil religion is an empty and broken shell.").
58. Id.at 85.
59. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
60. Jesus of Nazareth admonished his followers to "[riender therefore unto Caesar the things
which are Caesar's; and unto God the things that are God's." Matthew 22:21 (King James). In
doing so he established the principle ofgoveming primarily through conscience. George Washington
acknowledged that the republican form of government adopted by the United States was fit only for
a people controlled by conscience (meaning a religious people). President Washington, Farewell
Address (Sept. 17, 1796), reprinted in SAFIRE, supra note 51, at 362 (1992).
61. Harold Berman is the Robert W. Woodruff Professor of Law at Emory Law School and
the James Barr Ames Professor of Law, emeritus, at Harvard Law School. He is well known for his
work in the area of comparative law.
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tradition developed and grew principally through the interaction of law
and religion.6 2 After describing this relationship, he expresses his
concern that, due to the radical separation of law and religion in the
western world, law will eventually lose its respectability.6 3
In light of Berman's prediction, it is necessary to determine the role
religion has played in the development of the Western legal tradition, the
American legal tradition in particular. If that tradition is built on a
religious foundation, it will be necessary to assess the extent to which
religion has influenced law, and to determine whether such a foundation
must be maintained. It is generally acknowledged that, in the twentieth
century, jurisprudence has moved away from any religious foundation and
toward a reliance on decisions of the law giving bodies. Religion has
been privatized and radically separated from the public forum and
decision-making apparatus of government. Nevertheless, if religion is a
vital component in the resolution of society's problems, it may be
necessary for the public school system to serve as a vehicle to facilitate
religious value training. If so, then the Supreme Court's Establishment
Clause decisions may be implicated.
a. The American Legal System
Western law developed out of the Christian heritage.64 Initially, it
is important to recognize that the distinctive features 65 of the Western
legal tradition originated around 1075 with the Gregorian Revolution of
1075-1 122.66 The Revolution made it possible for the Roman Church
to create a separate corporate, hierarchical church, independent of the
secular authorities and subject only to the Bishop of Rome.67 Within

62. See HAROLD J. BERMAN, THE INTERACTION OF LAW AND RELIGION (1974) [hereinafter
INTERACTION].

63. Id. at 73-76.
64. The doctrine of religious liberty embodied in the First Amendment is a prime example of
a governmental principle which was as much the product of theologians as lawyers and philosophers.
See also infra note 75 and accompanying text.
65. Such features include, among others, the belief in the capacity of law to grow, the
supremacy of law over political authorities, and the plurality of coterminous jurisdictions. See
HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION

9-10 (1983).
66. INTERACTION, supranote 62, at 57. Prior to that time the relationship between the secular
and the sacred had been overlapping. Id. This was true throughout the Holy Roman Empire, which
was inaugurated in 800 A.D. with the crowning of Charlemagne. S.M. HOUGHTON, SKETCHES FROM
CHURCH HISTORY 32 (1980).

67. This event is also known as the "investiture controversy" because it involved the assertion
of church authority to appoint church officials as against secular rulers. Berman states:
In the latter part of eleventh and first part of the twelfth century, there took place in the
West a great revolution which resulted in the formation of a visible, corporate,
hierarchical church, a legal entity independent of emperors, kings, and feudal lords, and
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the church, a systematized body of law developed including criminal law,
family law, inheritance law, property law, and contract law. 68 This early
system of law formed the common foundation, or more specifically a
common language, of Western law.
The next major influence on the development of Western law was
the Protestant Reformation and its belief in the power, indeed duty, of the
individual to create new social organizations.6 9 Protestant thought was
expressed in Lutheran and Calvinistic forms."0 Of particular importance
for English and American law was the Calvinistic form of
Protestantism. 71 The Puritans in particular asserted a duty of Christians
to reform the world and in carrying out this duty, incurred the hostility
of the English crown. The Puritans' resistance "laid the foundations for

subordinate to the absolute monarchical authority of the bishop of Rome.. . . It led
to the creation of a new kind of law for the church as well as new kinds of law for the
various secular kingdoms.
INTERACTION, supra note 62, at 56.
68. Id. at 58. Berman states"
[Tihere had been ecclesiastical canons long before . . . . However, there was no
systematized body of ecclesiastical law, criminal law, family law, inheritance law,
property law, or contract law, such as was created by the canonists of the twelfth and
thirteenth centuries. The canon law of the later Middle Ages, which only today, eight
centuries later, is being called into question by some leading Roman Catholics
themselves, was the first modem legal system of the West and it prevailed in every
country of Europe.
Id. at 57-58. Berman further observed:
The success of the canon law stimulated secular authorities to create their own
professional courts and professional legal literature, to transform tribal, local, and feudal
custom, and to create their own rival legal systems to govern feudal property relations,
crimes of violence, mercantile transactions, and many other matters.
Id. at 59.
69. As stated by Berman:
The key to the renewal of law in the West from the sixteenth century on was the
Protestant concept of the power of the individual, by God's grace, to change nature and
to create new social relations through the exercise of his will. The Protestant concept
of the individual will became central to the development of the modem law of property
and contract.
Id. at 64-65.
70. INTERACTION, supra note 62, at 66.
71. The Calvinistic form included English Puritans, Scotch Presbyterians, and Dutch Reformed.
Their influence was felt in the colonies of the new world in the seventeenth century. This Article
does not explore the nuances between these sects, but focuses more particularly on the influence of
English Puritans. See infra note 72.
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the English and American law of civil rights and civil liberties"7
expressed in their respective constitutions.
From the mid-sixteenth century through the seventeenth century,
Calvinist theologians labored to develop the concept of covenant as an
organizing principle of all human and divine relationships. The covenant
idea was used to unify the two testaments (covenants) of the Bible and
to develop the concepts of ecclesiastical, civil (e.g. marriage,
government)73 and other appropriate relationships. Marriage is an
example of the application of religious covenants to society. In 1525 one
of the reformers "spoke of marriage as 'a most holy covenant' and
perhaps inaugurated the great change in marriage theology which came
when covenant replaced sacrament as the determinative element of
marriage thought."74 This shift to a covenant emphasis view of
marriage elevated the status of marriage and the family, but also
introduced the possibility of divorce.
Puritan literature also demonstrates an intense interest in the
relationship of religion to government. Puritans were notorious for

72. INTERACTION, supra note 62, at 67. According to Berman:
[The Puritans] added two new elements: first, a belief in the duty of Christians to reform the
world... and second, a belief in the local congregation, under its elected minister and elders,
as the seat of truth .... As the early Christian martyrs... the seventeenth-century Puritans
.. . by their open disobedience to English law laid the foundations for the English and
American law of civil rights and civil liberties as expressed in our respective Constitutions:
freedom of speech and press, free exercise of religion, the privilege against self-incrimination,
the independence of the jury from judicial dictation, the right not to be imprisoned without
cause, and many other such rights and freedoms. We also owe to Calvinist congregationalism
the religious basis of our concepts of social contract and government by consent of the
governed.
Id. at 66-67.
73. For most law students, the concept of covenant is unknown. Nevertheless, early religious
covenants were used as a model for civil covenants under which communities in the American
colonial period operated. Examples are the Mayflower Compact of 1620 and the Pilgrim Code of
Law of 1636. The latter, which incorporates the Mayflower Compact and the colonial grant from
the King of England, added a description of political institutions and became the first constitution
in the colonies. Consider that, by 1636, John Locke was only four years old.
74. Charles J. Butler, Religious Liberty and Covenant Theology 29 (1979) (unpublished PhD
dissertation, Temple University) (on file with the author). Dr. Butler states:
[T]he heavy covenant emphasis on consent -- '. . . the partners must throughout their life
together continually renew their consent' -- broke the indissolubility based on the sacramental
view and opened the door to divorce once consent failed, as in the cases of adultery or willful
desertion. It also reversed the traditional order of marriage purposes by emphasizing Genesis
2:18. Procreation, remedy for sin, and mutual society became mutual society, procreation, and
remedy for sin. The family created by the marriage covenant was "welded . . . into a
solidarity in Christ: through the Covenant of Grace's baptismal formula -- "to you and to your
children"; and since the Church and State were considered to be composed of families rather
than individuals, it became "the clearinghouse through which revisions in other institutions
were mediated.
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advocating personal liberties against the English Crown. This advocacy
provided an impetus for the development of such basic civil rights
concepts as the privilege against self incrimination and the right to be
free from ex post facto acts.75
The concept of "religious liberty"76 and its offspring, the doctrine
of separation of church and state, developed out of a gradual maturing of
covenant thought during the seventeenth century."
Puritan Roger
Williams (1603-1683) had established religious liberty in the Rhode
Island colony by the mid-seventeenth century. He believed that religious
liberty was necessary to protect the church from the encroachments of
government. Is it possible that Roger Williams, operating from a
Christian perspective, is the intellectual father of the First Amendment?
Many consider John Locke to be the intellectual source of the religion
clauses in the Constitution. However, Locke received his ideas from
Puritan sources, which he arguably did not credit because English society
after the Revolution of 1689 was no longer receptive to Puritan
thought.78

75. As stated by Berman:
[The Puritan] experience ... was ... crucial ... in the development ... of constitutional
principles of civil rights ....They asserted a right to refuse to testify against themselves in
criminal proceedings, and a right not to be prosecuted for an act that had not previously been
declared to be criminal. They objected to excessive bail, excessive fines, cruel and unusual
punishments, the presumption of guilt, the subjection of the jury to the will of the judge, royal
interference in adjudication, and torture. They objected to these on principle: first, that they
were against the will of God; second, that they violated "the ancient constitution," the common
law of former times--that is, before the Tudor-Stuart monarch had assumed supremacy over
the church.
Harold J. Berman, Law and Belief in Three Revolutions, 18 VAL. U. L. REV. 569, 606-07 (1984),
reprinted in FAITH AND ORDER: THE RECONCILIATION OF LAW AND RELIGION 83, 118-19 (1993).
76. This is the preferred term because it focuses on the true purpose of the doctrine, which is
to protect religion.
77. Butler, supra note 74. Dr. Butler develops the relationship between religious liberty and
seventeenth century covenant theology. He posits that as covenant theology developed, the religious
view of the church/state relationship developed from one of intolerance (John Calvin, Theodore Beza,
Samuel Rutherford, and John Cotton - stressing religious unity) to toleration (John Owen, Philip
Mornay, Johannus Althusius, and John Selden - stressing religious peace) to religious liberty (John
Goodwin, Roger Williams, Henry Vane the Younger, and Richard Overton - stressing religious
purity). Id. at v-vi.
78. Winthrop S. Hudson, John Locke: Heir of Puritan PoliticalTheorists, in CALVINISM AND
THE POLITICAL ORDER 108 (George L. Hunt ed., 1965). As stated by historian Hudson:
Where did Locke derive his political ideas? With regard to his general political principles one
need not look far. They were being shouted from the housetops during the years he was at
Westminster and Oxford, and they had been explicated again and again by the sons of Geneva
with whom he was in contact throughout his life ....
[Puritan] thinking is familiar to anyone who has read Locke's Letter concerning Toleration,
for Locke did no more than restate the argument that had been fashioned by Independent
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The standard law school curriculum gives students a basic familiarity
with Western legal tradition from the time of the Constitution, but often
conveys the impression that religion played little or no part in the process
of drafting the Constitution or the Bill of Rights. Justice Brennan, in his
lengthy concurring opinion in Schempp,79 refers to Locke, Jefferson, and
Roger Williams as the sources of our ideas of religious liberty. Jefferson
however, relied on Locke, and Locke on Williams."0
Therefore,
religious liberty was the flower of Christian thought which bore fruit, in
part, through the actions of nonbelievers."' As stated by Justice
Brennan:
When John Locke ventured in 1689, "I esteem it above all things
necessary to distinguish exactly the business of civil government from
that of religion and to settle the just bounds that lie between the one
and the other," he anticipated the necessity which would be thought
by the Framers to require adoption of a First Amendment, but not the
difficulty that would be experienced in defining those "just
bounds." 2
It has rightly been said of the history of the Establishment Clause that "our
tradition of civil liberty rests not only on the secularism of a Thomas
Jefferson but also on the fervent sectarianism ... of a Roger Williams." 3

divines.... The parallels with the thought of Roger Williams, however, are so close that it
is not an entirely implausible conjecture to suggest that Locke's major contribution may have
been to reduce the rambling, lengthy, and incoherent exposition of the New England
"firebrand" to orderly, abbreviated, and coherent form. Beyond a differing emphasis and
concern, it is impossible to discover a single significant difference between the argument set
forth by Williams and that later advanced by Locke. They scarcely differ even in the details
of its practical application.
1d. at 113, 117-18. See also SANFORD COBB, THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA 61
(1968). But see Timothy Hall, Roger Williams and the Foundations of Religious Liberty, 71 B. U.
L. REv. 455, 489, 498 n.173 (1991) (suggesting Hudson's position lacks any direct evidence of
reliance by Locke upon Williams' works).
79. School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 231 (1963).
80. See David Little, Roger Williams and the Separation of Church and State, in RELIGION
AND THE STATE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF LEO PFEFFER 3, 7 (J. Wood ed., 1985) (suggesting that
Locke's ideas were developed by Puritan Independents like John Milton, John Owen, John Goodwin,
and Henry Stubbe, as well as Roger Williams).
81. Few Christians today adhere to the doctrine of predestination as held by such theologians
as Augustine, Martin Luther, John Calvin, Jonathan Edwards and others. Nevertheless, the doctrine
of predestination was the foundation upon which Roger Williams built his doctrine of religious
liberty. See Little, supranote 80, at 12. Little shows how the influence of Roger Williams mediated
through John Locke to Thomas Jefferson and through Baptist political activist Isaac Backus into the
thought of Revolutionary America. Id. at 7-16.
82. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 231.
83. Id. at 259-60 (citing FREUND, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 84 (1961)).
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In crediting Williams and Locke, it is also proper to credit French
lawyer turned theologian, John Calvin, a major contributor to the concept
of the modem state with its system of representative government and
individual liberties.84 Calvin's program for the civil state in Geneva,
which began in 1536, was the experiment that fired the flames of liberty
in England, Scotland, Holland, and, ultimately, New England.85 At the
time of Calvin's arrival in Geneva, that city was much like other
protestant cities. The religious reforms introduced by other reformers
(e.g., Martin Luther in Germany and Ulrich Zwingli in Switzerland) did
not include the establishment of an organized church, and the Roman
Catholic Church still maintained the medieval theory of the supremacy of
the church over the state.8 6 Into this void stepped John Calvin, with a
desire to develop consistent theories of church and state that would
acknowledge God as sovereign, as well as the power of government
mediated through the people and for the benefit of the people.8 7 He
established a representative government responsive to the people, yet
subject to the written standards of the Word of God and the contracts
(e.g., covenants and constitutions) between the people and government
institutions. In this way the church government could serve as a check
against arbitrary power. Coupled with Calvin's insistence on the
independence of the church from civil authorities, this balance formed the
model that could be used as a standard for civil government.

84. Calvin, of course, developed many of his concepts from the work of others. See BELLAH
supra note 40, at 17.
85. See Herbert Foster, Calvin 'sProgrammefora PuritanState in Geneva, 1536-1541, HARV.
THEOLOGICAL REV. (1908), reprinted in, COLLECTED PAPERS OF HERBERT D. FOSTER 30-76
(privately printed, 1929) [hereinafter Calvin's Programme].
86. Id. at 43. Foster quotes a German scholar who made the following observation of Luther:
"Luther, when he had preached and sowed the seed of the Word, left to the Holy Spirit the care of
producing the fruit, while with his friend Philip he peacefully drank his glass of Wittenberg beer."
Id.
87. It is unfortunate that Calvin's contribution to republican government and other areas is
overshadowed by his involvement in the execution of Michael Servetus, an individual who spread
non-Trinitarian doctrine in Geneva. Prior to coming to Geneva, Servetus had barely escaped the
executioner in France for his beliefs. One can only regret that John Calvin's thinking was not ahead
of his time on this important subject as it was in so many other areas.
Calvin's ardent followers included New England's Roger Williams, as well as Scotch
Presbyterians who flooded the Colonies in the early eighteenth century and provided strong support
for non-establishment of religion as well as for principles of representative government. See, e.g.,
Samuel W. Calhoun, Conviction Without Imposition: A Response to ProfessorGreenawalt,IX J. LAW
& RELIG. 293-98 (1992). See also JOHN CALVIN, INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION in 5 THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 44-45 (P. Kurland & R. Lerner eds., 1987) (discussing the role of civil
and ecclesiastical bodies). For Clavin's classic statement on resistance to tyranny through people's
representatives, see John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion IV, xx, 31, noted in Calvin's
Programme, supra, note 85, at 77.

COMETH THE REVOLUTION

Through Locke there filtered to the American Revolution
five points of political Calvinism held by hundreds of
Calvinists, but clarified through his Civil Government:
fundamental law, natural rights, contract and consent of
people, popular sovereignty, resistance to tyranny through
responsible representatives."8

It is not asserted that Locke, or even the Calvinists, were not
influenced by other sources. Indeed, Calvinists did not claim that their
ideas were fully original.8 9
Religious sources have had a profound effect on the Western legal
tradition. Thus, when a school system places religion in a second class
status, it ignores the deep historical roots of the American experience.
Even Rousseau, in his Social Contract, reflects an understanding of
Calvin's contribution. Rousseau, a child of Geneva, stated:
Those who consider Calvin only as theologian fail to
recognize the breadth of his genius. The editing of our
wise laws, in which he had a large share, does him as
much honor as his Institutes. Whatever revolution time
may bring in our religion, so long as the love of country
and liberty is not extinct among us, the memory of this
man will be held in reverence. 9"

Calvin wed religion to morality and the result was good government,
freedom, prosperity, and social consciousness. From the absolute
sovereignty of God over all men, Calvin deduced man's moral obligation
to society, and a consequent devotion to production and public service as
part of his service to God. 9' The impact of Calvin's Geneva experiment

88. Herbert Foster, InternationalCalvinism Through Locke and the Revolution of 1688, AM.
HiST. REv. (1927), reprintedin COLLECTED PAPERS OF HERBERT D. FOSTER 163 (privately printed,
1929) [hereinafter InternationalCalvinism].
89. Herbert Foster noted:
[Calvinists] built upon the past; but they "took the next step," possibly the most distinguishing
contribution of Calvinism. Ancient and medieval writers had taught fundamental law, natural
rights, contract, sovereignty of the people, obedience to God rather than man. Each of these
teachings Calvinists carried into active resistance through law representatives following a
"calling," ordained of God and responsible, not to "God and the Church," but to "God and the
people." With a possible exception on this point, the contribution of Calvinism was not in
origination, but in (1) carrying theories to logical conclusions; (2) tying them all together into
a workable system; (3) developing the type of people capable of putting them into practice;
(4) demonstrating that their principles work successfully in practice.
Id. at 176-77.
90. Herbert Foster, Liberal Calvinism; the Remonstrants at the Synod of Dort in 1618, HARV.
THEOLOGICAL REv. (1923), reprintedin COLLECTED PAPERS OF HERBERT D. FOSTER 114 (privately

printed, 1929) [hereinafter Liberal Calvinism].
91. See id. at 115. Foster credits Calvin with taking a significant step which opened the door
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carried into the colonies of America. Edmund Burke in 1775 reminded
Parliament that the colonists in America were Englishmen who loved
their liberty. 92 Connecting the English love of freedom with Calvin,
historian, Winthrop Hudson, stated:
While the "love of freedom" had deep and ancient roots in
English society, it had been nurtured and transformed into
a "fierce spirit of liberty" during the first half of the

seventeenth century when the religious issue had come to
the fore and had become inextricably intermingled with the
liberties of Englishmen. During the course of the
constitutional struggle in England it became evident to the

participants that certain theological convictions had definite
political implications .....
Burke described [Calvinistic Protestants] as "the most adverse to all
subjection of mind and opinion."

.

. . It has been said of the early

Calvinists that they feared God so much that they could not fear any
man, be he king or emperor.... When John Knox informed Queen
Mary that "right religion takes neither origin nor authority from

to the development of capitalism by refocusing the church's understanding of usury as follows:
Two examples will illustrate this, Calvin's epoch-making teaching that interest-taking
was lawful and that "ydle money is altogether unprofitable," quoted, translated, and
applied by his followers, and reinforced by his teaching of "calling," resulted in the
extension of credit in the great Calvinistic trading peoples, Scotch, English, Dutch, and
American colonists, and in their enormously increased economic power of production.
It was illustrated more fully in the teachings regarding Sunday and "calling." Man
must not merely rest on Sunday, but must do so in order that he may, like Masterworkman work six days in the week, and "do all his work" in "that estate and calling
which it shall please thee to ordain," where, "however humble his calling, each man
can make his best contribution to the Kingdom of God." Boys and girls brought up on
such prayers from Calvin's Catechism become social assets rather than social liabilities.
On going to work they were taught to pray: "May we faithfully follow our estate and
calling in pursuit of thy ordinance rather than in satisfaction of our ambition to enrich
ourselves; yet if it shall please thee to make our labour to prosper, grant us the goodwill to come to the aid of those in want, according to the power which thou hast given
US."
Id. See also EUGEN VON BOHM-BAWERK, CAPITAL AND INTEREST, V-I at 18-19 (reprinted 1959)
which sets out the theological arguments of religious reformer John Calvin and the legal arguments
of French jurist Dumoulin (Carolus Molinaeus) against the cannonistic prohibition against interest
taking.
92. WINTHROP S. HUDSON, RELIGION IN AMERICA 83 (1965). Burke articulated this
observation as follows:
England, Sir, is a nation which still I hope respects, and formerly adored, her freedom. The
colonists emigrated from you when this part of your character was most predominant; and they
took this bias and direction the moment they parted from your hands. They are therefore not
only devoted to liberty, but to liberty according to English ideals, and on English principles.
THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUrION, supra note 87, at 67.
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worldly princes but from the eternal God alone" and then told her that
subjects therefore must not "frame their religion according to the
appetite of their princes," he was speaking in the accent that was
familiar to all sons of Geneva. . .."
Puritan political thought ...reshaped the English constitution through
the ordeal of civil war and became so deeply rooted in the
consciousness of Englishmen [that] Defenders of the royal prerogative
had few doubts as to the source of the rebellious and seditious notions
of the time. . . .And in 1663 Robert South repeated the charge,
saying: "In our account of the sons of Geneva, we will begin with the
father of the faithful (faithful, I mean, to their old antimonarchical
doctrines and assertions), this is, the great mufti of Geneva"--John
Calvin.94

Carrying the argument a step further, we see the impact of Puritan
political thought in the colonies where Christians and Deists could find
common ground in the cause of the revolution because the ideas
emanated

from

common

sources.95

A continuing

and

serious

examination of the Western experience, particularly the religious sources
of this experience, is crucial for the maintenance of freedom as it is
currently known.96

A further understanding of religion's impact on law in America is
gleaned by looking at the history of governmental covenants.97 Many
early state constitutions (often called charters) were reaffirmed in 1776,

93. HUDSON, supra note 92, at 84.
94. Id. at 85-86.
95. Winthrop Hudson stated:
The alliance of Christians with Deists [e.g. Washington, Jefferson, Franklin, Paine] in
carrying forward the Revolution was not as strange as it may seem to be, for Deists did
little more than appropriate Puritan political ideas. English Puritans as early as the
1640's had made a distinction between the realm of nature and the realm of grace,
between natural revelation and special revelation. . . .Christians had no difficulty
uniting with Deists for common political ends on the basis of the shared assumptions
of "natural" religion.... William Penn (1644-1718), Algernon Sidney (1622-83), and
John Locke (1632-1704) served as transmitters of Puritan political ideas to the
Revolutionary generation.
Id. at 93-94.
96. See, e.g., Donald Kagan, Why Western History Matters, WALL ST. J., Dec. 28, 1994, at
A-12 (reacting to a current controversy over the teaching of Western History at Yale University).
97. The age-old concept of covenant embodies the following principle:
the guarantee that the covenant requirements will be met and that the covenant promises will
be fulfilled does not lie in any superior power that can and will force the parties to meet their
mutual obligations, if need be, but only in the sacred character of the agreement and in the
honor and faithfulness of the covenanting parties.
Louis Berkhof, The Covenant of Grace and Its Significance for Christian Education, in
FOUNDATIONS OF CHRISTIAN EDUCATION 68 (D. Johnson ed., 1990).
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following the Declaration of Independence," with little change except
the removal of references to the King (e.g. Connecticut, which readopted
its 1662 Charter in 1776). 99 The concept of federalism reflected in the
relationship between state and national constitutions is built on the
covenant idea. In fact the very word "federal" comes from the latin
"foedus," meaning covenant.100
Early state constitutions influenced the content and structure of the
Bill of Rights in the United States Constitution.' °' Early state "political
compacts" had two parts.0 2 The first portion contained a preamble and
bill of rights; the second contained the constitution, or description of the
governmental institutions being established. Before the adoption of the
Bill of Rights in 1791, numerous colonial state constitutions contained
bills of rights enumerating most of the rights currently found in the first
ten amendments to the United States Constitution.' 3 Many of the
colonial predecessors to the Bill of Rights contained marginal references
to passages in the Bible that were thought to support such rights. It has
been suggested that the Declaration of Independence is comparable to the
first part of a colonial compact (containing an implied bill of rights on
the basis of natural law), and the Constitution adopted in 1787 is
comparable to the second part of that compact. 104
In addition to recognizing the religious basis of early state
constitutions, it is important to note that the civil covenant, upon which
the authority of civil government was founded, was limited to enforcing
the duties between men as set forth in the Ten Commandments. Those
duties included the commandments against murder, adultery, stealing,
lying, and coveting as well as the duty to render respect for the
established authorities."'

98. Strict Separationist Robert Boston railed against the thought that the Declaration of
Independence may have any current authority. He suggested that the only document of relevance
is the Constitution with the amendments, and he pointed to the absence of any reference to God. See
BOSTON, supra note 8, at 211.
99. See Donald S. Lutz, Religious Dimensions in the Development of American
constitutionalism, 39 EMORY L.J 21, 22 (1990).
100. Professor Siegfried Wiessner recently reconceptualized federalism on the basis of
continuous consent as a technique of "allocating authority along the vertical axis of voluntarily
entered-into and continually reaffirmed territorial communities." Siegfried Wiessner, Federalism: An
Architecturefor Freedom, 2 NEw EUROPE L. REv. 129 (1993).
101. See Lutz, supra note 99, at 22.
102. The material in this section is taken generally from Lutz, supra note 101.
103. For example, the Massachusetts Body of Liberties (1641) contained all but three of the
twenty-eight rights enumerated in the first ten amendments to the Constitution. Lutz, supra note 101,
at 39.
104. Id. at 35-40.
105. See Butler, supra note 74, at 258-60 (quoting Roger Williams, The Bloody Tenent Yet
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Despite the influence of religious history and early state charters on
the United States Constitution, their relevance is largely ignored in the
study of constitutional law. Today, students of constitutional law begin
their study with the 1787 document as though it came into being merely
as the immediate creation of an enlightened group of men seeking to
incorporate current thought. The religious history, or even the history of
state constitutions, is seldom explored by law students.
b. The Virginia Experience
A continuing area of dispute in the interpretation of the
Establishment Clause is the selection of the relevant historical background
for interpreting the intentions of the Founders. Three positions have been
advocated: (1) a complete wall of separation eliminating all cooperation
between government and religion; (2) a restriction that prohibits only
preferential aid; and (3) a restriction that prevents only a formal
establishment of religion.' 6
The United States Supreme Court set the tone for Establishment
Clause interpretation in Everson v. Board of Education,107 in which the
Court applied the Establishment Clause against state action for the first
time.'10 The Court held that a state program which authorized local
school boards to reimburse parents of children in public and private
schools the cost of transportation was constitutional.' 0 9 Finding the
program constitutional, Justice Black used the majority opinion to

More Bloody, 4:144; Williams, Bloody Tenent, 3:152; 7 Writings of Williams, The HirelingMinistry
None of Christ's 159). See also Little, supra note 80, at 13-14. Williams believed that until the
second coming of Christ, the civil government will have no power to involve itself in religious
matters, which include the duties owed to the Creator under the first four commandments.
106. See generally M. MALBIN, RELIGION AND POLITICS: THE INTENTIONS OF THE AUTHORS
OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1978). See also Philip B. Kurland, The Originsof the Religion Clauses
of the Constitution, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 839 (1986); Douglas Laycock, "Nonpreferential"Aid
to Religion: A False Claim About Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 875 (1986); Michael
McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 933 (1986).
107. 330 U.S. 1 (1947)
108. It is difficult to understand how the Court could incorporate the religion clauses into the
Fourteenth Amendment and thereby make them applicable to the states with hardly a comment, since
the history of the Fourteenth Amendment gives no indication of the thought of disestablishing
religion in the states. See Kurland, supra note 106, at 844-45. See also John S. Baker, Jr., The
Establishment Clauseas Intended: No Preference Among Sects and Pluralismin a Large Commercial
Republic (1991), in EUGENE W. HICKOK, JR., THE BILL OF RIGHTS, ORIGINAL MEANING AND
CURRENT UNDERSTANDING 47-48 (1991), in which the author argues that the question of

incorporation is irrelevant to the question of original intent because the original intent was that the
First Amendment only required that no preference be given to a particular sect.
109. The Court drew a line between "tax legislation which provides funds for the welfare of the
general public and that which is designed to support institutions which teach religion." Everson, 330
U.S. at 14.
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designate a strict separationist position. Justice Black utilized the history
of disestablishment in Virginia as the ruling principle of interpretation in
Thomas Jefferson... and
analyzing the Establishment Clause. 1 '
James Madison were the prominent spokesmen of the Virginia tradition
of strict separation." 2 However, critics," 3 including members of the
Court," 4 have challenged the Everson view of history, asserting that the
Everson Court did not consider the proper historical background in
interpreting the Establishment Clause.

110. A biographer of Justice Black noted that Black looked upon the result in Everson as a
pyrrhic victory for those opposing his views of strict separation. ROGER NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK
363-64 (1994).
111. The Jeffersonian "wall of separation" has dominated Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
However, Jefferson's views on religious liberty seem to focus on the liberty of opinion, and he has
been criticized for failing to grasp the need for free exercise. See Hall, supra note 78, at 493, 497.
Ultimately, Hall concludes that Madison is more in tune with the evangelical Roger Williams. Hall
stated:
Although Madison's writings lack the evangelical fervor and profoundly Biblical
orientation of Williams's tracts, they nevertheless share a common framework in which
religion is protected because it is itself worth protecting and not simply banished from
the public sphere to satisfy those like Jefferson who were bothered by any religion
other than a mute and unseen one. The religious freedom envisioned by Madison was,
like Williams's, a freedom at least in significant part for religion rather than a
Jeffersonian freedomfrom religion. Moreover, Madison consistently recognized that
freedom of religion had to embrace more than mere opinion, and even more than acts
of worship.
Id. at 510. Madison's more enlightened view may be the result of his acquaintance with John
Witherspoon. See M.E. BRADFORD, FOUNDING FATHERS, BRIEF LIVES OF THE FRAMERS OF THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 44-45 (P. Kurland & R. Lerner eds., 1987).
112. That history centers on the efforts of Jefferson to disestablish the church in Virginia
through a legislative act to prevent use of tax funds to support religious teachers. Everson, 330 U.S.
at 11-12. So strong was the Court's reliance on the Virginia experience of Jefferson and Madison
that the Court felt comfortable using the Jeffersonian metaphor, taken originally from Roger
Williams, of a wall of separation. The metaphor appeared in a letter written fourteen years after the
Bill of Rights was adopted. See id. at 16.
113. See Baker, supra note 108, at 41.
114. See Justice Rehnquist's attack on the Everson reliance on Jefferson's "wall of separation"
in his dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 106-107 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), in which
he concludes that the Establishment Clause was designed to prohibit the establishment of a national
religion, and perhaps to prevent discrimination among sects, but not as requiring neutrality on the
part of government between religion and irreligion. Id. at 113-14.
Regarding the First Amendment religion clauses, Chief Justice Story stated that the "general,
if not the universal sentiment in America was, that Christianity ought to receive encouragement from
the state, so far as was not incompatible with the private rights of conscience, and the freedom of
religious worship." 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 593
(1851) (footnote omitted). In the same volume, Story continued,
The real object of the amendment was, not to countenance, much less to advance,
Mahometanism, or Judaism, or infidelity, by prostrating Christianity; but to exclude all
rivalry among christian sects, and to prevent any national ecclesiastical establishment,
which should give to a hierarchy the exclusive patronage of the national government.
Id. at 594.
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From a historical perspective, the Supreme Court's reliance on a
strict separationist view in Everson seems flawed. Since the First
Amendment originally only applied to the federal government, the states
were free to establish religions as well as schools based solely on
religion. A glance at the beliefs of the majority of the Framers of the
Constitution reveals their deep commitment to Christianity." 5 Thus,
had proponents of separatism proposed prohibiting the teaching of
religion in schools by applying the amendment to the states, a sharp,
extended debate would have undoubtedly resulted. However, a debate
never took place because the proposal was not made. It seems evident
that statesmen would not have seriously considered implementing an
educational system based on the Supreme Court's premise in Everson that
education at the primary and secondary level can be adequate without
some element of religious instruction. This is particularly apparent when
it is recognized -that the impetus for universal education was the desire to
educate people so they could read the Scriptures and become responsible
and honest citizens. Education without religion was rare, and where
secular education was suggested, training in personal virtue was the
6
substitute for religion."1
The Court recently coccluded in Lee v. Weisman"' that Madison's
opposition to a religious establishment did not rest solely upon its effect
on non-adherents. According to the Court, a principle ground for
Madison's view was that "[e]xperience witnesseth that ecclesiastical
establishments, instead of maintaining the purity and efficacy of Religion,
have had a contrary operation.""' 8 The Court did not focus on
Madison's reliance on the natural law principle that religious liberty, like
other basic rights, is a gift of nature. Nor did the Court focus on
Madison's appeal to the Supreme Lawgiver of the Universe to intervene
to assist in the passing of the Remonstrance. It would be difficult to
envision Madison, who appealed to God in the state legislature, as
advocating an education that did not include a religious base." 9

115. See M.E. BRADFORD, ORIGINAL INTENTIONS, ON THE MAKING AND RATIFICATION OF THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 87-102 (1993).
116. See generally, 5 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EDUCATION 251-58 (Deighton ed., 1971). It is
noted that the thought of permitting the national government to enter the field of education was
rejected. "A federal policy for schools and even for a national university was briefly raised at the
Constitutional Convention, but fear of centralized power, the prerogative of states' rights, and older
colonial traditions of church sponsorship of schooling, together defeated arguments for a national
educational design." Id. at 252.
117. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
118. Id. at 2657 (citing Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (1785), in
8 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 301 (W. Rachal et al. eds., 1973)).
119. For a brief discussion of education in the colonies, see Kurland, supra note 107, at 853.
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The Virginia experience with religious liberty was only a part of 150
years of debate and constitutional experimentation concerning religion
and its relationship to the state before the adoption of the United States
Constitution. Prior to Virginia's experience, Pennsylvania had enjoyed
100 years of religious liberty during which the colony prospered amid
great diversity. 20 Subsequent to Virginia's experience, a number of
colonies enjoyed established churches. 121 When Connecticut gave up
its established church in 1818, Jefferson, then in retirement, was
pleased. 22 While non-establishment ultimately prevailed throughout the
colonies, it was not by Constitutional mandate. Rather, non-establishment
resulted from voluntary action of the states, which were left free to
experiment in religious matters.
c. The Present Crisis
Man is religious by nature and one expression of his religion is
through law. The early historian Plutarch wrote:
If you go through the world, you may find cities without walls,
without letters, without rulers, without houses, without money,
without theaters and games: but there was never yet seen nor
In discussing the religious impetus for the principle of non discrimination among believers in a deity,
Kurland stated: "I am hard put to find any evidence in the development of legal protection for
religious freedom that indicates any intention to protect atheists." Id. at 856. In conceptualizing the
requirement of neutrality toward religion, Laycock suggests religion includes "any belief about God,
the supernatural, or the transcendent... [and any] belief that there is no God, or no afterlife ... and
it is a belief that must be accepted on faith, because it is not subject to empirical investigation."
Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and DisaggregatedNeutrality TowardReligion, 39 DEPAUL
L. REv. 993, 1002 (1990).
However, today the only acceptable presupposition is the non-existence of a creator. See
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987), in which Louisiana's "Creationism Act" was held to
violate the Establishment Clause because it was a theory that posited the existence of a creator;
therefore, the purpose and effect of the Act was to advance religion. Notwithstanding evolution's
speculative big bang theory being taught as fact, the possibility that scientific evidence may point to
special creation cannot be suggested.
120. Gaustad infra note 122, at 37-41.
121. Id. at 32-34.
122. See Edwin Scott Gaustad, The Emergence of Religious Freedom in the Early Republic, in
RELIGION AND THE STATE, supra note 80, at 39-40. Connecticut had the honor, in January, 1639,
of adopting the first written constitution known to history, creating a government. The constitution
contained the provision that the "Civil Authority here established hath power and liberty to see that
the peace, ordinances, and rules of Christ be observed in every Church according to His Word."
COBB, supra note 78, at 243 (citing CONNECTICUT COLONIAL RECoRDs, 1, 21, 524, 525). At the
time Thomas Hooker, a minister who influenced its adoption, stated the following in a sermon:
The foundation of authority is laid in the free consent of the people. The choice of the public
magistrates belongs unto the people by God's own allowance. They, who have power to
appoint officers and magistrates, have the right also to set the bounds and limitations of the
power and place unto which they call them.
Id. at 242.
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shall be seen by man a single city without temples and gods, or
without prayers, oaths, prophecies, and sacrifices, used to obtain
blessings and benefits, or to avert curses and calamities: nay I
am of opinion that a city might be sooner built without any
ground beneath it, than a commonwealth could be constituted
altogether destitute of belief in the gods, or, being constituted,
could be preserved.' 23
Carl Jung, the founder of analytical psychology, also reached the
conclusion that there is a religious function in the psyche of man that
inevitably must be expressed.' 2 4
In contrasting the views of our
intellectual forefathers, one may ask, "Where are the temples of the
cultural elite today?" What has happened to the religious function of
those who shape American culture? How can a society void of public
interaction between law and religion enforce its laws?
In discussing the relation between law and religion, Harold Berman
describes four qualities that characterize both the legal system and the
religious beliefs of a people. These qualities, which are necessary for
society to develop a respect for law, are ritual, tradition, authority and
universality.215 They are-essentially religious and impart a sense of
sanctity and dignity to law and legal institutions. In return, law offers
religion a sense of organization and structure through which religion
expresses society's most fundamental religious values.'26 By reflecting
the religious nature of the people, law expresses the highest goals, values,
and aspirations of society. In Berman's view, religion and law have

123. Plutarch, Letter Against Colotes the Epicurean,reprinted in GEORGE DANA BOARDMAN,
THE TEN COMMANDMENTS 53 (1946). Where are the temples today? The religion of twentieth
century man is science. Science and its sister, education, are looked to for solutions to all problems.
Science has a theory of origins, evolution, which, although a theory of extreme speculation, is held
to firmly and religiously. See PHILLIP JOHNSON, DARWIN ON TRIAL (1991), in which law professor
Phillip Johnson examines the evidence supporting Darwinian evolution and concludes that to believe
in evolution theory is to do so in spite of a lack of evidence. Nevertheless, evolution has become
the standard of scientific truth. Science offers an eschatology of a future solution to all problems as
well as a present hope of immediate solutions. Hence, President Bush, in his 1990 State of the Union
message to Congress, could state that "U.S. students must be the first in the world in math and
science achievement." President George Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 31, 1990) in L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 1, 1990, at A19. Postmodern thought, however, with its emphasis on total relativeness,
may threaten even the foundations of science.
124. He observed that adults in the second half of life fall ill (i.e., experience the
meaninglessness of life) because they lose that which the living religions of every age have given
to their followers. He concluded that these individuals cannot be truly healed without regaining their
religious outlook on life. Jung did not, however, speak of any particular creed or membership of a
church. CARL G. JUNG, MODERN MAN IN SEARCH OF A SOUL 229 (1933).

125.
126.

INTERACTION, supra note 62, at 31-39.
Id. at 77-105.
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interacted in the Western World since the late eleventh and early twelfth
centuries in such a way as to create the Western legal tradition.' 27
Today, with the radical separation of religion and law, a crises has
developed which Berman calls a "crises of integrity."' 28 According to
Berman, law has degenerated into legalism, and religion, with its retreat
from the public arena, has degenerated into pietism. Without a religious
foundation, law's capacity to regulate society is in jeopardy. Professor
Berman illustrated this point using the simple governmental function of
protecting property:
To say, for example, that it is against human nature to
tolerate indiscriminate stealing and that every society
condemns and punishes certain kinds of taking of another's
property is not the same thing as to say that there is an allembracing moral reality, a purpose in the universe, which
stealing offends. And when a society loses its capacity to
say that--when it rests its law of property and of crime
solely on its rational perception of human nature and of
social necessity and not also on its religious commitment
to universal values--then it is in danger of losing the
capacity to protect property and to condemn and punish
stealing.'29
Compare Berman's statement with that of Professor Graeme Forbes
of Tulane University:
Evidently, [Secretaryof Education William Bennett] thinks
there is an intimate relationship between our values and
those of [the Judeo-Christian] tradition, but most of his
former colleagues ...would greet with derision the thesis
that there is some conceptual or logical dependency of
moral values or ethical principles upon the theological
doctrines characteristic of the tradition. Stealing and
killing are not wrong because God forbids them;
presumably, God forbids them because they are wrong.
The grounds of moral value do not lie in divine
commands.130

127. Id. at 49-76.
128. Id. at 22-23, 143-44 nI. See also BELLAH, supra note 40, at 142.
129. INTERACTION, supra note 62, at 39.
130. Forbes, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1985, at A22, reprinted in Norman
Dorsen, The Religion Clauses and Nonbelievers, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 863, 871-72 (1986). The
letter was the response of Professor Forbes to a statement by Secretary of Education William Bennett
that "[o]ur values as a free people and the central values of the Judeo-Christian tradition are flesh of
the flesh and blood of the blood." Id.
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Professor Forbes goes on to credit the central values of a free society to
the Enlightenment.'3
However if Forbes' view is erroneous, and Bennett and Berman are
correct that law and basic values must be linked to religious precepts,
profound questions arise in the areas of jurisprudence, constitutional law,
theology, legal and religious history, sociology, and psychology. How
strong is a legal system that rejects religious content if religion is a
prerequisite for law to be respected? Can religions support and build
respect for a system of law that protects abortion rights?
Can
contemporary American religion provide the foundation of support for a
legal system that only reflects the view of corrupt politicians?
It is generally acknowledged that religion in America has become
substantially a private matter without significant influence in government,
business, law, or medicine. Conversely, religion played a crucial role in
the Revolutionary War and the formation of constitutional government
two hundred years ago (although a number of revolutionary leaders were
advocates of the Enlightenment with its natural law emphasis).
Berman notes that this radical separation of law and religion has
become more acute over the last forty years than at any other time in this
country's history. 32
He suggests that law has become a mere
pragmatic tool to achieve specific ends, and that this Enlightenment
concept of separation and religion as private and psychological did not
take root in America until the last forty years. 133 For Berman, this
radical separation of religion and law portents that law will no longer be
respected. 134 A purely instrumental theory of law becomes inefficient
because, according to Berman, people will follow law voluntarily and
willingly only when law is thought to be trustworthy, fair and a part of
society. 135 To expect compliance with law only when the enforcer is
3 6 Berman proves
present is an inefficient method of law enforcement.Y
131. Id. at 872. As stated by Professor Forbes:
Perhaps all Dr. Bennett meant was that in some historical or cultural way, the values that
support the institutions of a free society are derived from the Judeo-Christian tradition. Among
the central freedoms distinguishing free societies from their opposites are freedom of inquiry,
of expression and tolerance of a variety of philosophical, religious and political outlooks. The
idea that we owe such values to the Judeo-Christian tradition is ludicrous. We owe them to
the Enlightenment.
Id.
132. Harold J. Berman, The Interaction of Law and Religion in American Constitutional
History, 8 CAP. U. L. REv. 345 (1979), reprinted in FAITH AND ORDER: THE RECONCILIATION OF
LAW AND RELIGION 209 (1993) [hereinafter LAW AND RELIGION].
133. Id. at 214-15.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Professor Berman explains:
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his point that reliance on law as coercion is inefficient by looking at
American cities today, where it is increasingly difficult to protect life and
property. Laws cannot create fear where they do not create respect or a
sense of perceived fairness.' 37 As a solution, Berman suggests that the
separation of law and religion need not require a total separation of legal
and religious values. This radical separation leads to perverse results in
that it shields extreme cults from governmental inquiry, while preventing
schools from openly and effectively transmitting the common culture.' 3 8

In the past two generations the public philosophy of America has shifted radically from
a religious to a secular theory of law, from a moral to a political or instrumental theory,
and from a communitarian to an individualistic theory. Law is now generally
considered . . . to be simply a pragmatic device for accomplishing specific political,
economic, and social objectives....
This view of law, founded on utilitarianism, goes back to the Enlightenment ....
[P]rior to World War I, and even up to the Great depression, Americans as a people
continued to believe that the Constitution and the legal system were rooted in a
Covenant made with God by which this country was to be guided in its mission to be
a "light to all the nations."
Likewise, it is only in the last two generations that the Enlightenment concept
of religion as something wholly private and wholly psychological ...has come to
dominate our discourse.
The radical separation of law and religion in twentieth century American thought
..creates a serious danger that law will not be respected. If law is to be measured
only by standards of expediency, or workability, and not by standards of truth or
rightness, then it will be difficult to enforce it against those who think that it does not
serve their interests .... Far more important than coercion in securing obedience to
rules are such factors as trust, fairness, credibility, and affiliation. It is precisely when
law is trusted and therefore does not require coercive sanctions that it is efficient..
Id. at 214-15 (footnotes omitted).
137. Berman stated:
Today this point has been proved in a negative way by the fact that in our cities that branch
of law in which the sanctions are most severe--namely, criminal law--has been powerless to
create fear where it has failed to create respect by other means. Today everyone knows that
no amount of force which the police are capable of exerting can stop urban crime. In the last
analysis, what deters crime is the tradition of being law-abiding, and this in turn depends upon
a deeply or passionately held conviction that law is not only an instrument of secular policy
but also part of the ultimate purpose and meaning of life.
LAW AND RELIGION, supra note 132, at 215-16. See also BELLAH, supra note 40, at 142.
138. LAW AND RELIGION, supra note 132, at 209. He further notes:
Increasingly, law has come to be seen not as a pointer or witness to the collective
fulfillment of a higher aspiration and destiny but as an end in itself, the very purpose
of our national existence, the ultimate bond of our unity as a people. We have come
to believe in the Constitution for its own sake--to believe in the "free exercise" clause
and the "establishment" clause for their own sake. We find legal neutrality in matters
of religion to be convenient, and we know of no other principle that would be
acceptable in a "pluralistic," that is, a first amendment, society. No other justification
is thought to be needed.
The cult of self has already begun to have the effect both of gradually removing
from public education and public discourse all references to traditional religion and of
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Berman laments the possibility that the secular religion of America (e.g.
scientific atheism, which claims not to be a religion) will push other
religions from the public stage, resulting in the very persecution that it
ascribes to other religions.'3 9 The First Amendment alone does not
safeguard our religious freedom; it is the First Amendment guarantee
coupled with its original purpose of fostering a society in which political,
legal, and religious values freely interact that safeguards our freedom. 4
Like Berman, Robert Bellah has pointed out that America's problems
are essentially moral and religious. Bellah states:
If [America's] problems are, as I believe them to be,
centrally moral and even religious, then the effort to
sidestep them with purely technical organizational
considerations can only worsen them....
It is one of the oldest of sociological generalizations that any coherent
and viable society rests on a common set of moral understandings
about good and bad, right and wrong, in the realm of individual and
social action. It is almost as widely held that these common moral
understandings must also in turn rest upon a common set of religious
understandings that provide a picture of the universe in terms of
which the moral understandings make sense. Such moral and
religious understanding produce both a basic cultural legitimation for
a society which is viewed as at least approximately in accord with
them and a standard of judgment for the criticism of a society that is
seen as deviating too far from them.' 4'
Bellah describes the synthesis of secular and religious sources in the

American Constitutional system. Noting that both sources played a
significant role, Bellah points to Jefferson's fusion of "laws of nature"

gradually substituting its own jargon and ritual and its own morality and belief system.
Thus there is a danger that this new secular religion will, indeed, place all other
religions in subordination to itself, inflicting on other the very mischief of which it
complains.
Id. at 218. See also BELLAH, supra note 40, at 48.
139. Professor Berman, a prominent Soviet law scholar, is fully aware of the dismal record of
atheistic governments to protect free expression, especially religious expression. The same can be
said for the current Pope, John Paul II, who lived in, and resisted Communism in, Poland. See
Centesimus Annus, supra note 33, at 9-12, where he describe the events of 1989 in terms of the
Marxist denial of basic rights of workers and the spiritual void created by atheism which "deprived
the younger generations of a sense of direction and in many cases led them, in the irrepressible
search for personal identity and for the meaning of life, to rediscover the religious roots of their
national cultures and to rediscover the person of Christ himself as the existentially adequate response
to the desire in every human heart for goodness, truth and life." Id. at 10.
140. LAW AND RELIGION, supra note 132, at 219.
141. See BELLAH, supra note 40, at ix.
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with "nature's god" in the Declaration of Independence. Bellah believes
that this fusion, which was also reflected in republican formulas for civil
compact and in the Puritan covenant, explains the "passion" and "reason"
that produced the revolution and the constitution. 42 For Bellah,
revolution, with its religious furor, must be followed by the
institutionalization of the revolutionary victory. The success of the
American Revolution was institutionalized by the adoption of the
Constitution. The same process was repeated at the time of the Civil War
when the country moved to "institutionalize" that victory with the
enactment of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to
the Constitution. At the time, Lincoln succeeded in imparting religious
energy into the conflict. 43
According to Bellah, the secret of the
success of American government is that "[d]uring the American
Revolution . . . the traditions of Protestant covenant theology and
republican liberty were joined together, but the seam was still highly
visible. By the time of the Civil War the fusion was complete, the
garment seamless.""' Today, however, the unity and cohesiveness of

142. Id. As stated by Bellah:
The remarkable coherence of the American revolutionary movement and its successful
conclusion in the constitution of a new civil order are due in considerable part to the
convergence of the Puritan covenant pattern and the Montesquieuan republican pattern.
The former was represented above all by New England, the latter by Virginia, but both
were widely diffused in the consciousness of the colonial population. Both patterns saw
society resting on the deep inner commitment of its members, the former through
conversion, the latter through republican virtue. Both saw government as resting on
law, which, in its positive form, was created by the active participation of those subject
to it, yet ultimately derives from some higher source, either God or Nature. When
Jefferson evoked at the beginning of the Declaration of Independence the "laws of
nature and of nature's god" he was able to fuse the ultimate legitimatingprinciplesof
both traditions. And when in concluding it he wrote, "And for the support of this
declaration, with a firm reliance on the protection of divine providence, we mutually
pledge to each other our lives, our fortunes, and our sacred honor," he was not only
invoking a republican formula for the establishment of civil compact but echoing the
formula of the Puritan covenant. Only the confluence of these two patterns can help
us understand the fusion of passion and reason that, with such consistency, seems to
have motivated the major actors in the revolutionary drama. (emphasis added)
Id. at 27.
143. Id. at 52. Bellah articulated:
I do claim that without those cultural and religious motives it is not possible to
understand what has been called the Second American Revolution and its outcome in
a new birth of freedom, partial and incomplete though that outcome, like the first one,
was. Sidney Mead has argued that Abraham Lincoln is "the spiritual center of
American history." Certainly in terms of the dialectic of covenant and chosenness..
. the Civil War, the event with which Lincoln is most closely identified, was a kind of
culmination.
Id.
144. BELLAH, supra note 40, at 52-53. If Bellah is correct that a seamless web exists between
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the society has broken down. It may be said that the covenant is broken,
that the hopes and aspirations of the Civil War amendments have not
been realized.
Bellah laments the loss of a sense of public virtue as a central
principle of society, as well as the declining sense of personal obligation
to one's occupation, family, and country. Moreover, he refuses to justify
the unwillingness to impose moral obligations on one's self with the
argument that basic institutions of society are unjust and serve the
interests of a few at the expense of the many. Rather, Bellah identifies
a paradox: "The declining sense of moral obligation, together with a
heightened sense of distributive justice, may be partially explained by
observing that both phenomena reflect the influence of the last remaining
element of the common value system; individual freedom."' 45 Today
freedom does not mean the freedom to do good but the freedom to pursue
self-interest. Whether self-interest can provide a coherent morality for a
viable society is open to doubt. Coupling several current phenomena
together Bellah suggests:
The complex of capitalism, utilitarianism, and science as
a cultural form has its own world view, its own "religion"
even-though it is an adamantly this-worldly one-and its
own utopianism: the utopianism of total technical control,
of course in the service of the "freedom" of individual selfinterest.146
Bellah concludes, "The Pilgrim Fathers had a conception of covenant and
of virtue which we badly need today."'' 47 Earlier Biblical motifs do
continue to mold society, at least in part, today. When successful, these
motifs call people to a higher calling for which they willingly sacrifice,
to paraphrase Jefferson, their lives, their liberty and their sacred
48
honor.

religion and secular ideas in the American experience, then the radical separation of religion from
public education will have the effect of tearing the fabric of society apart. It will also have the effect
of placing on churches and other religious institutions the burden of teaching the religious component
of American history. See Hall, supra note 79, at 516. Hall stated:
The theological foundation of religious freedom thus initially rested in large measure
upon a theological premise shared by a broad, if not universal consensus of Americans
at the close of the eighteenth century--that religion consisted of duties owed to a
Creator, and that these duties could not be surrendered in formation of a social
compact.
Id.
145. See BELLAH, supra note 40, at xii.
146. Id. at xiii.
147. Id. at xv.
148. Id. at 62.
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As Bellah points out, the public-school system serves as a
particularly important context for the cultic celebration of civil
rituals. 4 9 At this level, the importance of the Supreme Court's view
of the Establishment Clause comes into focus. In a recent opinion, Lee
v. Weisman,5 0 the Court considered whether offering an invocation and
benediction at public school graduation ceremonies violated the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. It concluded that state
involvement in the decision to offer such prayers, the selection of clergy,
and the recommendation regarding the content of the prayer placed an
impermissible, subtle, psychological pressure on students to participate,
or appear to participate, in the religious exercise in violation of the
Constitution.15 ' Although the school board argued that the presentation
was merely a reflection of our civil religion, the Court rejected any
concept of a civil religion that could be considered as an accommodation
of culture at graduation.'52
Thus, once an invocation is determined to be a religious exercise, it
must be held to violate the Constitution. However, to view the
invocation as a reflection of the best traditions and cultural heritage of
this country not only pays homage to historical truth, but also calls the
graduates to a high standard of sacrifice for the good of the nation and
the preservation of its freedoms. By rejecting the cultural view of the
invocation, the Court strikes to the heart of the country's ability to pass
on to future generations the truths of America's history.
4. Schools: A CulturalBattleground
According to Diane Ravitch of Columbia University:

149. Id.
150. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
151. Id. at 2661.
152. The Court stated:
We are asked to recognize the existence of a practice of nonsectarian prayer, prayer within the
embrace of what is known as the Judeo-Christian tradition, prayer which is more acceptable
than one which, for example, makes explicit references to the God of Israel, or to Jesus Christ,
or to a patron saint. There may be some support, as an empirical observation, to the statement
of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit... that there has emerged in this country a civic
religion, one which is tolerated when sectarian exercises are not.... If common ground can
be defined which permits once conflicting faiths to express the shared conviction that there
is an ethic and a morality which transcend human invention, the sense of community and
purpose sought by all decent societies might be advanced. But though the First Amendment
does not allow the government to stifle prayers which aspire to these ends, neither does it
permit the government to undertake that task for itself.
Id. at 2656. See also Yehudah Mirsky, Civil Religion and the Establishment Clause, 95 YALE L.J.
1237 (1986) (describing the concept of civil religion).
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Questions of race, ethnicity, and religion have been a
paramount source of conflict in American education. The
schools have often attracted the zealous attention of those
who wish to influence the future, as well as those who
wish to change the way we view the past. In our history,
the schools have been not only an institution in which to
teach young people skills and knowledge, but an arena
where interest groups fight to preserve their values, or to
revise judgments of history, or to bring about fundamental
social change." 3

Public schools are the battlegrounds where the answers to larger
societal questions will be implemented.'54 If moral and ethical values
cannot be implemented, these other values will. Perhaps the current
fascination with economics will be the priority of the future.'55
Certainly the political dialogue of the 1992 presidential election confirms

153. Diane Rav itch, Multiculturalism,AM. SCHOLAR, Summer 1990, at 33 7-54, reprintedin The
Reference Shelf, The State of U.S. Education, at 91-92 (1991).
154. In a January, 1992 Public Television program, three leading policy makers were asked to
put themselves in the shoes of the next president. George M.C. Fisher, Chairman & CEO of
Motorola, Inc. and head of the Council on Competitiveness set his priorities as "First, education.
There is no doubt that this country has awakened to the fact that we have a problem in K through
12 education ....
Professor Paul Krugman of M.I.T. said "The first three big things to do are
children, children and infrastructure." Alice Rivlin, then senior fellow at the Brookings Institution
and now Clinton Administration Budget Director, responded that the most important thing to revive
the economy long term is saving and investment. She believes, however, that education is a local
problem which must be addressed by the local community. Educational Broadcasting Corp., J.
Graphics Transcripts, Adam Smith Show, Jan. 16, 1992 (Transcript #812).
155. See infra note 379. Since economics is likely to dominate government, one would think
that we can have some control over our economic destinies. It is, therefore, remarkable that Paul
Krugman made the following response to the question, "Why, briefly, did our standard of living stop
rising over the last quarter of a century?":
If we knew that we would have solved all the problems of economics. We don't really
know. The most important thing, maybe, that one should know about productivity,
about long-term economic growth, is that it is something of a mystery. We don't really
know why some countries do well and some do badly and we don't really know why
the magic went away for the U.S. economy. We can only make a list of things that we
think probably contributed to it. If I had to name number one on the list I would say
the declining quality of education in the U.S.
Educational Broadcasting Corp., J. Graphics Transcripts, Adam smith Show, Jan. .16, 1992
(Transcript #812).
If we put the economy first and explain our understanding of its workings with terms like
"magic" and "mystery," we have not only abandoned the Judeo-Christian value structure, which
places character above gain, but have replaced it with a quest for material security that we cannot
control or direct. In a 1930s Japanese movie, a poor dying father who suffered at the hands of
wealthy in-laws gave his 10 and 12 year old sons this advice: "Never put profit above people; when
others pay wages of ten you pay twelve; Do this and things will go well with you." THE FOUR
SEASONS OF CHILDREN (Hiroshi Shimizu, director, 1939) The lesson is obvious: sound economics
is built on character - not greed.
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the existence of this trend, since President Bush initially placed an
emphasis on traditional family values but abandoned that platform in
response to overwhelming pressure to address economic issues.' 56
Governor Clinton, who stressed economic issues (values) almost
exclusively throughout his campaign, was successful.' 57 Independent
candidate Ross Perot based his entire candidacy on his ability to bring
sanity to the country's fiscal dilemma and to restore the American
dream.' 5 8 Not to be outdone, the Supreme Court addressed the
economy in its latest decision on abortion rights with the following
statement: "The ability of women to participate equally in the economic
and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control
their reproductive lives."' 59
Sound economics, however, must be built on the character of the
people, which is essentially determined by religion. Michael Novak, 16
in
his recent book, The Catholic Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism,
acknowledged the core of Max Weber's great thesis on the Calvinist
foundation of capitalism by stating, "[i]t was Max Weber's great
achievement to discern that the humdrum and often drab work of
economics, grubby and messy as it sometimes is, has a religious
underpinning."'' The point is not to prove an economic thesis, but to
show that the education process must instill values regarding what is
important in life, what is the nature of man, and what is man's potential.
These are all themes addressed by religion; thus, to exclude religion from
any place in the education process distorts the truths being presented.
5. Many Solutions
With society's rejection of traditional religious values and emphasis
upon self-interest and individual "rights," various solutions are being
offered daily in all forums. Communitarians 162 call for a reassertion of

156. See, e.g., E.J. Dionne, Jr., GOP Reassesses Values War; CollateralDamage Seen in Moral
Attacks, WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 1992, at Al.
157. See, e.g., Cathleen Decker, Clinton Setting Offfor a West Coast Weekend, L.A. TIMES,
July 25, 1992, at A16; Steven Mufson, Clinton to Send Message with Economic Choices, WASH.
POST, Nov. 8, 1992, at A33.
158. See, e.g., Howard Kurtz, 30-Second Politics, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 1992, at A I7.
159. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2797 (1992) (quoting syllabus).
160. MICHAEL NOVAK,THE CATHOLIC ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (1993).
161. Id. at 1. However, Bellah notes, "That happiness is to attained through limitless material
acquisition is denied by every religion and philosophy known to man but is preached incessantly by
every American television set." BELLAH, supra note 40, at 134 (1975).
162. Harvard Law professor Mary Ann Glendon states that people who are attracted to the
communitarian effort are those who "are tired of having to choose between the stinginess of extreme
right and the simplicity of the extreme left. .. tired of having to choose between hardhearted laissezfaire and ... big regulation ... tired of hearing complicated issues stuffed into 10-second sound
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community values. Professor Amitai Etzioni suggests that a community
use family, schools, and neighborhoods as defenses against excessive
individualism. 163 Regarding schools he states:
Schools are the second line of defense. Suggestions that
they step in where parents have failed and contribute to the
character education of the young are often opposed with
what is supposed to be a trump challenge: "Whose values
will you inculcate?"
The fact is that there are numerous values we all share.
While racism and prejudice and sexual harassment occur,
no one seriously claims that these are morally justified.
And while we may differ about the conditions under which
one may tell a white lie, we all agree that lying to advance
oneself at the cost of others is indecent. We abhor
violence, favor democracy, and so on. To urge teachers to
be value-neutral achieves only one thing: It leaves the
young open to all other voices, from their peers to
television, but muzzles their educators."
Analysts appear daily in the newspapers.' 65 One commentator
suggests that a combination of approaches is necessary, including a
structural approach (providing jobs), a rationalist approach (government
benefits generous enough to form families), and a cultural approach
(provide a non-traditional family solution).'66 Recognizing the need for
diversity in solutions, this commentator believes that the government
should not try to find a single solution but should enable the states to find
their own solutions. The only proviso would be that the states follow
minimum precepts of equal protection and that each new initiative be
independently evaluated. In other words, a national policy (e.g., a
national family policy) should be rejected in favor of local initiatives.
bites." Mary Vorobil, Have we lost sense of "us" in favor of "I",MIAMI HERALD, June 29, 1992,
at IC.
163. Amitai Etzioni, The Other Side of the Rights Coin, A.B.A.J., Aug. 1992, at 110.
164. Id.
165. In an editorial in the Miami Herald, Gianni De Michelis, foreign minister of Italy from
1989 to 1992, suggested that Newtonian democracy consciously devised by French and British
thinkers in the 18th century according to the physical principles of classical science can no longer
accommodate the dynamic of the complex 21st century. His view is that the mass political parties
that dominated politics during the cold war must give way to multiple'parties whose voices will be
broadly heard through the new information age. New rules for "inclusive participation" are needed
to guide a process of global integration that operates on a transnational basis "so that the democratic
world does not fall back into the disintegration of racism, ethnic hatred and tribalism." Gianni De
Michelis, Reinventing Democracy, MIAMI HERALD, July 26, 1992, at IC, 5C.
166. Wilson, supra note 21.
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Professor Joe Holland.67 suggests that the destructive tendencies
of the individual in a technologically dominated society may be averted
by the re-emergence of the family and community as suppliers of social
For example, he
needs made possible by the information age."'
visualizes the computer as enabling traditional household functions, such
as religion, health care, and education, to return to the family. 6 9
Bellah seeks a solution in a renewal of the American myth of
covenant. Bellah states:
As a first step, I would argue, we must reaffirm the
outward or external covenant and that includes the civil
religion in its most classical form. The Declaration of
Independence, the Bill of Rights, and the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution have never been fully
implemented
fulfilled. 17

....

I would . . . insist that they be

Taking this step will lead to revolution in the society, and a move away
from the current worship of materialism and into a new era. According
to Bellah:
Culture is the key to revolution; religion is the key to
culture. If we win the political struggle, we will not even
know what we want unless we have a new vision of man,.
. . a new conception of the ordering of liberty, the
constitution of freedom. Without that, political victory,
even were it attainable, could have no lasting result.' 7 '
His solution
Professor Berman posits yet another solution.
recognizes a need for synthesis in which the common elements of law
and religion are brought together. Rather than talk of law and other
fields of study as either/or propositions, it is necessary to look at them as
both/and propositions - for example, "law and religion."' 7 2 From a
First Amendment standpoint, he poses the following challenge to the
religious community:
If religious communities can, in fact, show that not only
private belief but also social commitment is an integral

167. Professor, St. Thomas University School of Law. Religious Myth, Sexual Symbol, and
Technological Function in the Post Modem Electronic Ecological Era, Address Before the
Association for the Sociology of Religion (Aug. 18, 1992).
168. Id. at9.
169. Id.at 10.
170. BELLAH, supra note 40, at 151.
171. Id.at 162.
172. INTERACTION, supra note 62, at 115.
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part of what they mean by "religion," then the courts
should begin to expand the "free exercise" clause of the
[F]irst [A]mendment. If the social commitment of various
religious groups is exercised in cooperation with
government programs in ways that do not adversely affect
other religious or not-religious groups, then the courts
should begin to contract the "establishment" clause, thus
reconciling the two clauses.'73

6. A Proposal
As suggested throughout this Article, religious values dominated
America's past and the future may be dependent on the re-emergence of
those values. The paradox is that Supreme Court Religion Clause
jurisprudence, barely fifty years old, has built walls that effectively
prevent meaningful, parentally supervised religious training as part of the
child's twelve to fifteen years of public school education. At the same
time, the legislative and executive branches have become preoccupied
with economic goals which, arguably, can only be achieved after
widespread agreement on values and ultimate goals. This Article does
not recommend that public schools be established specifically to teach
religion or conduct prayer; nevertheless, a far greater accommodation
than is presently tolerated is possible. The practice of allowing parentapproved religious instruction by local churches on school premises
should be re-examined, although this practice was held unconstitutional
in the 1948 decision, McCollum v. Board of Education.'74 Despite
parental approval prior to any religious instruction, the McCollum Court
objected to such instruction because of compulsory school attendance
laws and the use of school premises. While the McCollum Court did not
view parental consent as.sufficient to protect the child from uninvited
religious ideas, today's school children are introduced to the mechanics
of sex and other value training contrary to the wishes of their parents.
A re-examination of McCollum and other such precedent is
appropriate. The need for re-examination is particularly acute in light of

173. Harold Berman, Religious Freedom andthe Challenge ofthe Modern State, 39 EMORY L.J.
149, 162 (1990), reprinted in FAITH AND ORDER: THE RECONCILIATION OF LAW AND RELIGION 221,
233 (1993). Berman further stated:
In the words of the Williamsburg Charter, "In light of the First Amendment, the
government should stand in relation to the churches, synagogues and other communities
of faith as the guarantor of freedom." That freedom should include not only the
freedom to exercise inner belief but also the freedom to exercise social commitments
intrinsically involved in such belief.
Id. (footnote omitted).
174. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
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dramatic changes in education since 1948,' including the isolation of
schools from the families served by them, and the continued emphasis on
national educational standards. Schools have become less and less
responsive to the values of the people. For these reasons, permitting
voluntary, parentally controlled religious education to be a part of the
school routine is but a modest step toward realizing the diversity needed
to effectively educate a child. Sufficient and efficient safeguards can be
instituted within the schools to prevent any suggestion of state
endorsement of religion. Indeed, the danger of state endorsement of a
particular religion would be less if a large number of religious groups
participated in the program.
Such a solution, which will be examined in greater detail in Part B,
might not prevent the further decline and privatization of religion in
America, but it might stem the call for a constitutional prayer amendment
for schools, as well as the growing exodus of students now leaving for
home-based education and religious schools. These results would
eventually strengthen the public schools.
PART B: Legal Structure of Religion in Public Schools
1. Introduction to Part B.
Having established the interdependence of law, culture, and religion,
it is easy to see why many people are willing to amend the Constitution
to allow greater recognition of religion in public schools. Amending the
Constitution is a drastic remedy; before resorting to the amendment
process, society should explore less extreme measures. The solution
proposed in this Article is far less drastic than an amendment, particularly
in light of the recent case of Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village
School District v. Grumet,'76 in which the Court split in several
directions in reaching the decision. In that case, five justices expressed
a willingness to re-examine two 1985 cases that built on McCollum.
Should those two cases be reversed as was suggested, it would be but a
small step to review and reverse McCollum, which is at the root of the
current problem. This part will first look at the premises underlying the
175. A comparison can also be made with the educational views of 1791, when the First
Amendment was adopted. At that time the government was relatively ineffective, and the church and
home dominated and supplied religious, health care, and educational needs. Today, government
monopolizes health care and educational services. It seems appropriate that such a dramatic role
reversal would demand opening of educational establishments to appropriate mechanisms for
parentally approved and provided religious education. Certainly religious health care establishments
have facilitated religious exercises without objection.
176. 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994).
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Establishment Clause as applied in the elementary and secondary school
cases. Second, it will review the standard for reversal set forth in Casey
v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania7 7 and third, it
will demonstrate that the justification for each such premises no longer
exists and that, under Casey, reversal of McCollum is required.
2. The FirstAmendment and the Doctrine of Incorporation
The First Amendment to the Constitution prohibits the government
from involving itself in religious matters. 78 The First Amendment
originally applied to the federal government, not to the states. 179 It
reads, in pertinent part, as follows: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; . ,80
Few cases arose under this clause since its adoption in 1791 until the
1940s, probably because it was generally viewed as applying only against
the federal government. However, the First Amendment was made
applicable to the states indirectly through the Fourteenth Amendment; the
Supreme Court has determined that the First Amendment is incorporated
into the Fourteenth Amendment by the concept of "liberty" under the due
process provision of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 8 ' The process of
absorption' of the religious guarantees of the First Amendment as
protections against the actions of the states under the Fourteenth
Amendment began with the incorporation of the Free Exercise Clause in
1923. s3 Everson v. Board of Education8 4 marked the completion of

177. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
178. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
179. See Kurland, supra note 106, at 843-45. See also supra note 109.
180. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
181. See Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940). The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in part," nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
182. See Justice Brennan's description of the absorption process in Abington Sch. Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 253-60 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
183. Justice Brennan cited Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923), as holding that the
protections of the Fourteenth Amendment include at least a person's freedom "to worship God
according to the dictates of his own conscience." See Abington, 374 U.S. at 253. The Court first
applied the free exercise clause against the states to invalidate state action in Cantwellv. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296 (1940). There the Court stated that the fundamental concept of liberty embodied in
the Fourteenth Amendment embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment, with the result
that state legislatures were subject to the same restrictions under the First Amendment as the federal
government. The Court continued:
The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of religion has a double
aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any
creed or the practice of any form of worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to
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this process when the Court incorporated the Establishment Clause into
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Everson involved an Establishment Clause challenge to a state plan
to reimburse school children for the cost of transportation to and from
public as well as religious schools. Although it acknowledged that the
First Amendment is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court held that the reimbursement plan did not violate
the Establishment Clause.1 5 Nevertheless, the opinion in Everson
endorsed a Jeffersonian metaphor (e.g. that the First Amendment erects
a "wall of separation" between the church and the state) that had appeared
in a letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist Association
dated January 1, 1802.86 The metaphor formed the basic principle for
interpreting the Establishment Clause." 7 The Everson Court concluded
that the First Amendment had erected a wall between church and state,
a wall that must be kept high and impregnable. 8 ' The Court could not
approve the "slightest breach."' 89
A year after Everson, construction of Jefferson's wall began with
9
McCollum v. Board of Education."'
McCollum held that permitting

adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as the individual may choose
cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the
chosen form of religion. Thus the Amendment embraces two concepts, -- freedom to
believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second
cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society.
Cantivell, 310 U.S. at 303-04 (footnote omitted).
184. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). The Court merely stated, without comment, that "the First
Amendment, as made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth ... commands that a state 'shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." Id.
at 8 (citation omitted).
That the absorption was accomplished so quickly and without dissent is amazing. In the
1870s, James G. Blaine proposed a Constitutional Amendment applying the religion clauses against
the states. Apparently the incorporation doctrine was not obvious at the time. See Abington, 374
U.S. at 256-57. It is also amazing that Establishment Clause analysis focuses on what the "founders"
thought, since the founders the states free to experiment with religion and education. See supra note
109.
185. Everson, 330 U.S. at 17-18.
186. FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 87, at 96.
187. Chief Justice Rehnquist asserted that the'use of this metaphor as a guiding principle for
the Establishment Clause interpretation distorts not only the Constitutional history of the clause but
also the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence. In particular, he would reject the "Virginia
Experience" as the guiding principle of the Establishment Clause. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38,
91-114 (1985).
188. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
189. Id.
190. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
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clergymen to conduct parentally approved9 religion classes during school
hours was an "establishment of religion." '
3. McCollum v. Board of Education9 ' and Its Progeny
In McCollum, decided in 1948, the Supreme Court took the first step
toward eliminating any vestiges of religious culture from the public
school classroom. McCollum involved an Illinois program under which
public school classrooms were opened during regular school hours once
a week for religious instruction of fourth to ninth grade students whose
parents signed a consent for such instruction. Teachers kept track of the
attendance at these religion classes; students not wishing to participate in
the classes pursued secular studies during that period. Rejecting requests
to limit the Establishment Clause to situations involving a preference of
one religion over another and to repudiate the incorporation doctrine, the
Court held:
This is beyond all question a utilization of the tax-established and
tax-supported public school system to aid religious groups to spread
their faith. And it falls squarely under the ban of the First
Amendment .... There [in Everson] we said:
"Neither a state nor the Federal Government can
set up a church. Neither can pass laws which
aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one
religion over another. Neither can force or
influence a person to go to or to remain away
from church against his will or force him to
profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No
person can be punished for entertaining or
professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for
church attendance or non-attendance.. ..
The Court, denying that its action manifested a hostility to religion,
defended its position by stating that "[t]he First Amendment rests upon
the premise that both religion and government can best work to achieve
their lofty aims if each is left free from the other within its respective
sphere."' 9 4 The violation in McCollum consisted of two elements.

191.

Id.

192.

Illinois ex reL McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).

193. Id. at 210 (citations and footnote omitted).
194. 333 U.S. at 212. It may be questioned whether the First Amendment rests on such a
premise. Government may not be able to restrain criminal activity in society from becoming
overwhelming without religion doing its job. As Professor Berman suggests, government loses its
ability to govern unless it reflects, to some extent, the deep seated religious views of the society.
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First, tax-supported public school buildings were used for the
dissemination of religious doctrines. Second, the State afforded sectarian
groups an invaluable aid in that it helped to provide pupils for religious
classes through use of compulsory public school laws. 95
In a lengthy concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter chronicled the
development of public education in the United States during the
nineteenth century.' 96 He concluded that "long before the Fourteenth
Amendment subjected the States to new limitations, the prohibition of
furtherance by the State of religious instruction became the guiding
principle, in law and feeling, of the American people.' ' 197 He then
traced the history of efforts during the twentieth century to reintroduce
religious training into the public school curriculum. Justice Frankfurter
suggested that churches were unable, financially and otherwise, to obtain
their sectarian objectives outside the public school system.' 98 From
these frustrations the week-day church school developed, and from 1914
to 1947, the number of affected pupils grew from 619 in a single
community to over 2,000,000 in some 2,200 communities.' 99
I n
evaluating the effects of the program in McCollum, Frankfurter expressed
concern that the child who did not attend the religious classes would feel
the pressure of exclusion and feel compelled to participate.2 °0
Frankfurter also noted that "to speak of 'released time' as being only half
or three quarters of an hour is to draw a thread from a fabric., 20 He
then concluded that the McCollum program effectively furthered religious
beliefs and stated:

INTERACTION, supra note 60, at 39. Thus, the effectiveness of government may be dependent on
religion's effectiveness in imparting respect for the legal system.
195. 333 U.S. at 212.
196. Id. at 215 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
197. Id.
198. Id. at 222-24. Justice Frankfurter stated as follows:
A religious people was naturally concerned about the part of the child's education
entrusted "to the family altar, the church, and the private school."... Laboring under
financial difficulties and exercising only persuasive authority, various denominations
felt handicapped in their task of religious education. Abortive attempts were... made
to obtain public funds for religious schools ....
There were experiments with vacation
schools, with Saturday as well as Sunday schools. They all fell short of their purpose.
It was urged that by appearing to make religion a one-day-a-week matter, the Sunday
school ... tended to relegate the child's religious education, and thereby his religion,
to a minor role not unlike the enforced piano lesson.
Id. at 220-22.
199. 333 U.S. at 224-25.
200. Id. at 227.
201. Id. at 231.
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Separation means separation, not something less.
Jefferson's
metaphor in describing the relation between Church and State speaks
of a "wall of separation," not of a fine line easily overstepped. The
public school is at once the symbol of our democracy and the most
pervasive means for promoting our common destiny." 2
Thus, Frankfurter found Illinois' modest efforts at accommodation
constitutionally defective.
Justice Jackson, in a concurring opinion, wrestled with how to
separate the secular from the religious and still maintain an educational
system.2 °3 While he concluded that the program in Illinois went too far
by actually proselyting students, he also stated:
The fact is that, for good or for ill, nearly everything in our culture
worth transmitting, everything which gives meaning to life, is
saturated with religious influences, derived from paganism, Judaism,
Christianity -- both Catholic and Protestant -- and other faiths
accepted by a large part of the world's peoples. One can hardly
respect a system of education that would leave the student wholly
ignorant of the currents of religious thought that move the world
society for a part in which he is being prepared.20 4
Dissenting, Justice Reed had great difficulty determining exactly
what the Court found to be an establishment of religion.20 5
He
suggested that this was the first time the Court had gone so far in its
application of the Establishment Clause. According to Reed:
The phrase "an establishment of religion" may have been intended by
Congress to be aimed only at a state church. . . . Passing years,
however, have brought about acceptance of a broader meaning,
although never until today, I believe, has this Court widened its
interpretation to any such degree as holding that recognition of the
interest of our nation in religion, through the granting, to qualified
representatives of the principal faiths, of opportunity to present
religion as an optional, extracurricular subject during released school
time in public school buildings, was equivalent to an establishment of
religion. 6

202. Id.
203.

Id. at 232-38 (Jackson, J., concurring).

204. 333 U.S. at 236.
205. Id. at 238-56 (Reed, J., dissenting).
206. Id. at 244. Justice Reed went on to quote Thomas Jefferson's support of religious
education being a part of the required activities at the University of Virginia which Jefferson had
founded. Reed suggested that it is improper to build constitutional doctrine on a casual general
statement, noting that "[A] rule of Law should not be drawn from a figure of speech." Id. at 247.
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The next case to come before the Court concerning religion and
public schools was Zorach v. Clausen,2" 7 which involved children being
released from public schools during regular school hours to attend
privately sponsored religion classes held off school premises. The
practice was challenged on the basis that the influence of the public
school supported religion, that teachers policed attendance, that the
education process stopped while the students participated in the released
time program, and that the church was aided in its efforts to indoctrinate
children.2"8 Finding essentially that neither coercion nor pressure was
exerted by state authorities to force the children to participate in the
program, Justice Douglas rendered an expansive view of government's
ability to accommodate religion, asserting, "[W]e are a religious people
whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being."20 9 In distinguishing
McCollum, Douglas noted that in Zorach the state did not incur costs for
the program, that no classrooms were used, and that the force of the
public school was not used to promote religion.21 However, he limited
his expansive language by his statement that government may not "blend"
2 13
2
Justices Black,2" 2 Frankfurter,
secular and sectarian education. "'
and Jackson2 14 issued .strong dissents, arguing that Zorach was
inconsistent with McCollum, and that the essence of the released time
program, whether on or off premises, was coercive.
Following McCollum and Zorach, Establishment Clause
jurisprudence developed on the framework of Jefferson's metaphor. The
principles that evolved were finally enunciated as a coherent whole in

207. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952)
208. Id. at 309-10.
209. Id. at 313. The often quoted statement is as follows:
We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being. We
guarantee the freedom to worship as one chooses. We make room for as wide a variety
of beliefs and creeds as the spiritual needs of man deem necessary. We sponsor an
attitude on the part of government that shows no partiality to any one group and that
lets each flourish according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma.
When the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates with religious authorities
by adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our
traditions.
Id. at 313-14.
210. Id. at 315.
211. Justice Douglas has been criticized for expressing concepts in universal terms because he
is led into inevitable contradictions. See BERNARD WOLFMAN ET AL., DISSENT WITHOUT OPINION
132 & n.461 (1975), in which it is pointed out the Zorach language, "We are a religious people
whose institutions presuppose a Supreme being," conflicts with Douglas' statement in U.S. v. Ballard,
322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944), "Man's relation to this God was made no concern of the state."
212. 343 U.S. at 315 (Black, J., dissenting).
213. Id. at 320 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
214. Id. at 323 (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
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1971, in Lemon v. Kurtzman. 2 5 The so-called "Lemon" test is a
three-part Establishment Clause test under which a governmental practice
is evaluated.216 To satisfy the Establishment Clause, the proposed
action of the state or federal government must:
(1) reflect a clearly secular purpose;
(2) have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
religion; and,
(3) avoid excessive government entanglement with religion.21 7
The Lemon test has been the subject of scathing criticism from
commentators, as well as from the Supreme Court Justices
themselves. 2 8 Nevertheless, the Establishment Clause decisions in the
area of elementary and secondary schools have been built on several clear
premises which focus on the following: the importance of education to
the child, the ability to separate secular and religious education, the
symbolic union between church and state when secular and religious
education are interrelated, the special vulnerability of children to
influences within the school, the feelings of inferiority experienced by
children not participating in majority exercises, the importance of parental
choice over the child, the potential for divisiveness when religion and
secular education are combined, and the fear of entangling secular and
religious institutions. These premises essentially address the second and
third prong of the Lemon test. Most general welfare programs involve
an easily definable secular purpose, thus satisfying the first prong.21 9

215. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
216. See id. at 612-13.
217. Id. See also Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773
(1973).
218. See, e.g., Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village v. Grumet, 114 S.Ct. 2481, 2495 (1994)
(O'Connor, J., concurring); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., _ U.S.
113 S. Ct. 2141, 2149-50 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring); Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2549,
2678 (1992) (Scalia, J., with White, J. and Thomas, J., dissenting). In the Lamb's Chapel opinion
Justice Scalia stated:
As to the Court's invocation of the Lemon test: Like some ghoul in a late-night horror
movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly
killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again,
frightening the little children and school attorneys of Center Moriches Union Free
School District.
Id. at 2149-50.
219. Essentially, the purpose would not be to advance religion, but to facilitate needed moral
training, which is viewed as built on a religious foundation. In addition, it could be seen as an
extension of accommodation to facilitate the free exercise of religion, which is also seen as a valid
purpose, in which case the second prong becomes the focus of inquiry.
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Therefore, much of the discussion addresses whether general welfare
programs have the effect of promoting religion and whether the
constitutional requirements can be realized without unduly entangling the
state in religious affairs.
4. EducationalPremises Used by Courts
a. Importance of Education
During the nineteenth century, the concept of universal public
education provided by the government gained wide public
acceptance.22 In 1994, Justice Souter confirmed that providing public
schools is at the apex of governmental functions. 22 ' Additionally, the
Court had stated previously that:
education is perhaps the most important function of state and
local governments. .,. . It is the very foundation of good
citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the
child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional
training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his
environment.222
Moreover, Justice Frankfurter, in 1948, claimed that public education is
"the symbol of our democracy and the most pervasive means for
223
promoting our common destiny."
He also claimed that it is the
224
symbol of our secular unity.

In response to the importance of the free public schools, the
Supreme Court has raised a wall against the religious encroachment into
the public educational system. In doing so, the Court has eliminated any
cultural reflection of religion in the public schools. After deciding in
McCollum v. Board of Education that programs permitting religious
organizations to conduct classes on public school premises are
unconstitutional, the Court went further to hold that the daily reading of
state-composed prayers is unconstitutional.22 The Court also held that
state-required prayer and Bible reading 22 6 are unconstitutional. The

220. McCollum, 333 U.S. at 213-16 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
221. See Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994). Cf.
Board of Educ. of Monroe-Woodbury Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. (1994) with Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972).
222. Brown v. Board of Educ. 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
223. McCollum, 333 U.S. at 231 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter further stated
that "[i]n
no activity of the State is it more vital to keep out divisive forces than in its schools." Id.
224. Id. at 217.
225. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
226. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 (1963).
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Court's rejection of the posting of the Ten Commandments 227 and the
teaching of creation science followed. 2 8 Considering the strategic
importance of the public school system and the successful effort to
eliminate all sectarian influence, it must be concluded that it is the
Supreme Court's view that the future of the country and the achievement
of national objectives can be secured without reliance on religious input.
In other words, the rise or fall of the nation is independent of religion.
Absent such a conclusion, the Court would not have sought so diligently
to remove religion in McCollum and the cases that followed.
b. Separation of Secular Education
Another premise which was ruled on in McCollum and which was
developed during the nineteenth century is that education can be divided
into secular and religious subjects,2 29 with religious subjects banned
from the classroom and left to other sources. In McCollum, Justice
Frankfurter acknowledged that colonial education was provided largely

227. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980). The Court rejected the posting of the Ten
Commandments because of the obvious religious overtones of the first four Commandments.
However, the Court could have recognized that the Ten Commandments reflect the very separation
of religious and secular duties that divide the duties of govemment and the church. Roger Williams
recognized just such a distinction in developing his doctrine of religious liberty for the Rhode Island
colony. Little, supra note 80, at 7. In Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), Chief Justice
Rehnquist observed that "The very chamber in which oral arguments on this case were heard is
decorated with a notable and permanent-not seasonal-symbol of religion: Moses with the Ten
Commandments." Id. at 677.
228. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
229. Justice Jackson, in his Everson dissent, stated:
[Tmhe whole historic conflict... between the Catholic Church and non-Catholics comes
to a focus in their respective school policies. The Roman Catholic Church ... does
not leave the individual to pick up religion by chance. It relies on early and indelible
indoctrination in the faith and order of the Church by the work and example of persons
consecrated to the task.
Our public school, if not a product of Protestantism, at least is more consistent
with it than with the Catholic culture and scheme of values. It is a relatively recent
development dating from about 1840. It is organized on the premise that secular
education can be isolated from all religious teaching so that the schQol can inculcate
all needed temporal knowledge and also maintain a strict and lofty neutrality as to
religion. The assumption is that after the individual has been instructed in worldly
wisdom he will be better fitted to choose his religion. Whether such a disjunction is
possible ... I need not try to answer.
mhe Roman Catholic Church ... would forego its whole service for mature persons
before it would give up education of the young .... Catholic education is the rock on
which the whole structure rests, and to render tax aid to its Church school is
indistinguishable to me from rendering the same aid to the Church itself.
Everson, 300 U.S. at 23-24. A Catholic maxim attributed to the Jesuits states: "Give me a child for
the first seven yeas, and you may do what you like with him afterwards. 3 LEAN'S COLLECTANEA
at 472 (1903).
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by religious institutions.23 ° He then credited the efforts of Horace
Mann for the removal of sectarian teaching from the public schools in
nineteenth century Boston in response .toconflicts that developed over the
religious instruction in schools."' Justice Frankfurter argued that "long
before the Fourteenth Amendment . . . the prohibition of furtherance by
the State of religious instruction became the guiding principle, in law and
feeling, of the American people. 23 2 Frankfurter,
in fact, called the
2 33
public school the "symbol of our secular unity.
When such assertions are combined with the belief that religion
should be kept out of public schools, the implicit assumption is that
religion is unnecessary to the achievement of educational goals. A
further assumption is that religion is not a necessary element in
"awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later
professional training, [or] in helping him to adjust normally to his

230.
231.
232.

333 U.S. at 213-14.
Id.at 215.
Id. (emphasis added). The context of the quotation is as follows:
. The evolution of colonial education, largely in the service of religion, into the
public school system of today is the story of changing conceptions regarding the
American democratic society, of the functions of State-maintained education in such
a society, and of the role therein of the free exercise of religion by the people. The
modern public school derived from a philosophy offreedom reflected in the First
Amendment .... In Massachusetts, largely through the efforts of Horace Mann, all
sectarian teachings were barred from the common school to save it from being rent by
denominational conflict. The upshot . .. is . . .that long before the Fourteenth
Amendment subjected the States to new limitations, the prohibition of furtherance by
the State of religious instruction became the guiding principle, in law andfeeling, of
the American people.
Separation in the field of education. . . was not imposed upon unwilling States
... mhe Fourteenth Amendment merely reflected a principle then dominant in our
national life. To the extent that the Constitution thus made it binding upon the States,
the basis of the restriction is the whole experience of our people.
Id. at 214-15 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
233. Id. at 217. The context of the quotation is as follows:
The non-sectarian or secular public school was the means of reconciling freedom in
general with religious freedom .... Designed to serve as perhaps the most powerful
agency for promoting cohesion among a heterogeneous democratic people, the public
school must keep scrupulously free from entanglement in the strife of sects. The
preservation of the community from divisive conflicts, of Government from
irreconcilablepressures by religiousgroups, of religionfrom censorship andcoercion
however subtly exercised, requires strict confinement of the State to instruction other
than religious,leaving to the individual's church and home, indoctrination in the faith
of his choice.
This development of the public school as a symbol of our secular unity was not
a sudden achievement nor attained without violent conflict....
McCollum, 333 U.S. at 216-17 (emphasis added). Frankfurter also referred to President Grant's 1876
speech calling for the states to "[Iheave the matter of religion to the family altar, the church, and the
private school, supported entirely by private contributions." Id. at 218.
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environment.""2 4 In arriving at such conclusions, the Court has not
embraced legal theories but theories of sociology, education, and
psychology--theories which are not necessarily demanded by the
Constitution.
c. The Symbolic Union of Church and State
In applying the second prong of the "Lemon" test, the effects prong,
the Court has been concerned with governmental acts that create an
impression that government has endorsed religion. The Court fears that
if a group received the governmental endorsement on religion, then that
group could use the endorsement to persecute non-adherents or, at a
minimum, to create peer pressure on those who do not affiliate
themselves with the dominant religion. 2"
The symbolic union is described in School District of the City of
Grand Rapids v. Ball,236 a 1985 case holding that the primary effect
of a state sponsored program to provide teachers for secular subjects to
parochial schools was the advancement of religion. In Ball, the Court
determined that this prohibited effect is achieved whenever a close
identification is fostered between government and religious organizations
so that a message of either endorsement or disapproval is conveyed.
Such a message is seen as a violative of the Establishment Clause.237
The Ball Court found support for its symbolic union problem by
comparing the earlier decisions in McCollum and Zorach. McCollum,
which involved an on-premise program, was held to be unconstitutional,
while Zorach, which involved an off-premise program, was held to be
constitutional. The difference, according to the Ball Court, was that "the

234. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
235. See infra note 236-37 and accompanying text.
236. School Dist. of the City of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
237. See Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 125-26 (1982). The Court in Ball
elaborated on the "appearance" of endorsement in the context of public schools as follows:
It follows that an important concern of the effects test is whether the symbolic union
of church and state effected by the challenged governmental action is sufficiently likely
to be perceived by adherents of the controlling denominations as an endorsement, and
by the non-adherents as a disapproval, of their individual religious choices. The
inquiry into this kind of effect must be conducted with particular care when many of
the citizens perceiving the governmental message are children in their formative years.
...The symbolism of a union between church and state is most likely to influence
children of tender years, whose experience is limited and whose beliefs consequently
are the function of environment as much as offree and voluntary choice.
Ball, 473 U.S. at 390 (emphasis added). Ball distinguished prayers opening the legislative session,
which are Constitutional, with prayers opening the school day, which are unconstitutional. The court
noted that the former do not violate the Establishment Clause because of "long historical usage and
lack of particular sectarian content." Id. at 390 n.9.
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symbolic connection of church and state in the McCollum program
presented the students with a graphic symbol of the 'concert or union or
dependency' of church and state ... [which] was conspicuously absent
in the Zorach program., 238 In Ball, students in religious schools spent
a typical school day moving between religious school and "public school"
classes. Both types of classes took place in the same religious school
building and both were largely composed of students who adhered to the
same denomination. The Court determined that the students would "be
unlikely to discern the crucial difference between the religious school
classes and the 'public school' classes. ' 239 Even if a conspicuous notice
was placed at the door of the room, the student would "have before him
a powerful symbol of state endorsement and encouragement of the
religious beliefs taught in the same class at some other time during the
day. 2 40 In concluding, the Court found the symbolic union to be an

238. Ball, 473 U.S. at 391. In Board of Educ. of the Westside Community Schools v. Mergens,
496 U.S. 226 (1990), the Court described the result in Ball as follows:
[In Ball, we] invalidated the use of public funds to pay for teaching state-required
subjects at parochial schools, in part because of the risk of creating "a crucial symbolic
link between government and religion, thereby enlisting -- at least in the eyes of
impressionable youngsters -- the powers of government to the support of the religious
denomination operating the school.
Id. at 250. Compare Justice Brennan's opinion in Abington, in which he stated:
[T]he McCollum program placed the religious instructor in the public school classroom
in precisely the position of authority held by the regular teachers of secular subjects,
while the Zorach program did not. The McCollum program, in lending to the support
of sectarian instruction all the authority of the governmentally operated public school
system, brought government and religion into that proximity which the Establishment
Clause forbids. To be sure, a religious teacher presumably commands substantial
respect .... But the Constitution does not permit that prestige ... to be augmented
by investiture of all the symbols of authority at the command of the lay teacher for the
enhancement of secular instruction.
Abington Sch. Dist., 374 U.S. at 262-63 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan noted similar
cases that banned religious teachers from voluntarily teaching secular subjects in public schools, as
well as the wearing of clerical garb and the distribution of Gideon Bibles, all of which have been
held unconstitutional. Id. at 263.
239. Ball, 473 U.S. at 391.
The Court quoted from Giannella, Religious Liberty,
NonestablishmentandDoctrinalDevelopment: Part11. The NonestablishmentPrinciple, 81 Harv. L.
Rev. 513, 574 (1968), as follows:
This pervasive [religious] atmosphere makes on the young student's mind a lasting
imprint that the holy and transcendental should be central to all facets of life.... In
short, the parochial school's total operation serves to fulfill both secular and religious
functions concurrently, and the two cannot be completely separated. Support of any
part of its activity entails some support of the disqualifying religious function of
molding the religious personality of the young student.
240. Ball, 473 U.S. at 391-92. The Court cited Judge Friendly's remarks in Felton v. Secretary,
United States Dept. of Ed., 739 F.2d 48, 67-68 (1984), as follows:
Under the City's plan public school teachers are, so far as appearance is concerned, a
regular adjunct of the religious school. They pace the same halls, use classrooms in
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impermissible effect under the Establishment Clause. As will be
discussed further in the following section, courts have been generally
reluctant to rely on efforts to dilute or counteract the impact of the
symbolic union on children because the Court views children as too
impressionable.2 4 '
d Childrenare Easily Influenced
The Supreme Court maintains that, because elementary and
secondary school students are young and easily influenced, the school
must protect them from religious expressions. This premise is illustrated
by the Court's decision in Lee v. Weisman, which held that a nonsectarian
prayer at graduation violated the Constitution. By contrast, in Marsh v.
Chambers,242 the Court upheld prayers opening sessions of the state
legislatures. According to the Court, the difference is that invocations

the same building, teach the same students, and confer with the teachers hired by the
religious schools, many of them members of religious orders. The religious school
appears to the public as a joint enterprise staffed with some teachers paid by its
religious sponsor and others by the public.
Id. at 392.
241. Board of Educ. of the Westside Commun. Schools v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
Justice Marshall, concurring, commented on the use of independent clubs to introduce religion into
the classroom as follows:
The entry of religious clubs into such a realm poses a real danger that those clubs will
be viewed as part of the school's effort to inculcate fundamental values ....As the
majority concedes, the program is part of the "district's commitment to teaching
academic, physical, civic, and personal skills and values." But although a school may
permissibly encourage its students to become well-rounded as student-athletes,
student-musicians, and student-tutors, the Constitution forbids schools to encourage
students to become well-rounded as student- worshippers. Neutrality toward religion
. . . is not advanced by requiring a school that endorses the goals of some
noncontroversial secular organizations to endorse the goals of religious organizations
as well.
Id. at 265-66 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Justice Marshall's statement contradicts Justice Douglas' sentiment that "When the state
encourages religious instruction or cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule
events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions. For it then respects the religious
nature of our people and accommodates the public service to their spiritual needs." Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952) (emphasis added).
See also amicus curai brief of the Archdiocese of New York in Village of Kiryas Joel, 114
S. Ct. 2481 (1994), which criticizes Marshall's statement as follows:
Given the multitude of pernicious and destructive encouragements our students receive
today, surely it bespeaks a "callous indifference," indeed "hostility," to our students to
bar encouragement to practice, and practice earnestly, whatever religion they have
chosen. What the Constitution does prohibit, and all that it prohibits in this area, is
state proselytization of students in favor of a particular religion.
242. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
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sessions involve adults who are free to enter and leave
opening legislative 243
the session at will.
The special need to protect elementary school children was also
illustrated in Board of Education of the Westside Community Schools v.
Mergens.244 In that case, the Court allowed formation of a Christian
club with no faculty advisor to have equal footing with other clubs. In
Mergens, Justice O'Connor noted the ability of high school students to
discern the difference between government endorsement and private
endorsement.2 4' The Court decided that secondary school children were
mature enough 246 to discern that the school did not necessarily endorse
all speech that the school permitted. The Court also noted that the Equal
Access Act 2 47 limited participation by school officials at meetings of
student religious groups and that such meetings were held during
noninstructional time.2 4' Finally, where there are numerous officially
recognized student clubs and students have freedom to initiate additional
clubs, the message of endorsement is counteracted. Hence, the Equal
Access Act, as applied to Westside Community School, did not have a
primary effect of advancing religion and did not violate the First
Amendment.

243. Id. at 792.
244. 496 U.S. 226 (1990)
245. Id. at 250 (O'Connor, J.) Justice O'Connor did not think a significant difference existed
between the ability of college students and high school students to recognize that permitting language
was not equivalent to endorsing language. Id. See also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981)
(permitting religious groups on college campus).
246. Justice O'Connor noted "that Congress specifically rejected the argument that high school
students are likely to confuse an equal access policy with state sponsorship of religion." 496 U.S.
at 250.
247. See Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. § 4071(b), (c)(2), (c)(3) (1988).
248. Because of these features, the Mergens court thought the Equal Access Act avoided the
problems of mandatory attendance requirements that were of concem in Edwards v. Aguillard, 482
U.S. 578, 584 (1987), and McCollum. The Court viewed McCollum as a case involving a release
time program that conditioned the release from classes on the stipulation that students attend the
religious classes. Edwards, the Court noted, reflected on the school's responsibility to parents who
had entrusted their children to the school. The Court stated:
The Court has been particularly vigilant in monitoring compliance with the Establishment
Clause in elementary and secondary schools. Families entrust public schools with the
education of their children, but condition their trust on the understanding that the classroom
will not purposely be used to advance religious views that may conflict with the private beliefs
of the student and his or her family. Students in such institutions are impressionable and their
attendance is involuntary.
Edwards, 482 U.S. at 583-84. The Court concluded that, where formal classroom activities and
official participation are not involved, there was "little if any risk of official state endorsement or
coercion." Mergens, 496 U.S. at 251.
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e. SeparationProduces Feelings of Inferiority
The Court has also held that allowing religious expression on a
voluntary, non-compulsory basis produces feelings of inferiority in those
not participating, even when they are excused and given other tasks. The
fear is that persons so excluded while still young will carry the stigma
with them throughout their lives. Justice Frankfurter pointed out, in his
concurring opinion in McCollum, that the pressure on students to attend
the religious classes is great.249
In the 1992 case of Lee v. Weisman,25 ° the Court addressed the
issue of state-sponsored graduation prayers. It rejected outright the
argument that junior high school students should be mature enough to sift
through ideas and reject those with which they disagree. 25' The Court
recognized that a coercive element exists when a student is forced to
listen to a prayer to which he objects. The Court reiterated its heightened
concern for the subtle coercive pressure, easily exerted in the elementary
and secondary school setting, which forces a choice between participation
or protest and which could give the impression of state endorsement. The

249. Justice Frankfurter stated:
That a child is offered an alternative may reduce the constraint; it does not eliminate
the operation of influence by the school in matters sacred to conscience and outside the
school's domain. The law of imitation operates, and non-conformity is not an
outstanding characteristic of children. The result is an obvious pressure upon children
to attend ....
The children belonging to these non-participating sects will thus have
inculcated in them a feeling of separatism when the school should be the training
ground for habits of community, or they will have religious instruction in a faith which
is not that of their parents.... These are consequences not amenable to statistics. But
they are precisely the consequences against which the Constitution was directed when
it prohibited the Government common to all from becoming embroiled, however
innocently, in the destructive religious conflicts of which the history of even this
country records some dark pages.
McCollum, 333 U.S. at 227-28 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
250. 112 S.Ct. 2649 (1992).
251. In Weisman, the Court responded to the argument that the Constitution requires
"confidence in our own ability to accept or reject ideas of which we do not approve." The Court
stated:
The First Amendment protects speech and religion by quite different mechanisms.
Speech is protected by insuring its full expression even when the government
participates . . . . In religious debate or expression the government is not a prime
participant, for the Framers deemed religious establishment antithetical to the freedom
of all. The Free Exercise Clause embraces a freedom of conscience and worship that
has close parallels in the speech provisions of the First Amendment, but the
Establishment Clause is a specificprohibition onforms of state intervention in religious
affairs with no precise counterpartin the speech provisions... The explanation lies in
the lesson of history that . . . in the hands of government what might begin as a
tolerant expression of religious views may end in a policy to indoctrinate and coerce.
Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2657 (1992) (emphasis added).
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Court found that the graduation prayer in Weisman exerted a subtle
pressure which the state had no right to force on non-adhering students,
25
particularly adolescents who react to peer pressures most acutely.
The Court confirmed its conclusions with psychological findings253 that
the state caused the injury, in effect, by requiring participation in a
religious exercise." 4 In response to the opposing argument that
attendance at the graduation ceremony was voluntary, the Court noted
that high school graduation was "one of life's most significant occasions"
and to require someone to miss it to avoid participation in a state
sponsored religious exercise was too high a price to pay and one the
Constitution did not require.255
School desegregation cases, like Brown v. Board of Education of
Topeka,256 present a parallel situation. Those cases were decided under
the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which applied
directly (and not via incorporation) to the states. In Brown, the Court
examined the effects of separation of the races in elementary and
secondary schools. The Court relied on psychological research as
"modem authority

2 57

to support its finding that separating African

252. Id. at 2661.
253. The Court's finding in Weisman was supported by psychological research. Weisman, 112
S. Ct. at 2659. See Brittain, Adolescent Choices and Parent-PeerCross-Pressures,28 AM. SOC.
REV. 385 (1963); Clasen & Brown, The Multidimensionality of Peer Pressure in Adolescence, 14 J.
YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 451 (1985); Brown, Clasen, & Eicher, Perceptions of Peer Pressure, Peer
Conformity Dispositions, and Self-Reported Behavior Among Adolescents, 22 DEVELOPMENTAL
PSYCHOL. 521 (1986).

254. See Weisman, 112 S.Ct. at 2658, stating that:
there are heightened concerns with protecting freedom of conscience from subtle
coercive pressure in the elementary and secondary public schools .... What to most
believers may seem nothing more than a reasonable request that the nonbeliever respect
their religious practices, in a school context may appear to the nonbeliever or dissenter
to be an attempt to employ the machinery of the State to enforce a religious orthodoxy.
255. Weisman, 112 S.Ct. at 2659. The Court rejected the argument, stating:
[E]veryone knows that ... high school graduation is one of life's most significant
occasions... [and] absence would requireforfeiture of those intangible benefits which
have motivated the student ....
[W]hile in some societies the wishes of the majority might prevail, the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment is addressed to this contingency and rejects the balance
urged upon us. The Constitution forbids the State to exact religious conformity from
a student as the price of attending her own high school graduation.
Id.
256. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
257. The Court stated that "[w]hatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge
at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by modem authority. Any
language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected." Brown, 347 U.S. at 494-95. The
Court cited a number of contemporary books and journal articles such as WITMER AND KOTINSKY,
PERSONALITY IN THE MAKING (1952) and Deutscher and Chein, The Psychological Effects of
Enforced Segregation:A Survey of Social Science Opinion, 26 J. PSYCHOL. 259 (1948). Brown, 347
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American children from others of similar age because of their race
"generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that
may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be
undone.258 Segregation was found to result in a denial of the benefits
of a racially integrated school system. These benefits being denied were
intangible benefits, such as the reputation of the faculty.259
Brown emphasized the importance of educational institutions as
instruments to awaken values26 and, in particular, of integrated schools
as a means to deliver the intangible benefits denied in segregated schools.
It is, therefore, a strange result that integration of the school system to
obtain intangible benefits and awaken cultural values occurred at the same
time the Court was creating pressure to remove any semblance of a
religious value system or any religious or cultural expression from the
schools.
f ParentalChoice
The decision in McCollum hinged on the coercive nature of the state
action. The Court was concerned that under the school district's scheme,
compulsory education laws brought the children together while the school
conditioned release of certain children, for a period of time, on the

U.S. at 494.
258. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494. The Court stated:
[T]o separate [Negro children] from others of similar age and qualifications solely
because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the
community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.
The effect of this separation on their educational opportunities was well stated by a
finding in the Kansas case by a court which nevertheless felt compelled to rule against
the Negro plaintiffs:
Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect
upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law;
for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority
of the negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn.
Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the
educational and mental development of negro children and to deprive them of some of
the benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system.
Id.
259.
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). Other intangible benefits included "experience
of the administration, position and influence of the alumni, standing in the community, traditions and
prestige. . . . [and] the interplay of ideas and the exchange of views with which the law is
concerned." Id.
260. Brown identifies the importance of education in the life of the child and nation as follows:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments..
. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, . . It is the very
foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to
cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust
normally to his environment.
Brown, 347 U.S. at 493 (emphasis added).
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attendance at a religion class. In its analysis, the Court did not focus on
the question of whether the intervention of parental choice in the process
would mitigate the offensiveness of the coercive element created by
compulsory education laws.
Parental choice is an important consideration, particularly since it is
the parent who has been recognized as primarily responsible for the
education of the child and for making decisions on behalf of the
child. 6 ' Subsequent to McCollum, funding cases have accepted the
element of independent choice... as a means of neutralizing a claim of
establishment. In Witters v. Washington Department of Service for the
Blind,263 Larry Witters received assistance under a state program
providing funds for vocational training for the blind. Witters used the
funds to study at a private religious school in order to train for the
ministry. The Washington Supreme Court held that the program violated
the second prong of the Lemon Test.264
The United States Supreme Court reversed. It easily found a secular
purpose in the promotion of the well-being of visually handicapped
persons. With respect to the effect of the program, the support of any
religious institution was not attributableto the state since the funds were
mediated through the independent and private choice of the student. The
program was generally available to all 265 and did not favor religious
schools. Finally, the Court did not view vocational assistance for the
handicapped as a vehicle to subsidize nonpublic sectarian activities.
Indeed, since only a single student used the funds for a religious
education, the effect was minimal.266

261. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972).
262. In Abington, Justice Brennan characterized the choice offered by the Constitution as one
in which parents are free to choose between "public secular education with its uniquely democratic
values, and some form of private sectarian education, which offers values of its own." Abington 374
U.S. at 242. In Brennan's view, it was not a function of government to diminish the attractiveness
of either alternative. One wonders, however, how government can achieve neutrality in the decision
so long as one alternative is free while the other is costly. Nevertheless, Brennan stated that "a
system of free public education forfeits its unique contribution to the growth of democratic
citizenship when that choice ceases to be freely available to each parent." Id.
263. 474 U. S.481 (1986)
264. Id.
265. Witters, 414 U.S. at 488. The program was available "without regard to the
sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature of the institution benefited." Id. (quoting
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 782-83, n. 38 (1973)).
266. Concurring Justices Powell, O'Connor, and Rehnquist emphasized that private choice under
a neutral program is acceptable under the Constitution; these justices emphasized the continued
validity of tax deductions under Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983). Justice O'Connor further
noted that, "No reasonable observer is likely to draw from the facts before us an inference that the
State itself is endorsing a religious practice or belief." Witters, 474 U.S. at 494 (O'Connor, J.,
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g. Religion in Education is Divisive
Many argue that if religion is in any way allowed to permeate the
educational system, communities will become divided and sectarian strife
will develop. Such strife occurred in the nineteenth century between
Catholics and Protestants over the school system and ravaged Europe and
England from the time of the Reformation. 67 As seen by the Court,
whenever the state is perceived as supporting or favoring one religion
over another, divisiveness and disrespect for government is likely to
ensue. A "union of government and religion tends to destroy government
'
resulting in "hatred, disrespect, and even
and degrade religion"268
'
contempt of those with contrary beliefs."269
h. No InstitutionalEntanglement
In its Establishment Clause cases, the Court has continually dealt
with the concern that state and religious institutions will become
entangled, allowing the state to exert an influence on the beliefs of the

concurring). See also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
More recently, in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District, 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993), a sign
language interpreter was provided to a high school student in a religious high school. The Court
reaffirmed the principle that independent private choices, mediated between the government and the
institution, shield the governmental action from an Establishment Clause violation when no incentive
is created to undertake sectarian education. Id. at 2462.
267. See discussion in the amicus brief of Norman Redlich and Marc Stem on behalf of the
American Jewish Congress in Board of Education of the Kiryas Joel Village Districtv. Grumet, at
[2-146]. Justice Black, the author of the McCollum opinion once stated that "all of my religious
decisions are influenced by what happened to our Toland ancestors in Ireland." Justice Black was
referring to the Protestant and Catholic strife which continues to divide Ireland. See ROGER
NEWMAN, HuGo BLACK 365 (1994).
268. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962).
269. Id. Justice O'Connor does not believe that political divisiveness provides an independent
test of constitutionality in the absence of questions of institutional entanglement. She asserts that
divisiveness is too speculative and should only become relevant as evidence that institutional
entanglement is excessive or that a government practice is perceived as being an endorsement of
religion. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Her view is
that the "effects prong" of the Lemon Test should be tested by the following criteria:
What is crucial is that a government practice not have the effect of communicating a
message of government endorsement or disapproval of religion.- It is only practices
having that effect, whether intentionally or unintentionally, that make religion relevant,
in reality or public perception, to status in the political community.
Id. at 693. See also Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U. S.402, 421 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice
O'Connor's endorsement test is criticized by Justices Kennedy, Rehnquist, White, and Scalia in a
dissent in Allegheny County v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U. S. 573 (1989). These
justices argue that the emphasis should be on the Establishment Clauses prohibition of coercion to
participate in a religious exercise or the giving of direct benefits to a religious entity to the extent
that it establishes a state religion or tends to move in that direction. Id. at 659. They also argued that
the application of Establishment Clause jurisprudence must take into account historical practices,
which would require numerous exceptions to the endorsement test. Id. at 670-71.
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institution. The classic entanglement case was Walz v. Tax Commission
of New York City,27 ° where the Court upheld tax exemptions for
religious organizations. The decision was based in part on a recognition
of the benefits to faculty created by religious institutions, and on the
notion that taxing these institutions would involve the state in religious
affairs.
The entanglement prong of the Lemon Test was applied in Aguilar
v. Felton,27' where public school teachers were providing remedial
reading and other secular instruction in religious schools. In Aguilar, the
Court found three areas of entanglement. First, the aid was provided in
a sectarian environment. 272 Second, because teachers were working on
an ongoing basis, a monitoring system would be necessary to ensure they
did not succumb to the opportunity to inject religious teaching into the
class. 273 Finally, because the remedial classes provided by the public
school teachers would have to be administratively coordinated with the
religious classes, continued administrative interaction would create an
entanglement. 27' For these reasons, the Court found the entanglement
prong of the Lemon Test had been violated.
5. Reversal of McCollum Under Casey.
Having examined the premises underlying Establishment Clause
jurisprudence as applied to elementary and secondary schools, this Article
will consider the standard for reversal of McCollum and will discuss the
Court's latest decision in the area. Then, the Establishment Clause's
premises will be reexamined to determine whether there is a basis for
reversing the application of the Establishment Clause to the McCollum
situation.
a. The Casey Standard
2 75
In Casey v. Planned Parenthoodof Southeastern Pennsylvania,
the Court, while refusing to overturn Roe v. Wade,2 76 discussed the
need to overrule cases when the "facts, or an understanding of the facts,
changed from those which furnished the claimed justifications for the
earlier constitutional resolutions. 277 While the Court found the basic

270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.

397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970).
473 U.S. 412 (1985).
Id. at 412.
Id.
Id. at 413.
112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992).
410 U.S. 110 (1973).
Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2812-13.
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tests of stare decisis had been met,27 it nevertheless felt compelled to
compare the requested overturning of Roe to other significant Court
reversals in the twentieth century. The Court found that in the two most
significant overrulings, Lochner v. New York,279 overruled by West
2"' and Plessy v. Ferguson
2"', overruled
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,
282
by Brown v. Board of Education, the overrulings resulted from a
change in the understanding of factual situations. By 1937, the
Depression had taught most people that Lochner and its progeny 283 had
rested on false factual assumptions about the capacity of a relatively
unregulated market to satisfy minimal levels of human welfare.284 In
the case of Plessy,the Court had mistakenly rejected "the assumption that
the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a
'
badge of inferiority."2 85
By 1954, the Court, recognizing the changed
perception of segregation,286 reversed Plessy. In Casey, the Court
found that no such change in perception or factual basis had occurred
with respect to Roe and, accordingly, Roe was not overruled.287

278. The Court reviewed Roe to see if(1) it had proven unworkable, (2) citizens had come to
rely on the original decision, (3) the evolution of legal principles had undermined the doctrinal
footings of Roe, and (4) the facts supporting the decision regarding fetal viability and safety of
abortions had undermined the holding. Id.
279. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
280. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
281. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
282. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
283. See e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp. of D.C., 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
284. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2812.
285. Plessy, 163 U.S. 537, 551, referred to in Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2813.
286. The Court, relying on the findings of psychologists, stated: "Whatever may have been the
extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply supported
by modem authority." Brown, 347 U.S. 483, 495 n. 11. Any language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary
to this finding is rejected.
nil K. B. CLARK, EFFECT OF PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION ON PERSONALITY
DEVELOPMENT (Midcentury White House Conference on Children and Youth, 1950);
WITMER AND KOTINSKY, PERSONALITY IN THE MAKING (1952), c. VI; Deutscher and
Chein, The Psychological Effects of Enforced Segregation:A Survey of Social Science
Opinion, 26 J. PSYCHOL. 259 (1948); Chein, What are the Psychological Effects of
Segregation Under Conditions of Equal Facilities?,3 INT. J. OPINION AND ATTITUDE
RES. 229 (1949); BRAMELD, EDUCATIONAL COSTS, IN DISCRIMINATION AND NATIONAL
WELFARE 44-48 (Maclver, ed., 1949); FRAZIER, THE NEGRO INTHE UNITED STATES
674-681 (1949). See generally MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA (1944).
Brown, 347 U.S. 483, 495.
287. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2811-12. In Casey the Court suggested that the original decision in
Plessy had been wrong at the time it was decided. Id. at 2813. For a discussion of the underlying
moral questions raised by the Court's analysis of the reasons Plessy was overruled in light of
contemporary natural law theory, see Morrissey, Moral Truth and the Law: A New Look at an Old
Link, 47 SMU L. REV. 61 (1993)
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While Casey clearly upholds Roe, the opinion's authors, Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, do not totally adhere to their own
principles of stare decisis since they narrow the holding of Roe by
permitting the imposition of an "undue burden" test on abortion decisions
in the first trimester. 8 They justify the limitation by claiming Roe
contained an internal contradiction when it prohibited regulation during
the first trimester while, at the same time, acknowledging the state's
interest in preserving potential life and the health of the mother.289
Justice Blackmun objected to Casey's retreat from Roe29 ° and Justice
Rehnquist, in dissent, dubbed the Court's position as retaining the shell
" '
of Roe while retreating from its substance.29
Casey is particularly important to this article for two reasons. First,
it sets forth the standards to be used for reversing highly significant
decisions, particularly those that are intensely divisive.
Second,
McCollum contains an internal contradiction, far more blatant than the
one in Casey, that could allow the Court to uphold McCollum's basic
principle of separation while finding some latitude in permitting voluntary
parentally controlled religion classes in elementary and secondary public
schools. That contradiction is that the public school system can be the
chief instrument of passing the American culture to the next generation
without any recognition of or assistance by religion. Third, Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy, two of Casey's authors, are those most likely to
determine the outcome of future Establishment Clause cases. As will be
shown, the continued validity of the premises derived from the cases is
being questioned, and the premises used to support Establishment Clause
jurisprudence in McCollum-type situations can no longer be defended.
b. Changed Conditions in the Schools
In looking at the changed circumstances since 1948, one must keep
in mind that the moral responses of the young have deteriorated
dramatically and many people in society have no place to look for help
except the public school system. Since 1960 there has been a dramatic
increase in the rate of illegitimate births within the United States.

288. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2820.
289. Id. at 2821.
290. Id.at 2844.
291. Id. at 2855. Chief Justice Rehnquist (joined by Justices White, Scalia, and Thomas)
dissented and issued a strong attack on the standard of review using factual changes for reversing
major decisions. Justice Rehnquist argued that no new facts had occurred in the case of either
Lochner or Plessy, but that the overruling Court had merely recognized its prior error and reversed
patently incorrect decisions. Id. Justices Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas would probably join Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy in any attempt to review the Ball and Aguilar decisions.
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Between 1920 and 1960, the rate of illegitimate births rose 2from
3% to
5%.292 From 1960 to 1970 the rate grew to almost 11%; "3 by 1980
the rate was over 18% and by 1991 the rate was 30%.294 The United
States now ranks first in illegitimacy in the industrialized world 295 In
1970, 5% of fifteen year old girls had experienced sexual intercourse; by
1988 the rate was 25%.296
The incidence of violent crime increased threefold from 1960
through 1991.297 In inner cities criminal activity is endemic. The term
"criminogenic" describes this phenomenon:
In essence, the inner city has become a criminogenic
community, a place where the social forces that create
predatory criminals are far more numerous and
overwhelmingly stronger than the social forces that create
virtuous citizens. At core, the problem is that most inner
city children grow up surrounded by teenagers and adults
who are themselves deviant, delinquent, or .criminal. At
best, these teenagers and adults misshape the character and
lives of the young in their midst. At worst, they abuse,
neglect, or criminally prey upon the young.298
The school is not immune from this aspect of society and has been
seeking community help to stem the tide of crime within the educational
setting. 299 However, school philosophy focuses on the needs and rights
of violent students to the detriment of other students.3 °.
Schools also lack an answer for the illegitimacy problem. Sex
education, while widespread and even pressing into kindergarten, has not
stemmed the tide of illegitimacy. Sex education is value-laden at the
deepest level of human personality since it seeks to promote a concept of
responsible exercise of human sexuality. However, the programs are not
292.

Gertrude Himmelfarb, A De-Moralized Society: The British/American Experience, AM.

EDUC., Winter 1994-95, at 14. The article is an adaptation of a chapter in the author's book, THE
DEMORALIZATION OF SOCIETY: FROM VICTORIAN VIRTUES TO MODERN VALUES (1995). The article

points out that England has been experiencing the same problems of illegitimacy since 1960. From
the mid-sixteenth century until 1960 illegitimacy rarely exceeded 50/o, with a maximum of 7% in
1845. During that period it was often less than 3%. Today it is 30%. Id. at 15-16.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 16.
297. Himmelfarb, supra note 292, at 16-17.
298. Id. at 18.
299. See Robert. O'Harrow, Jr., Schools Seek Help to Stop Violent Acts, AM. EDUC., Winter
1994-95, at 18.
300. See Albert Shaker, Privileging Violence: Too Much Focus on the Needs and 'Rights' of
Disruptive Student, AM. EDUC., Winter 1994-95, at 7.
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based on scientific research but reflect a political agenda. According to
one commentator:
The unifying core of comprehensive sex education is not
intellectual but ideological. Its mission is to defend and
extend the freedoms of the sexual revolution, and its
architects are called forth from a variety of pursuits to
advance this cause. At least in New Jersey, the sex
education leaders are not researchers or policy analysts or
child-development experts but public-sector entrepreneurs;
advocates, independent consultants, family planners,
freelance curriculum writers, specialty publishers, and
diversity educators. However dedicated and high-minded
they may be, their principal task is not to serve the public
or school children but to promote their ideology.
For better or worse, sex education advocacy is largely women's
work. And there is an unmistakably female bias in the
advocates' idea of what is sexually nice. It favors what
thousands of Americans have told Ann Landers: In their sex
lives women would like more talking, more hugging, more
outercourse.3 °'
This breakdown of the family, 302 which is the basic building block
of society, is unlike anything imagined by the Supreme Court in 1948,

301. Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, The Failure of Sex Education, AM. EDUC., Winter 1994-95, at
47. Ms. Whitehead is vice president of the Institute for American Values in New York City. The
article describes the comprehensive sex education program in New Jersey.
Another article suggests that what works in protecting teenage girls from pregnancy is a close
relationship with a residential father or long-term stepfather. That article states,
The ramifications of the rise of illegitimacy is disastrous for society as a whole. Both
mother and child are likely to experience poverty and its predictable social
consequence, chronic welfare dependence. If three risk factors for poverty are present - teenage childbearing, failure to complete high school, and non marriage--then it is all
but inevitable that the mother and her child will live in poverty: 79 percent of all
children born to mothers with those three risk factors are poor.
Kay S. Hymowitz, The Teen Mommy Track, CITY J. (1994), in The Importance of Fathers in the
Lives of Girls, AM. EDUC., Winter 1994-95, at 49.
302. For many of the world's religions, man's vital community is the family and, next to his
relationship to God, is the most crucial area of life. That concept of family being at the heart of
man's condition is recognized in Pope John Paul 1l's 1991 encyclical, CentesimusAnnus, where he
states:
The first and fundamental structure for "human ecology" is the family, in which man
receives his first formative ideas about truth and goodness, and learns what it means
to love and to be loved, and thus what it actually means to be a person. Here we mean
the family founded on marriage, in which the mutual gift of self by husband and wife
creates an environment in which children can be born and develop their potentialities,
become aware of their dignity and prepare to face their unique and individual destiny.
Centesimus Annus, supra note 33, at 15.
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when McCollum was decided and religion classes were removed from the
public school. Whether schools, even with the modest religion program
proposed in this Article, will be able to stem the tide of problems faced
by America's young cannot be predicted. Government has no answers.
c. The Court's Latest Decision.
Establishment Clause jurisprudence continues to defy definition. In
the most recent Supreme Court Establishment Clause decision, Board of
Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet, °3 the
various opinions express a sense of frustration, but also one of hope.
While a six person majority pressed to achieve a result which intuitively
seemed correct, two of the six expressed a willingness to review the two
earlier Supreme Court cases, Ball'0 4 and Aguilar,"5 which created the
problems addressed by the statute being challenged in Kiryas Joel. Three
dissenters agreed that such a review was desirable.3"6 This sharp
division in the Court demonstrates that the time may be right for change.
The Kiryas Joel case arose because handicapped Satmar children
were only offered federal and state special education services 0 7 at
public school facilities with non-Satmar children, whose style of life was
very different from that of the Satmar children. The handicapped Satmar
children, because of their unusual mode of dress, language, and lifestyle,
found it emotionally oppressive to attend programs with handicapped
children of the larger non-Satmar community. The Satmar children
allegedly experienced "panic, fear and trauma" from leaving their own
community and being with people whose ways were so different from
theirs30 8 Eventually, the Satmar parents stopped sending their children

303. 114 S.Ct. 2481 (1994).
304. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
305. 473 U.S. 402, 419 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
306. 114 S. Ct. at 2505 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, J., and Thomas, J.).
307. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (1988 ed. &
Supp. IV); N.Y. EDUC. LAW, § 89 (McKinney 1981 & Supp. 1994). Special education services
were available to children enrolled in private sectarian schools.
308. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2485. In the brief for Petitioner Board of Education of the
Monroe-Woodbury Central School District, the effect on the children was described as follows:
The District Committee on Special Education, recognizing its authority under...
concept of "least restrictive environment", continued ... to recommend public school
placements for the handicapped students.... The Satmarer... declined to accept such
services in the regular classes of the public schools. They . . . indicated that such
placements had proved inappropriate because of such nonreligious factors as the impact
upon the children of travelling out of the sheltered environment of the Village; the
psychological harm of being thrust into a strange environment; the fact that their
physical appearance and language difficulties immediately set them apart from other
students; and the necessity for bilingual, bicultural programs specially adapted to meet
their social, psychological and cultural needs.
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to programs offered at the public schools. ° 9 The Satmars alleged that
emotional trauma, not religious doctrine, prevented Satmar children from
attending public schools with non-Satmar children.3"'
Prior to 1985, the Monroe-Woodbury Central School District had
provided special education classes for the handicapped Satmar children
on the premises of the Satmar Hasidim religious school. However, this
practice was abandoned after two 1985 U.S. Supreme Court decisions3 '
held that sending public school teachers into religious schools violated the
Establishment Clause. As a result of the 1985 cases, the town of Monroe
decided that all special educational classes would be offered in public
school buildings. Initially the Satmar children attended the public school
classes, but quickly found them unacceptable.
The Satmar community petitioned the New York legislature to grant
union free school district status to the Village of Kiryas Joel,3" 2 thereby
qualifying the village for federal or state aid that could be used to provide
special education services within the village for handicapped students.3t 3
In response, the New York legislature enacted 1989 New York Laws
Chapter 748 ("Chapter 748"), granting the Village of Kiryas Joel the
status of a union-free school district. 14 The Village established its own
school that could accommodate the peculiarities of the community in
which the children resided.3 15 The New York statute was facially
neutral, was used to facilitate special education for handicapped members
of the sect,
and required that the school district be operated in a secular
3 6
manner.

1

Id. at 4-5. Petitioner also alleged that the purpose clause is not usually decisive because a secular
purpose for providing education can usually be found. "Here the purpose was facilitating.., access
to secular special education services by disabled students who would otherwise forbear from
accepting such services (because of non-religious, cultural reasons) if offered only in the regular
classes of the public schools of the Monroe-Woodbury Central School District." Id. at 16.
309. Board of Educ. of Monroe-Woodbury Central Sch. Dist. v. Wieder, 72 N.Y.2d 174, 181
(1988).
310. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2486.
311. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S.
373 (1985).
312. The Village of Kiryas Joel had been formed out of the town of Monroe under a New York
law which enabled residents to form a political subdivision upon meeting certain procedural
requirements. The Kiryas Joel opinion did not question the formation of the village. Because the
village was created under legislation of general applicability, the Court seemed to accept the
legitimacy of the village even though all the residents were Satmars.
313. The only services provided for non-handicapped children by the school district of the
Village of Kiryas Joel were transportation, remedial education, and health and welfare services.
Those non-handicapped students in the school district, for the most part, attended private schools.
314. 1989 N.Y. Laws, ch.748.
315. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2486.
316. Id.
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Relying on Ball,3 17 the New York Court of Appeals held that,
although the U.S. Supreme Court has not adopted Justice O'Connor's
objective observer nuance for detecting an impermissible endorsement of
religion,3 18 the statute creating the school district violated the "symbolic
impact" test under the second prong of the Lemon test. The New York
Court of Appeals concluded that because (1) the services were already
available, (2) only Hasidic children would attend the newly established
schools and (3) the school board would all be Hasidic, a symbolic union
was sufficiently established so that an endorsement or disapproval of
religious views could be perceived by the Satmar Hasidim sect.3 19
Justice Souter, writing for a plurality of the Supreme Court, held that
granting political power to a religious group violated the core rationale

317. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
318. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) in which Justice O'Connor suggests that, when
the government lifts a burden on free exercise, the "purpose clause" of the Lemon Test will not be
given weight but will be modified because:
It is disingenuous to look for a purely secular purpose when the manifest objective of
a statute is to facilitate the free exercise of religion by lifting a government-imposed
burden. Instead, the Court should simply acknowledge that the religious purpose of
such a statute is legitimated by the Free Exercise Clause. I would also go further. In
assessing the effect of such a statute -- that is ... whether the statute conveys the
message of endorsement. . . -- courts should assume that the "objective observer,"..
• is acquainted with the Free Exercise Clause and the values it promotes. Thus
individual perceptions, or resentment that a religious observer is exempted from a
particular government requirement, would be entitled to little weight if the Free
Exercise Clause strongly supported the exemption.
Id. at 82. Justice O'Connor also noted that free public schools supported by-taxes were unforeseen
by the Founders, did not arise until the late nineteenth century, and should not color an understanding
of what the Founders intended. Id. at 71. In Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989), the Court
acknowledged that the plurality of the prior Lynch case had been unified in its statement of the
Constitutional principle that "the government's use of religious symbolism is unconstitutional if it has
the effect of endorsing religious beliefs, and the effect of the government's use of religious
symbolism depends upon its context." Id. at 597. Context is evaluated under the perception test of
Ball. See Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 397.
319. Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet, 618 N.E.2d 94 (N.Y.
1993). In dissent, Judge Bellacosa argued that the secular nature of the services should determine
the constitutionality of the action and did not create a symbolic union and the ancillary message of
endorsement. He put the issue in perspective, stating:
The unmistakable reality of this case is that the stricken legislation tried to create a secular
public school for pupils with special education needs. The Majority concludes that the effort
fails. Yet, the new public school district offers programs and services at odds with many basic
precepts of Satmarer Hasidism, yet secularism is the quidproquo imposed by the State for
these Village residents to avail themselves in this way of State-regulated special educational
services for their handicapped youngsters. Though the Legislature bent over backwards ...
to address the ... needs of the Satmarer students, it did not bend to the theology of their
families or community.
Id. at 115-16 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
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underlying the Establishment Clause. 2 Looking to the context of the
legislation, the plurality concluded that "doctrinal adherence" was
essentially the reference criteria for the legislation in its delegation of
governmental powers.3"2'
Such delegation was unusual and went
counter to New York's recent practice of consolidating school districts to
make larger districts; the Village of Kiryas Joel was not a natural
boundary for creating a school district.322 Further, because Chapter 748
was special legislation, it would be impossible for the Court to monitor
the activities of future legislatures so that other groups would receive the
same consideration received by the Village of Kiryas Joel.323
The Court recognized that the Free Exercise Clause requires an
accommodation of religion, but held that Chapter 748 was inpermissible
because it was not neutral.3 24 Additionally, the Court noted alternative
ways to accommodate the Satmars, such as structuring the public school
program to avoid the types of conflict that had been faced by the Satmar
children. In summary, Justice Souter stated:
In this case we are clearly constrained to conclude that the
statute before us fails the test of neutrality. It delegates a
power this Court has said "ranks at the very apex of the
function of a State," . . . to an electorate defined by
common religious belief and practice, in a manner that
fails to foreclose religious favoritism. It therefore crosses
the line from permissible accommodation to impermissible
establishment.325
The problem with Chapter 748, therefore, is that the children and the
community in which they live have a common religion. Presumably, a
group not identified by religion would not have posed a problem. Thus,
only religious groups face this problem. The Court viewed the problem
as a fusion of important, discretionary, governmental power with a
religious body.326 That the grant was to individuals who share common
religious doctrine as opposed to a religious organization or its leaders was
a distinction of form and not of substance. 27

320. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2492.
321. Id. at 2489.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 2491. The Court could not directly review a denial of discretionary legislative
power.
324. Id.
325. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2494 (citations omitted).
326. Id. at 2488.
327. Id. Justice Stevens, concurring, suggests that the school district could find ways to teach
the non-Satmar children to be "tolerant and respectful of Satmar customs." Such action would
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Justice O'Connor, concurring, stated that Chapter 748 is likely to
reflect a religious based classification although it may not reflect
legislative favoritism toward the Satmars.3 28 The Court, in her opinion,
could not easily review future denials of similar requests by other
groups.329 Therefore, she deemed it appropriate to find a violation.33 °
Justice O'Connor suggested that in order to accommodate the
Satmars in a neutral manner, New York could allow all villages to
She also thought that if
operate their own school districts.'
government provides school programs on the premises of public and
private schools it should do so at sectarian schools as well. On this basis,
33 2 because
O'Connor called for a reconsideration of Aguilar v. Felton,1
she believed it resulted in a disfavoring of religion beyond the
Finally, O'Connor
impartiality required by the Constitution.333
suggested abandoning the Lemon test and advised considering future cases
based on the relevant concerns of each case rather than attempting to
apply a single theory to all cases.334
Justice Kennedy, concurring, found that Chapter 748 violated the
Establishment Clause only to the extent that it created a special school
district.335 He recognized that the effort was to lift a specific burden
on the Satmars' religious practice while creating no burden on nonadherents, and that Chapter 748 did not seek to favor the Satmar
religion.336 He found the essence of the Establishment Clause violation
in the creation of political boundaries along religious lines.337 But for

"further the strong public interest in promoting diversity ... in the public schools." He questions
the effect of any legislation which shields the children from contact with others having different
ways. Such legislation would assist the Satmars in furthering their goal of segregation and assist in
providing official support for the cementing of children to the particular faith.
Id. at 2495. (Stevens, J., concurring).
328. Id. at 2498 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
329. Kiryas Joel, 114 S.Ct. at 2498.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. 473 U.S. 402 (1985)
333. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2498 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
334. Justice O'Connor suggested several categories which might call for different analysis,
including (1) cases involving government actions targeted at particular individuals or groups,
imposing special duties or giving special benefits, (2) cases involving government speech on religious
topics, which require an analysis focusing on whether the speech endorses or disapproves of religion,
rather than on whether the government action is neutral with regard to religion, (3) cases in which
the government must make decisions about matters of religious doctrine and religious law, often
involving neutral property or contract principles to religious institutions, (4) cases of government
delegations of power to religious bodies, and (5) other types as necessary. Id. at 2499.
335. Id. at 2582 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
336. Id. at 2502 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
337. Id. at 2504 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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this violation, Kennedy would have found Chapter 748 to be a legitimate
He recognized that the need for
accommodation of religion.33
accommodation arose out of the Ball and Aguilar decisions, which
prohibited public school teachers from teaching secular classes at
religious facilities, and suggested that these earlier decisions may be
"erroneous" and should be revisited at some point.339
Justice Scalia, in dissent, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Thomas, attacked the plurality opinion of Justice Souter on the
grounds:
(1) that it is improper to overturn a statute merely on the basis that
it reposes political power in citizens who happen to be of the same
religion, and
(2) that there is insufficient evidence the New York legislature was
religiously motivated in enacting Chapter 748.340
On the first point, Justice Scalia noted that there is no basis for
holding the conferral of political power unconstitutional merely because
the recipients are of the same religion.34' Scalia also criticized Justice
Souter for disregarding the distinction between conferral of political
power on a religious institution and conferral on its members.342
Specifically, Scalia disagreed with Justice Souter's suggestions that
drawing political boundaries to coincide with the village is wholly
religious, that Chapter 748 is special rather than general legislation, and
that Chapter 748 is counter to the trend in New York to consolidate
school districts. Scalia believed that these are not sufficient reasons to
conclude that conferral of political power on a group of citizens is
equivalent to conferral on an institution. Such reasons go to the second
point, legislative intention.343
On the second point, Justice Scalia would place the burden of
proving the legislature's alleged religious motivations on the objector.344

338. Justice Kennedy found justification for accommodation in the Court's precedents where
(1) government seeks to lift a burden on religious practice, (2) the action does not impose a burden
on non-adherents, and (3) the action cannot be said to favor one religion to the exclusion of others.

Id. at 2505 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.

Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2505 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 2506 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 2507 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id.
Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2509 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Scalia argued that accommodation of cultural characteristics does not
prove a desire to prefer a religious belief.34 5 He would place a strong
burden on the objector to show impermissible motivation even if the
cultural accommodations were religiously determined. Scalia believed
that the Village of Kiryas Joel was comprised solely of Satmars because
the village had high-density zoning, which is undesirable to most nonSatmars. 346 He viewed the village lines as reflecting a community of
secular governmental desires, not religious desires,34 7 and that this same
pattern was reflected in the creation of the school district. On the
question of accommodation, Scalia criticized Justice Souter's argument
that Chapter 748 was unconstitutional because other religious groups
would not be guaranteed the same treatment as the Satmar Hasidim.34 8
Scalia referred to Souter's argument as a "novel Establishment principal
to the effect that no secular objective may be pursued by a means that
might also be used for religious favoritism if some other means is
available. 041
Justice Scalia responded to Justice Kennedy's objection to politicalline-drawing by noting that Kennedy was inconsistent to accept the
establishment of the village based on general laws even though it is a
religious community. 35 ° Scalia agreed with Justice O'Connor's
suggestion that Lemon should be abandoned, however he did not agree
that it should be replaced with a case by case method but, instead, would
use the following formula:
The foremost principle I would apply is fidelity to the
longstanding traditions of our people, which surely provide
the diversity of treatment that Justice O'Connor seeks, but
do not leave us to our own devices.35 '
Finally, Justice Scalia stated that he would reconsider GrandRapids
v. Ball3 12 and Aguilar v. Felton,"'3 the cases which prompted the
Monroe-Woodbury School District to discontinue providing services on
the premises of the Satmar Hasidim private school. Scalia agreed that the

345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.

Id. at 2509 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
Id. at 2511 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 2510 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2510.
Id. at 2514 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2515 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
473 U.S. 373 (1985).
473 U.S. 402 (1985).
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such cases were hostile to "our
cases should be overruled, stating that
35 4
national tradition of accommodation.
Though straining to articulate why conferring political power on a
community violated the Constitution merely because the members of the
community happened to have a common religion, the Court held Chapter
748 unconstitutional, in part because of the uniqueness of the situation
and in part because of the manner in which the statute was enacted.355
The irony of the case is that when the New York Legislature enacted
Chapter 748, it was attempting to provide services to handicapped
children after the Bell and Aguilar cases had held that providing
educational services on the premises of sectarian schools had the effect
of creating a symbolic union between the church and the state and,
therefore, the primary effect was to advance religion in violation of the
The Kiryas Joel decision was described in a recent
Constitution.
publication as follows: "The high Court's decision . . . denies some
religious citizens accommodation by their elected representatives and
neutral government benefits solely because they live in a religious
community."35' 6
6. Reexamination of Premises
a. Public Education's ChangingPurposes
Education is important, but the reasons why education is important
today differ even from such a short time ago as 1948, when
McCoIlum 357 was decided. Universal public education is not a uniquely
The Protestant state of Geneva established
American tradition. 35"
Later,
universal primary education between 1528 and 1536 . 59
university education was added as a necessary support for both church
and state under Calvin's concept of the state. 36 ' Following Geneva's
example, the American colonies, with their Calvinistic heritage, sought

354. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2515 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
355. Id. at 2488.
356. Report of Steve McFarland, CHRISTIAN LEGAL Soc'Y. Q., Spring 1994, at 16.
357. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
358. Aristotle's famous quote is of interest: "All who have meditated on the art of governing
mankind are convinced that the fate of empires depends on the education of Youth."
359. See Herbert Foster, Geneva Before Calvin (1387-1536). The Antecedents of a Puritan
State, AM. HIST. REv. (1903), reprinted in COLLECTED PAPERS OF HERBERT D. FOSTER 1, 23
(privately printed, 1929). [hereinafter Geneva Before Calvin]. See also Calvin's Programme, supra
note 85, at 74-76.
360. Geneva Before Calvin, supra note 359, at 23.
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education as a means of developing a godly character.36 ' The Supreme
Court dates the public school in the United States from 1840.362
Philip C. Schlechty, author of Schools for the 21st Century,363
identifies the original purposes of public education in the United States
as promoting republican/protestant morality and civil literacy.3' Those
early public schools faced a rural and agrarian environment dominated by
white Anglo-Saxons. However, as people who did not fit this mold
immigrated into the greater society (primarily Catholics from Ireland,
Germany and Italy who flocked to industrial jobs in the cities), demand
for a public school system was generated to assimilate the
newcomers. 365 Horace Mann, whom Frankfurter credits with promoting
the secularization of education in Massachusetts in the 1800s, nevertheless
believed that a major task of public schools was the moral education of
youth.36 6 By the late 1800s, the purpose of education had shifted
toward integrating immigrants into the general population and selecting
appropriate workers for the new urban industrial economy. As the
country moved into the twentieth century, Progressives in education
began viewing schools as a vehicle to redress the evils of urban industrial
society and ensure the ascendance of humanistic and democratic values
in a world polarized by haves and have-nots.367
Thus three purposes of public education are shown: first, to provide
a common core of learning to Americanize students; second, to provide

361. Mr. Justice Frankfurter acknowledged the religious nature of education in the colonies.
This nature was an outgrowth of Puritan religious thought which pervaded the colonies, but was also
generally true of Protestant countries which believed in the right and obligation of all persons to read
and understand the Scriptures.
362. See Everson v. Board of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. I, 23 (1946).
363. PHILIP C. SCHLECHTY, SCHOOLS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (1990). Then Governor Bill
Clinton wrote an introduction to Schlechty's book, praising his work in Arkansas. Id. at xi-xiii.
364. Id. at 4 -5.
365. Id. at 5. See also BELLAH, supra note 40, at 102.
366. See J. ELIAS, MORAL EDUCATION: SECULAR AND RELIGIOUS, at vii (1989).
367. John Dewey, perhaps the most prolific and influential educator of the 20th century, stated,
"There is only one way out of the existing educational confusion and drift. That way is the definite
substitution of a social purpose, controlling methods of teaching and discipline and materials of study,
for the traditional individualistic aim." JOSEPH RATNER, JOHN DEWEY'S PHILOSOPHY 689 (1939).
Dewey further stated, "Schools do have a role--and an important one--in productionof social change"
Id. at 688. Dewey thought that it was the duty of the school system to weed out undesirable
elements of the culture and to pass on to the next generation only that which would make a better
society. The school system was the chief element of such work. J. DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND
EDUCATION 24 (1916). See also D. BRUCE LOCKERBIE, A PASSION FOR LEARNING: THE HISTORY
OF CHRISTIAN THOUGHT ON EDUCATION 326-32 (1994). Dewey was influenced by the romanticists
theories of childhood innocence propagated by Rousseau, whose book, EMILE, is credited with
undermining the foundations of the Christian theory of education. Id. at 328 (citing RIAN,
CHRISTIANITY AND AMERICAN EDUCATION 30).
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vocational training to support the economic community; and finally, to
redress the inequities of the social order. By the 1970s and 1980s,
schools were being paralyzed by forces calling for a stemming of the tide
368
of poor performance. Some individuals, such as William Bennett,
advocated "back to basics," while others demanded better testing and
accountability.3 69 Still others pushed for enhanced research on effective
teaching.37
Schlechty calls these three views of the school,
respectively, the "tribal center" invoking cultural values, the "factory"
supporting the industrial state, and the "hospital" calling for a core of
professional experts in the knowledge of healing the ills of our
children. 7' Schlechty subscribes to a combination of all three. He
views leadership from the school board, teacher unions, and business
community as essential for the restructuring of schools.372 Schlechty
suggests boards of education have broad authority to "assert what the next
generation should know, understand, and believe. 3 73
To move
forward, however, a purpose for education must be established. He
states: "Schools cannot ...provide students with supportive parents.
But schools can be organized to provide significant adult support to
children who do not have supportive parents."3 74 In sum, what we need
is a formulation of schools that honors the cultural and civic purposes
suggested by the tribal center image of schools, the purposeful activity
and economic link suggested by the factory metaphor, and the nurturing
and child-centered emphasis suggested by the concept of the school as
hospital.3 75
Schlechty also states, "What is wanted is a school system that can
ensure that all children will learn to read, write, and cipher, while at the
same time ensuring that all children will learn how to think. This is3 76
a
challenge that has never before faced public education in America.
Moreover, the "information" society of the future will require workers
who are able to pay attention to and work with cultural elements that

368.

SCHLECHTY,

supra note 363, at 7 (referring to critiques of William J. Bennett and citing

ADLER, THE PAIDEIA PROPOSAL: AN EDUCATIONAL MANIFESTO (1982) and HIRSCH, CULTURAL
LITERACY: WHAT EVERY AMERICAN NEEDS TO KNOW (1988).

369. SCHLECHTY, supra note 363, at 7 citing the Report of the National Commission on
Excellence in Education, A Nation at Risk (1983)..
370. Id. at 7 citing, among others HOLMES GROUP, TOMORROW'S TEACHERS: A REPORT OF
THE HOLMES GROUP (1986).
371. Id. at 17-18.
372. SCHLECHTY, supra note 363, at 8-15.
373. Id. at 12-13.
374. Id.
375. Id. at 32.
376. Id. at 40.
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Schlechty defines as ideas, propositions, beliefs, symbols, and modes of
explanation.37 7
Schlechty's proposal, referred to as "outcome based education," is
being implemented in many school districts but has been sharply
criticized for reducing standards by eliminating objective testing of

377. SCHLECHTY, supra note 363, at 42. Schlechty makes numerous value-laden statements
regarding the purpose of the school system:
In the school as a knowledge-work organization, the purpose of school is simple: It is
to invent schoolwork (knowledge work) at which students are successful (students can
do it and do it) and from which students learn something that is of consequence to
those on whose support the school relies. In sum, the purpose of school is to ensure
that each student is successful at doing schoolwork and that each student is provided
with schoolwork at which he or she can experience success. A shorthand way of
expressing the purpose of schools as knowledge-work organizations is to say that the
purpose of school is student success.
Id. at 53. Further, the results-oriented school proposed by Schlechty seeks to meet the beliefs and
values of the schools as noted in the following quotation:
In a results-oriented school district envisioned as a knowledge-work enterprise, teachers
and principals would know that the result they are after ... is the rate frequency with
which they invent and develop schoolwork at which students are successful... [T]he
school district is accountable for assuring that ... students acquire knowledge, skills
and attitudes that are socially and culturally valued ... [and] that these results ... be
achieved in ways that are consistent with the beliefs and values that comprise the
cultural orientation of the schools.
In such a context, philosophical statements like "respecting the dignity and worth of
individuals" take on a powerful meaning. Such a statement says: "We are after results-that is, getting children to do schoolwork--but there are some things we won't do to get
those results and one of those things is to violate human beings, their integrity, or their
dignity."
Id. at 114-15. Student testing under Schlechty's approach ceases to be an objective measure of
performance but is only conducted "when a teacher... indicates a child is capable of doing well on
the assessment. The purpose of the assessment should be to validate the teacher's judgment rather
than to test the child's ability to read." Id. at 118. Schlechty believes that moral authority resides
with the superintendent of schools who ultimately will determine the values which are manifested
throughout the school system. Id. at 128. Finally, Schlechty's belief statement places ultimate
responsibility for the success of the student on the teacher, rather than on the student. Note the
following belief statement:
I.
Every student can learn, and every student will learn, if presented with
the right opportunity to do so. It is the purpose of the school to invent
learning opportunities for each student each day.
2.
Learning opportunities are determined by the nature of the schoolwork
(knowledge work) students are assigned or encouraged to undertake. It
is the responsibility of teachers and administrators to ensure that students
are provided with those forms of school work at which they experience
success and from which they learn those things of most value to them, to
the community, and to the society at large.
3.
All school activity should be focused on the creation and delivery of
schoolwork at which students are successful and from which they gain
skills and develop understanding that will equip them to participate fully
in an information-based, knowledge-work society.
SCHLECHTY, supra note 363, at 128.
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achievement and by forcing conformity among all students.378 The
important point, however, is to recognize that education is valueladen.37 9 It is an effort to structure society in accordance with the
ideals of educators such as Schlechty. Since religion and religious
training are totally excluded, parents who believe a religious value system
is necessary for normal growth of a child have their efforts thwarted.
Eliminating religion may have been acceptable in schools of the
1940s, when a high degree of local autonomy made the schools
responsive to their local communities. However, with the massive federal
intervention into education from the late 1950s through the present,
parents are being forced to accept value-laden federal programs that are
unacceptable to them.38 ° As government has come to monopolize the
education of the young, the complete elimination of religious training to
counterbalance the value structures of the curriculum is hard to
justify.3"8' Today, the state goes even farther and seeks to intervene in
the child's life prior to entering school. Through the Headstart Program,
disadvantaged children are given training to prepare them to enter school
on par with other students. Many people today are advocating the
extension of state-provided care to all aspects of the prenatal child. But

378.

CATHY DUFFY, GOVERNMENT NANNIES, THE CRADLE-TO-GRAVE AGENDA OF GOALS 2000

& OUTCOME BASED EDUCATION 69-101 (1995).
379. That value may be economic. Noted educational consultant and writer, Myron Lieberman,
states:
Schooling in the United States first emerged for religious objectives.... Subsequently,
formal education was justified on political grounds, such as the importance of Americanizing
the immigrants: or of developing an informed citizenry supposedly essential to democratic
representative government.
In the future, however, economic considerations will be paramount. This is not to say
that religious or political or sociocultural factors will no longer play a role, or that economic
considerations were absent from educational policymaking in the past. The point is that
economic considerations will overshadow others .... Issues pertaining to separation of church
and state may be debated for centuries; survival in a competitive international economy does
not allow for such a leisurely paced resolution.
MYRON LIEBERMAN, PUBLIC EDUCATION: AN AUTOPSY 41 (1993).
380.
The federal control of education at all levels began with the National Defense Education
Act of 1958, passed as a response to the Soviet Union's threat of surpassing the United States in
technology, and continued with the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, passed as a
response to President Johnson's war on poverty. See Charlotte Twight, Origins of Federal Control
Over Education, THE FREEMAN, Dec. 1994, at 701-03. Federal dominance of education continues
under these acts but is also seen in President Clinton's "Goals 2000," setting national standards for
education and the Department of Education's funded project establishing national history standards.
The effects of such uniformity were objected to as early as 1926, by Princeton Theological Seminary
Professor J. Gresham Machen, testifying before the House and Senate Committees, February 25,
1926. See J. GRESHAM MACHEN, EDUCATION, CHRISTIANITY, AND THE STATE 99 (1987).
381. It is difficult to understand why religion can be barred if one child may be offended,
thereby frustrating the desires of millions of people who believe some accomodation is necessary.
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if families are so devastated by poverty and raising children is a
tremendous burden, how are those children going to receive the religious
training needed for full development if that religious training is not
received through public schools?
Many people, unable to provide material necessities for themselves
or their children, can provide love and emotional support. However,
people fighting poverty3 .2 and lacking education will find it almost
impossible, without help, to give their children a system of fundamental
values that can counteract the combined forces of peer pressure and the
entertainment media that are working to push the child to desire
immediate gratification. Many are unable to equip their young for even
limited upward mobility in the twenty-first century. If government does
not provide help, who will do so? Can moral and ethical precepts be
instilled without religion? If government is the only educational choice,
then poor and disadvantaged children will not be able to receive a
religious based education and value system - at least not through the
public educational processes. Such a result prompted at least one
commentator to reevaluate his position on school vouchers to include
religious schools."'
The foregoing demonstrates that there is no value-free education and
that it is impossible for a school system to avoid reflecting some type of
value system. This propositions will dominate the discussion of
education. It leads to the conclusion that the majority of students will be
indoctrinated into a government-dominated value system that is
determined by persons remote to the community where the child lives and
unknown to the child's parents. The present separation of religious
training from education will impede the efforts of parents and others to

382. All is not discouraging in our educational system. The Rand Corporation released a report
on December 21, 1994, suggesting that progress had been made in improving the educational level
of young Americans, particularly Black and Hispanic students. However, while children of single
parent households do not automatically underperform simply because such households are likely to
be poor and poor children do not perform as well as others, children of single parent homes did not
score as high as children in two parent homes.
383. See comment of Sanford Levinson (Constitutional Law Scholar at the University of Texas
Law School) in AMERICAN JEWS & THE SEPARATIONIST FAITH; THE NEW DEBATE ON RELIGION IN
PUBLIC LIFE (David Dalin, ed., 1992). In this piece, Levinson acknowledges changing his mind on
the question of funding religion-related schools. He accounts his change of mind to reading Michael
McConnell, The Selective FundingProblem:Abortions in [sic] Religious Schools, 104 HARV. L. REV.
989 (1991), in which Professor Michael McConnell asked the question: "If
we are so solicitous about
ensuring the practical right of poor women to enjoy their right of reproductive choice, why not be
equally concerned about the constitutionally protected right of less-well-off parents to choose
religious education for their children?" LEVINSON, supra, at 75. See also Levinson, The
Multicultures of Belief and Disbelief,92 MICH. L.REV. 1873, 1881 & n.42 (1994).
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instill a religious value system into a child's life or even to transmit a
value system consistent with a parent's view of western civilization.
Whoever controls the education system will ultimately control the
moral and ethical system of the future, perhaps not for those students rich
enough to enter private schools or whose parents are sufficiently skilled,
determined and devoted to instill a different value system, but for those
millions who are dependent on the public system.
b. Secular Education a Myth
Justice Frankfurter, in his concurring opinion in McCollum, asserted
that the concept of secular education separated from religion had become
a widely held view and an accepted historic fact.384 While that premise
may have been accepted by many people, others argued vigorously
against the trend toward secular public education and even in favor of
practical training as superior to formal education in the formative
years.385 Many religious leaders totally reject the concept that any sort
of secular education is appropriate for Christian children. These leaders
believe Christian precepts and a standard of morality must be
incorporated into every aspect of education.386 It is also argued that,
by addressing metaphysical questions, there can be no such thing as a
strictly neutral school, either in the public system or elsewhere.387
Numerous programs are value-laden to the core. The result is that
to delay religious training until adulthood puts parents at a disadvantage
when trying to counteract the influence of value training already
occurring in the public schools. Sex education involves all aspects of
family relationships, including procreation, an area that has been the
domain of religion from the earliest recorded history. What is important

384. McCollum, 333 U.S. at 213.
385. See the comment of R. L. Dabney, a late nineteenth century educator and leader of the
Southern Presbyterian Church, in The State Free School System reprinted in ROBERT L. DABNEY,
DISCUSSIONS, 200-06 (1979), reprinted from a 1876 article in the Richmond Enquirer,where Dabney
argued in favor of apprentice training rather than the common school in New England.
386. In a 1934 essay, The Necessity of the ChristianSchool, J. Gresham Machen argued that
Christian schools, together with private schools, stand against collectivism in education. In doing
so, such schools are not an enemy of public schools. In fact, the only way in which public schools
can be kept even relatively healthy is through the absolutely free possibility of competition by private
and church schools. If the public school becomes monopolistic, Gresham argued, it is the most
effective engine of tyranny and intellectual stagnation that has yet been devised. J. Gresham Macher,
The Necessity of the Christian School (1934), reprinted in EDUCATION, CHRISTIANITY, AND THE
STATE 75 (1987). The same thesis (i.e. the need for competition from private and religious schools)
is the main theme of educator Myron Lieberman's controversial book on education. LIEBERMAN,
supra note 379.
387. Richard A. Baer, Jr., "Strict Neutrality" and Our Monopoly System, in THE SCHOOLCHOICE CONTROVERSY 15 (James W. Skillen ed., 1993).

COMETH THE REVOLUTION

here is not what view of the family is preferable, but that, by addressing
these subjects in a way which affects lives, the school has entered the
domain of religion. It should not be allowed to expel different views
held by parents.
Government has acknowledged that adolescent sexual relations and
pregnancy problems can be addressed by religious institutions. The
Adolescent Family Life Act (AFLA) 8 8 provided federal grants to
public or nonprofit private organizations or agencies for services and
research in these areas. Because the AFLA permitted participation by
religious organizations," 9 it was challenged under the Establishment
Clause.3 90 In upholding the AFLA against a challenge of facial
invalidity, the Court held that under the Lemon Test, the Act had a
secular purpose, its effect of advancing religion was incidental and
remote, and the possibility of participation by "pervasively sectarian"
" ' Finally, the
institutions was insufficient to hold it unconstitutional.39
entanglement prong was not violated because the monitoring necessary
to determine if the funds were used properly would not be conducted in
a pervasively sectarian atmosphere and, therefore, any entanglement was
not excessive.392 The Court acknowledged the ability of religious
groups to participate in programs involving family planning so long as
the religious institution did not promote religious doctrines or provide the
services in a pervasively sectarian environment.393
c. Symbolic Union Can be Neutralized
When public schools accommodate religion, a possibility exists that
some people will perceive this as a government endorsement of religion.

388. 42 U.S.C, § 300z(a)(5) (1982 & Supp. IV). The purpose of the AFLA could be
accomplished through a diversity of private organizations, including religious groups. Congress
found that "[sluch problems are best approached through a variety of integrated and essential services
provided to adolescents and their families by other family members, religious and charitable
organizations, voluntary associations, and other groups in the private sector as well as services
provided by publicly sponsored initiatives." Id. at § 300z(a)(8)(B).
389. Religious organizations have participated in other general federal programs. Roemer v.
Maryland Bd. of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (involving a state statute thdt provided subsidies
to qualifying colleges and universities, including religiously affiliated institutions); Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (approving the Higher Educational Facilities Act, which provided
federal construction grants to colleges and universities regardless of any affiliation with or
sponsorship by a religious body); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) (approving South Carolina
statute making certain benefits available to all institutions of higher education, whether or not having
a religious affiliation).
390. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Id.
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In Ball394 and Aguilar3 9 the Court held such an impression of
endorsement was enough to bar public school teachers from performing
remedial reading on the premises of religious schools. As a result, public
schools have sought to provide the instruction off-premises, in mobile
units parked close to the religious school.396 The cost to provide the
mobile units has been enormous and the inconvenience generated has
greatly reduced the effectiveness of the programs. That handicapped
children in religious schools have not participated in programs to the
same extent as children in public schools led Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy to express a willingness to review those cases. Three other
justices expressed a similar willingness.
Is the "symbolic union" approach justified? Two recent Supreme
Court decisions are of importance: Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches
School District, 97 which permitted religious groups to use public school
facilities on a basis equal with other community groups, and Board of
Education of the Westside Community Schools v. Mergens,98 which
applied the Equal Access Act of 19849 to prohibit a public high
school from discriminating against student initiated religious groups on
the basis of religious content since the school already maintained a
"limited open forum."
By applying free speech concepts to religious speech and asserting
that religion should not be treated differently, the Court has brought
religion to the door of the school house. Students are permitted to teach
religion to other students on the premises of secondary schools as part of
extracurricular activities, and parents can use the premises for religious
purposes if other members of the community may use them for other
purposes. It could be argued that to allow religion to go a step further
by permitting voluntary parent-controlled religious instruction during the
school day would create a perception that religion is being endorsed.
That is, a "symbolic union" between church and school would be created
that would possibly enhance the prestige of religion because of approval
from a government-controlled school. While this argument may have
394. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
395. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
396. Since 1988 Congress has appropriated over $200 million to support the off-premise
delivery of remedial programs. M. BRUCE HASLAM & DANIEL C. HUMPHREY Chapter 1 SERVICES
TO PRIVATE RELIGIOUS-SCHOOL STUDENTS 41 (Dept. Educ. 1993) (approximately $161 million was
appropriated for capital expenses for fiscal years 1988-93). For a discussion of the costs incurred
as a result of Ball and Aguilar, see amicus curai brief of Mark E. Chopko and Phillip H. Harris on
behalf of the U.S. Catholic Conference in Village of Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994).
397. _
U.S. _
113 S.Ct. 2141 (1993).
398. 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
399. 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074.
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been tenable in 1948, pluralism and multiculturalism have changed the
nature of the public school of the 1990s. 4 0"
Today, a voluntary
program similar to that in McCollum would likely have a greater number
of smaller classes than those encountered in McCollum. A program today
would, therefore, be unlikely to create the symbolic union found
objectionable in Establishment Clause cases.
Analyzing the symbolic union question in one case involving a
seasonal display,4"' Justices Blackmun and O'Connor sympathized with
the notion that a display presenting a message of pluralism diminished the
perception of governmental endorsement of religion. Justice O'Connor
believed that the second prong may be considered under a test of
whether, from the standpoint of an objective observer, government would

400. These subtle changes were only becoming apparent in 1948. In a 1967 speech to the
managing editors of the Associated Press, scholar and historian Daniel J. Boorstin noted:
But in the last few decades we have had a movement from "assimilation" to
"integration." And this is an important distinction. In about the 1930s Louis Adamic
began writing, and, in his book A Nation of Nations in 1945, he began an emphasis
which has been often repeated. It was no longer the right of the immigrant to be
Americanized, to be assimilated; it was now the right of the immigrant to remain
different. The ideal ceased to be that of fitting into the total society and instead
became the right to retain your differences. Symptoms of this were such phenomena
in politics as the rise of the balanced ticket, a ticket which consists of outspoken and
obvious representatives of different minorities.
Reprinted in WILLIAM SAFIRE, LEND ME YOUR EARS 659 (1992).
401. Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 610-11, 617-18, 635-36 (1989). Justice
Brennan felt the justices' statements suggest a "more is better" approach. Id. at 644, Justice
Kennedy, in dissent, would go further and allow the display as a reasonable exercise of judgment by
local officials where "our Nation's historic traditions of diversity and pluralism" can be expressed by
"accommodation or acknowledgment of holidays with both cultural and religious aspects." Id. at 679.
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be viewed as endorsing a practice.4"2 Her view has been criticized, and
such a test has not been adopted. 0 3
d Moral Influence on Children Crucial
The fact that children are easily influenced can be used to support
two contradictory conclusions. First, such vulnerability requires that
children be protected from religion in the public schools until they are
mature enough to understand such matters for themselves. This is the
reasoning of the Court. Second, because children are easily influenced,
it is necessary to inculcate them with basic ideals and learning at the
earliest time possible. This is the reasoning in the world of religion and
education. For example, a well known Jewish and Christian proverb
states, "Train up a child ' 4in°4 the way he should go: and when he is old, he
will not depart from it. 1
In the field of education there is an increasing awareness that if the
cycle of poverty is going to be broken, programs interacting with a

402. The "endorsement" test is set forth in Justice O'Connor's concurring opinions in Allegheny
v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 623-33 (1989), Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69-70 (1985), and Lynch
v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). Her approach is criticized in Justice Kennedy's dissenting opinion
in Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 668-74. Justice Kennedy suggests two limitations on society's ability to
accommodate religion without violating the Establishment Clause. They are that:
government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in any religion or its
exercise; and it may not, in the guise of avoiding hostility or callous indifference, give
direct benefits to religion in such a degree that it in fact "establishes a [state] religion
or religious faith, or tends to do so.
Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 659. Justice O'Connor's endorsement test is stated in her concurring opinion
in Jaffree:
The endorsement test is useful because of the analytic content it gives to the
Lemon-mandated inquiry into legislative purpose and effect. In this country, church
and state must necessarily operate within the same community. Because of this
coexistence, it is inevitable that the secular interests of government and the religious
interests of various sects and their adherents will frequently intersect, conflict, and
combine....
The endorsement test does not preclude government from acknowledging religion or
from taking religion into account in making law and policy. It does preclude
government from conveying or attempting to convey a message that religion or a
particular religious belief is favored or preferred.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 69-70.
403. Id.
404. Proverbs 22:6 (King James). The classic instruction linking education to godliness
provides:
Hear, 0 Israel: The Lord our God is one Lord: And thou shalt love the Lord thy God
with all thine heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy might. And these words,
which I command thee this day, shall be in thine heart: And thou shalt teach them
diligently unto thy children ..
Deuteronomy 6:4-6 (King James).
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child's life must be implemented at the earliest age.4"' It is almost
axiomatic that children who do not receive training in the early stages of
life will have difficulty adjusting later. For example, sex education is
commenced in kindergarten. How, then, is it possible that religion,
traditionaly the means used for teaching values and conduct, can be
banned from public schools, yet public schools can still be considered
adequate to prepare children for success in life? The simple answer is
that public education cannot fulfill its purpose, and the child whose parent
cannot fulfill the function of moral trainer will be locked into a set of
haphazard and unfocused values and conduct established as an infant.
That child's moral choice as an adult, therefore, will be limited.
In today's environment, where a child encounters 5,000 hours of
commercial television 0 6 prior to attending school, it becomes
impossible to counter the moral misinformation fed into the child by such
powerful programming. The fact that advertisers spend enormous
amounts of money on advertisements directed at children strongly
suggests that children have the ability to respond to influences designed
to elicit a response.
It is not disputed that children must be trained to behave correctly
and to accept responsibility. While such training may have come from
the home in the 1940s, in the 1990s, when two wage earner families is
the rule rather than the exception, the pressures on parents to earn an
adequate living leave millions of children in situations without constant,
relaxed, parental nurturing. Religious training, even when desired by the
parents, becomes increasingly difficult. The changing needs of society
could best be accommodated by reviewing McCollum and allowing
voluntary, parent-controlled religion classes in public elementary schools.
e. CelebratingDiversity Counters Inferiority
Much of education today is involved with creating a positive selfimage. Outcome-based education, for example, is primerily concerned
with overcoming negative self-images. A recent study by the Public

405. It is claimed that $1 invested in preschool education saves as much as $6 in special
education, welfare, crime, and lost productivity. See Ann Reilly Down, How Washington Can Pitch
In, FORTUNE, Spring 1990, at 53 (referring to the Report of the House Select Committee on Children,
Youth, and Family).
406. While studies of the effects of television violence on children are debated, some studies
have indicated that the more television violence a child watches, the higher the likelihood the child
will commit violent acts. The intensity of those acts will also likely be greater. Moreover, the
effect of television violence may last throughout the child's life. See Elizabeth Kolbert, Television
Gets Closer Look As a Factor in to Real Violence, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 14, 1994, at Al.
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Agenda, a nonpartisan research and education organization, sought to
understand public concerns about education.0 7 Highest on the list of
concerns were those of child safety, order in the classroom, and the
teaching of basics. Next highest was the desire to teach values, especially
those values that allow a diverse society to live together peacefully."8
Today's emphasis on diversity is directed at establishing the same
societal recognition of self-worth regardless of culture or race. It is
inconsistent to totally exclude religious expression from a child's world
and then expect that child to appreciate and respect religious diversity;
therefore, it is necessary for religion to have a place in the school life of
early childhood. Recognizing and appreciating differences increases selfrespect and alleviates feelings of inferiority. 9 Whereas separation
created feelings of inferiority in 1948, today separateness has been turned
into a positive experience.
f ParentalChoice Builds Respect
The Supreme Court recognized long ago that education of the child
belongs in the realm and authority of the parents. 4 '
The Court in
McCollum did not address the important point that the parents were the
407.

This description of the Public Agenda's report is taken from Jean Johnson and John

Immerwahr, First Things First, What Americans Expectfrom the Public Schools, AM. EDUC., Winter
1994-95, at 4.
408. Id. Other core values included honesty and telling the truth; respecting others regardless
of their racial or ethnic background; learning to solve problems without violence; having friends from
different racial backgrounds and living in integrated neighborhoods; teaching children that girls can
succeed at anything boys can; teaching about the struggle for black civil rights in the 1950s and
1960s. Id. at 44.
409. See note 397-98 and accompanying text (discussing the opinions of Justices Blackmun and
O'Connor in Allegheny).
410. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). In Yoder, the Court stated that "when the interests
of parenthood are combined with a free exercise claim of the nature revealed by this record, more
than merely a 'reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the State' is required
to sustain the validity of the State's requirement under the First Amendment." 405 U.S. at 233.
See Daniel R. Gordon, The Ugly Mirror: Bowers, Plessy and the Reemergence of
ConstitutionalismofSocial Stratificationand HistoricalReinforcement, J. CONTEMP. L. 21, 36, 47-49
(1993). Professor Gordon suggests that protection of a parent's right over the education of their child
could be eroded under the Court's analysis in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). In Bowers,
the Court held that a state could criminalize homosexual activity. In its decision, the Court allowed
legislative decisions to take precedence over Constitutional principles of personal rights. Such a
position ignores the impact of historical justifications and social and moral attitudes which must be
considered in deciding any case. Professor Gordon suggests the reasoning could support a
governmental decision to impose uniform educational standards over the objections of parents. The
case of compulsory sex education is instructive; students are forced to attend even when parents
object because the program isviewed as undermined if full participation is not mandated. Id. at 4749.
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ones who made the decision as to whether the child attended a religion
class. By focusing on the state compulsory education laws,411 the Court
concluded that state power was brought to bear to aid religions, which
had failed in their attempts to win children's interest outside of
school." 2 We see in the funding cases that mediating funds through
parental choice has the effect of insulating the government's act from
Establishment Clause objection." 3
The same should be true of
attendance at voluntary, parentally controlled religious classes.

411. Chief Justice Warren, in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), noted that the
program in McCollum could be distinguished from Sunday closing laws on the basis that the latter
did not compel religious participation Id. at 451-52. See McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element
of Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV.933, 937 (1986) (arguing that Madison's view was that
coercion was at the essence of an establishment of religion). Even Jefferson, in his "Virginia Bill
for Religious Liberty," which the Court found to express the intent of the Founders, made explicit
references to coercion. Indeed, Jefferson seemed to abhor any attempt to use tax money to influence
"opinion," which, broadly construed, could even be used to suggest that the public school system
itself is an establishment of religion. The preamble of the statute provided:
Almighty God hath created the mind free; that all attempts to influence it by temporal
punishments or burdens, or by civil incapacitations, tend only to beget habits of
hypocrisy and meanness, and are a departure from the plan of the Holy author of our
religion, who being Lord both of body and mind, yet chose not to propagate it by
coercions on either.. .; that to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the
propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical; that even forcing
him to support this or that teacher of his own religious persuasion, is depriving him of
the comfortable liberty of giving his contributions to the particular pastor, whose morals
he would make his pattern ....
And the statute itself enacted
That no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place, or
ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or burthened in his
body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious opinions or belief
Everson v. Board of Educ. of Ewing., 330 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1946).
412. McCollum, 333 U.S. at 231.
413. In the school funding area, the fact that funds are transmitted through the individual free
choices of parents apparently avoids the Establishment Clause problem. See Witters v. Washington
Dept. of Services for Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986), and Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983). These
two cases deal specifically with government programs offering general educational assistance.
Mueller dealt with permitting taxpayers to deduct certain educational expenses from their state
income taxes; Witters dealt with a program of vocational assistance provided by the state to a blind
person studying to become a religious worker and attending a private religious college. Based on
these cases, the Court in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Dist., 113 S.Ct. 2462 (1993), upheld
the provision of a sign language interpreter to a high school student in a Catholic high school. The
Zobrest Court distinguished the case from Ball and Aguilar on the grounds that those cases involved
sending teachers into religious schools to teach secular subjects, white Zobrest involved no indirect
subsidy to a religious school and the work of an interpreter differed from that of a teacher. The
Court held that, "[b]y according parents freedom to select a school of their choice, the statute ensures
that a government-paid interpreter will be present in a sectarian school only as a result of the private
decision of individual parents." Zobrest, 113 S.Ct. at 2467. Justice Blackmun, in dissent, asserted
that Ball rejected the idea that aid to parochial schools could be disguised as aid to individual
students. Id. at 2469.
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Additionally, it is worth noting that the movement toward school
vouchers may reflect that parents feel best qualified to determine the
educational setting for their children.
The crux of the problem in McCollum was the force used by the
state to assemble the children at the school and then turn them over to a
religious instructor. 4
It is clear under Zorach"5 that parents (or
anyone else) could purchase a building across the street from a school
and children could walk across the street on released time to receive
religious instruction. Where force is not used, there seems no reason the
class could not be in the school building itself. The proposal herein is
that parents would be responsible for deciding whether a child
participated in the religion class, determining the content of the
instruction, and securing the instructor. Such a program, mediated
through the parents, would alleviate the concerns of McCollum. Students
not participating should be provided with stimulating and useful
educational activities and not merely set aside to await the return of those
attending the religion classes.4 16
An objection might be that the state would use force if the child
refused to obey the parent's decision to attend the religion class.
However, the religion class could be viewed as an extracurricular activity
and treated no differently than any other such activity. Generally,
younger students are required to participate in all activities; with regard
to the religion class, a child who refused to participate could be released
to the parent directly.4 17
By respecting parental choice, the school teaches the child respect
for parents and other appropriate authorities. By interacting with the
school, the parent demonstrates to the child appropriate respect for
authorities.
Respect for parents, if effectively reinforced in the

414. Justice Douglas noted the distinction between McCollum and Zorach: "in the McCollum
case the classrooms were used for religious instruction and the force of the public school was used
to promote that instruction." Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 315 (1952).
415. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
416. Such activities are important as a means of mitigating the effects of any sense of being
separated or mistreated and to meet Justice Jackson's complaint that:
schooling is more or less suspended during the "released time" so the nonreligious
attendants will not forge ahead of the churchgoing absentees. But it serves as a
temporary jail for a pupil who will not go to Church. It takes more subtlety of mind
than I possess to deny that this is governmental constraint in support of religion.
Zorach, 343 U.S. at 324 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
417. The religious rights of children is an area which has received little attention. Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), dealt with the parent's right to withdraw the child from a public
school, not the child's right to participate in public school contrary to the religious-based wishes of
his parents or the right of a child to receive religious training when his parents refused to provide
that training.
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classroom, is the foundation in the child's life for learning to respect
other authorities. " Thus, reinforcing parental choices builds character
in the child.
Peer pressure, whether encouraging constructive or destructive
conduct, is strong within the school setting. It is the school's function to
provide guidance to enable the child to discriminate between, and to
resist, peer pressures while respecting the rights of others. Peer pressure
to participate in religious classes is no different, and successful instruction
in mutual respect will reduce that pressure. Today the peer pressure
would probably be mixed, with many students advocating attendance and
others the opposite. But here, the decision to respond to any peer
pressure is in the hands of the parent, who is chiefly responsible for the
education and well being of the child.
Finally, as noted earlier, the independent choices of individuals has
insulated government payments supporting education from Establishment
Clause challenges even when government funds are used to obtain a
religious education. Similarly, independent choices of individuals can
protect the constitutionality of voluntary, parentally controlled religion
classes in public schools.
g. Divisiveness Can be Countered
Divisiveness, rather than being an independent ground for
invalidating governmental action, has been seen as evidence of excessive
entanglement. Such divisiveness, however, has not occurred in the many
encounters between religion and education over the years.419 In fact,
Justice Reed, in his dissent in McCollum, specifically found that the
religion classes fostered tolerance rather then intolerance.42
Justice O'Connor, in her dissent in Aguilar, made it clear that there
was no evidence that the public school teachers had sought to indoctrinate
students or that their presence in parochial school classrooms resulted in

418. This principle is embodied in the Ten Commandments. The fifth commandment
admonishes children to honor their parents. See Deuteronomy 5:16 (King James). It thereby teaches
respect for God as well as other authorities (e.g. employers and governments). In Roman myth the
word pietas, which denoted duties to gods and parents, was personified as a goddess.
Acilius Glabrio reared a temple to her honor, on the spot where a woman had nursed
with her own milk her aged father, whom the senate had ordered to be imprisoned and
starved. The goddess is represented on Roman coins as a matron, throwing incense
upon an alter, and her attributes are a stork and children.
BOARDMAN, supra note 123, at 150.
419. In Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992), Justice Kennedy acknowledged that neither
the existence nor the potential for divisiveness necessarily invalidates a state's attempt to
accommodate religion. Id. at 2655-56.
420. McCollum, 333 U.S. at 244 (Reed, J., dissenting).
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political divisiveness.4 2'
Government has sponsored numerous
programs that have involved religious institutions without any evidence
of sectarian strife. The massive education aid funnelled through the G.I.
Bill following World War II was a great boon to Catholic higher
education and put many Catholic institutions on a sound financial basis.
The program did not engender great political divisiveness. Handicapped
students have been given assistance to enable them to attend religious
educational institutions, 422 scholarships have been given and loans
guaranteed to enable students to attend religious educational institutions,
buildings for use in nonsectarian courses at religious colleges have been
allowed,423 child care facilities on religious premises received federal
funds, 424 and religiously operated hospitals have participated in the
enormous government support for medical services.425
With regard to the proposed voluntary, parentally controlled religion
classes, the risk of divisiveness will be slight since such classes will
likely be small and equally available to all desiring to participate. In the
event a particular religion dominates a situation, the school administrators
can take action to diffuse any perception of endorsement. If the
prevalence of Zorach-type released time programs is any indication, the
magnitude of on-premise programs would likely be seen as a minority
effort.426
h. Entanglement is Minimal
In Aguilar, the Court adopted Judge Friendly's formulation of the
entanglement prong of the Lemon test, 427 thereby creating a catch-22

421. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 427-28 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). O'Connor pointed out that the
programs challenged in Aguilar had operated without incident for over nineteen years. See also
Chopko & Harris, supra note 397.
422. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993).
423. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1972).
424. See Elizabeth Samuels, The Art of Line Drawing: The Establishment Clause and Public
Aid to Religiously Affiliated Child Care, 69 Ind. L.J. 39, 45-46 (1993). See also mark E. Chopko,
Religious Access to Public Programsand GovernmentalFunding, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 645, 65253 (1992).
425. See Chopko & Harris, supra note 397.
426. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 617-21 (1989) (allowing governmental
officials to minimize the possibility of creating a perception of endorsement in order to satisfy the
Constitutional standard). See also Felton v. Secretary, 739 F.2d 48, 56-57 (2nd Cir. Crt. App. 1984)
(Judge Friendly, in Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1972), discussed the reduced potential for
divisiveness on college campuses where the student constituency is diverse). Such diversity would
of course be the case in many elementary and secondary schools today.
427. Judge Friendly stated:
The Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence from Everson to Wolman has
been entirely consistent on the point that whatever forms of state aid may be given to
religious elementary and secondary schools, these must not create a risk, sufficiently
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where monitoring to avoid the advancement of religion created its own
violation of the Lemon test.42
In his dissent in Aguilar, Justice
Rehnquist responded to the Court's use of the entanglement prong by
emphasizing the catch-22: aid must be supervised to ensure that no
entanglement occurs, but that supervision is itself an entanglement.429
Justice O'Connor, in her Aguilar dissent, objected to the use of the
entanglement prong.43
She acknowledged that an earlier case had
asserted that the Court could not rely "on the good faith and
professionalism of the secular teachers and counselors functioning in
church-related schools to ensure that a strictly nonideological posture is
maintained," 43 ' but O'Connor found such analysis flawed since there
was no evidence in Aguilar that the public school teachers would violate
the trust.43 The contrary finding, in her opinion, is exaggerated. As
for the need of coordination between the institutions, Justice O'Connor
would find that the institutions interact and cooperate on numerous levels,
including such things as attendance requirements and fire and safety
regulations.433

significant to require policing, that public school personnel will act, even unwittingly,
to foster religion.
Felton v. Secretary, 739 F.2d at 64.
428. Aguilar requires the government to show that a violation of the Establishment Clause will
not occur. This burden has been criticized by commentators. See Glendon and Yanes, Structural
Free Exercise, 90 MICH. L. REv. 477, 514 (1991), where the authors state:
Aguilar deployed abstract separationist logic and baseless evocations of sectarian strife
to strike down a benign legislative program worked out by Congress after extensive
cooperative effort with and testimony from a wide variety of religious organizations.
Moreover, the decision seemed to place religion, alone among human activities, in a
suspect category. Normally, a litigant challenging a governmental action would have
the burden of showing that the activity in question violated the Constitution. But
Aguilar inverted the usual presumption, by striking down the remedial program because
the government could not prove there would never be unconstitutional advancement of
religion by public school teachers.
429. See Justice Rehnquist's dissents in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91 (1985) and Aguilar
v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 421 (1984), in which he describes the "catch-22" created by the
entanglement prong of the Lemon test. Professor Douglas Laycock refers to Aguilar as an extreme
case since it resulted from looking at only the "advancing" side of lhe "effects" prong. He argues
for a substantive neutrality that seeks to minimize the extent government encourages or discourages
religious belief or disbelief. The result in Aguilar was to greatly increase the cost of providing
remedial classes to students in religious institutions and to reduce the number of children receiving
the benefits of the program. The inhibiting effect overwhelms the possible effect of proselytization
by the public school teachers. Laycock concludes that the Court lost sight of its original objective.
Laycock, supra note 120, at 1008.
430. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 422 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
431. Id. at 427 (O'Connor, J., dissenting), (citing Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 369 (1975)).
432. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 427.
433. Id. at 430. Justice O'Connor would limit the entanglement inquiry in school aid cases
where the issue is whether the aid is used according to the legal requirements. Id. She would also
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In a McCollum type situation, entanglement would be minimal434
since all that would be required is the coordination of attendance and
some intervention if religious instructors create a disturbance or advocate
doctrines contrary to established public policy. Monitoring in this sense
would be minimal, much like the Internal Revenue Service's monitoring
of religious institutions. A case in point is Bob Jones University v.
United States, 435 where the Internal Revenue Service revoked a
religious university's tax exemption on the ground that the university
promoted a policy of racial discrimination contrary to established public
policy. 436 Protecting against similar violations by religious instructors
would involve minimal entanglement among the school, the parents
desiring to provide religion classes, and the persons making the
presentations.
7. McCollum: A Better Solution Than Zorach
McCollum and Zorach are often seen as the bedrock of stable
church-state relations in the area of education.437 Cases generally

limit the use of entanglement arguments without the showing of divisiveness as follows:
The Court's reliance on the potential for political divisiveness as evidence of undue
entanglement is also unpersuasive. There islittle record support for the proposition that
New York City's admirable Title I program has ignited any controversy other than this
litigation. In Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 403-404, n.l1 (1983), the Court
cautioned that the "elusive inquiry" into political divisiveness should be confined to a
narrow category of parochial aid cases. The concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), went further, suggesting that Establishment Clause analysis
should focus solely on the character of the government activity that might cause
political divisiveness, and that "the entanglement prong of the Lemon test is properly
limited to institutional entanglement."
Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 429.
434. This is particularly true since the monitoring would not take place in a pervasively
sectarian environment. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 615-17 (1988).
435. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
436. Id.
437. Commenting on the remarkable stability of church-state relations since 1947, former
Congressman and law school dean Robert Drinan, S.J., states:
The relationship between government and religion ... has been similarly stable since
the Supreme Court in 1952 held that released-time religious education could be held
off the school premises but not on school property.
[Olver the past two generations there has been a remarkably firm consensus with
respect to the traditional arrangement of church and state--no aid to church-related
schools and no sectarian religion in the public schools. The country . . . has more or
less agreed with the Supreme Court's repeated insistence that no substantial aid go to
religiously affiliated schools and that no sectarian practices be introduced into the
public schools.
R. Drinan, Religion and Politics in the United States in the Next Fifteen Years, in RELIGION & POL.
17-18 (Fred Baumann & Kenneth Jensen eds., 1989). Drinan is concerned about the effect of
fundamentalist Protestants and Catholics finding a common cause during the next 15 years. Id. at
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assume that off-premise, released-time programs of religious instruction
(approved in Zorach) constitute a reasonable accommodation of religion
and are less offensive constitutionally4 38 than released-time programs
conducted on-premise (prohibited by McCollum). However, with respect
to Lemon's entanglement prong, this assumption may not be accurate.
Entanglement can occur through purely administrative functions, such as
when public officials keep track of attendance at the released-time
programs. McCollum implied that keeping attendance reports would
violate the Constitution.439
Zorach reached the opposite
conclusion. 440 In this respect, an on-premise program, that merely
directs the child to a classroom within the same building would involve
less entanglement than an off-premise program that allows children to
leave school premises, during which time the school has no knowledge
of the child's movements.
A second way in which the McCollum solution is preferable to the
Zorach solution is in providing equal opportunity for poor and minority
students.
The financial burden on religious groups caused by
implementing off-premise programs would be similar to the enormous
expenses experienced by federal and state governments after the Court's
decisions in Ball and Felton prohibited public school personnel from
providing remedial education at religious schools.
Off-premise
instruction is extremely expensive because it requires mobile units or
other structures.44 ' If the burden is heavy for governments, it is
oppressive for religious organizations that are dependent on voluntary
contributions.
Wealthy groups may be able to fund the cost of off-campus religious
instruction. Lanner v. Wimmer 442 involved an off-premise released-time
program conducted by the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints
(L.D.S. Church) in secondary schools in Logan, Utah. The L.D.S.

18.
438. Off-premise, released-time programs are less coercive and involve less risk of
entanglement, thereby satisfying the requirements of the second and third prong, respectively, of the
Lemon Test.
439. McCollum, 333 U.S. at 208, 227 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
440. Zorach, 343 U.S. at 308 n.1, 312 n.6.
441. Costs to taxpayers have exceeded $200 million and have prevented many otherwise eligible
children from benefitting from the remedial education services. See HASLAM supra note 397, at 4046. (discussing increased costs (called "Felton" costs) incurred as a result of constitutional
restrictions on.placing public school teachers in religious schools). The report states that in 1990-91,
the most frequently used service delivery options were mobile vans parked near religious-school
premises or at a public school; portable classrooms on religiously neutral sites; religiously-neutral
facilities on or off the religious school premises; and public schools. Id. at iii.
442. 662 F.2d 1349 (10th Cir. 1981).
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Church constructed buildings called "seminaries", adjacent to the public
school buildings.
Students, with parental approval, attended the
seminaries one hour a day, five days a week. Acknowledging the need
for religious accommodation by public schools, 443 the Tenth Circuit
upheld the program while enjoining, as unconstitutional, the practice of
having public school students pick up attendance slips at the seminaries.
Keeping records of attendance, however, was not objectionable. The
court also enjoined the schools from giving students "elective credit" for
religion courses to the extent schools were required to determine whether
the seminary courses were "mainly denominational" in content.444
However, seminary attendance could be counted for state hours-per-day
requirements, participation in extra curricular activities, 445 and state
funding.446
Lanner demonstrates that wealthy religious denominations can afford
the costs associated with off-premise released-time programs.447
However, poor and minority religious groups will not be able to take
advantage of their constitutional rights.
8. Advantages of On-Premise Religious Training
The advantages of reversing McCollum to permit voluntary,
parentally controlled religious training in the schools is that this does not
implicate the Court's holdings in its prayer and Bible reading cases.448
Indeed, the proposal may alleviate the pressure for a constitutional

443. The court reasoned that:
No comprehensive school curriculum worthy of public support can be developed
without broaching subjects and questions concerning morality and the origin, meaning,
and destiny of humanity. Teachings concerning these same topics have been central
to the role of religion from time immemorial. No matter how public school teachers
treat such subjects as history, literature, psychology, biology, anthropology, and
geology, their concepts ostensibly approved and even imposed by state authority will
inevitably offend the deeply held religious beliefs of some students and parents.
Children are and will be compelled, on pain of reduced grades, to give answers which
both directly and by implication lead to the conclusion that their religious beliefs are
false. So long as the state engages in the widespread business of molding the belief
structure of children, the often recited metaphor of a "wall of separation" between
church and state is unavoidably illusory.
Id. at 1352.
444. Id. at 1362.
445. Id.
446. Id. at 1362-63.
447. There are several organizations promoting released-time programs. An example is The
National Association for Released Time Christian Education, P.O. Box K. Elijay, Georgia 30540
(Tel. 706/ 276-7900).
448. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374
U. S. 203 (1963).
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amendment overruling those cases. Permitting religious training within
the public school may eliminate the pressure for school voucher
programs, programs that address parents' perceived choice between their
religion and a free education, and that educators see as a threat to public
education. On-premise religious instruction would also relieve public
schools, at least in part, from responsibility they are ill-equipped to
handle, namely the moral training of the young.
Such programs would also involve parents in decision-making
processes concerning their child's moral and religious training and would
offset the forced uniformity of standardized state or nationally approved
criteria. The training would be entirely non-coercive, non-preferential,
non-state structured or determined and would acknowledge the diversity
that the Founders' respected and that exists within our society.
On-premise programs would also help establish the mutual respect
between religion and law that is necessary for both to grow and thrive,
as pointed out in Part A. Four elements through which law and religion
interact - ritual, authority, tradition, and universality - generate dignity
and respect in children. The process of releasing children to religious
classes coupled with religious teachers coming on to the school premises
would provide a ritual through which religion and law each acknowledge
the authority and separateness of the other. Such a practice would
provide a sense of tradition that religion has, from the beginning of this
country, been considered a part of education. Recognition that the future
is a shared interest of the state or community, the family, religion (if
any), and the child furthers the sense of education as an ongoing process
that carries the tradition to the next generation. To the extent that
religion imparts a sense of importance and relevance to the educational
function of government, government receives an acknowledgment of
universal worth and* purpose, namely, that governmental action can
embody an all embracing truth.449
Leo Pfeffer, an honored warrior for total separation, has argued that
schools should not undertake responsibility for religious education
because it is inconsistent with the separation of church and state; that
religion is a private matter; that intrusion inevitably leads to divisiveness;
that there is no proof that public schools are not doing an adequate job
in character training or inculcation of morals; and that leaning on school
cooperation implies a lack of ability in the churches to fulfil their
purpose.45 The positions set forth herein answer these arguments by

449.

See INTERACTION, supra note 62, at 31-39.

450.

LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM

353-54, 524-26 (rev. ed. 1967).
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suggesting that the state is not assuming responsibility for religion but
merely accommodating those who have responsibility for religious
training. Additionally, this Article asserts that religion never has been
and, indeed, can never be strictly a private matter because it is an
intrinsic part of human nature. It is part of the responsibility of the
schools to instill a sense of respect for differences, particularly since
American society has grown more diverse with time, with numerous
groups semanding recognition. A resulting divisiveness would be a
further acknowledgement that schools are not capable of training in
character. The tide of family breakdown and illegitimacy suggests that
schools are able to instill character and morals in spite of enormous
funding and freedom to experiment broadly over the past forty years.
Finally, seeking to be involved in the training of the young is not a sign
of church failure,45 ' but is a recognition that education, particularly of
the very young, is a function that is essentially religious since it involves
creating in the child a sense of who he is in the world and what the
essential values and realities are that will form his destiny.452 The state
can never accomplish this and must rely on family choices, including
religious choices.
Conclusion
America's legal system is in crisis. Christianity, which shaped and
justified the culture, traditions, law, and institutions of the Western World
for a thousand years, is being rejected. It no longer energizes the public
discussion or those who shape public opinion. It is true that a formal
acknowledgement of Christianity is often present, but with a wink of the
eye, signaling obvious disdain for those holding views of Christianity that
were developed and formulated over two thousand years through the
sacrifice of innumerable witnesses. Such witnesses not only provided the
intellectual foundations for government and its concepts of equality,

451. This argument was stressed by Justice Frankfurter in his dissent in Zorach where he stated,
"The unwillingness of the promoters of this movement to dispense with such use of the public
schools betrays a surprising want of confidence in the inherent power of the various faiths to draw
children to outside sectarian classes -- an attitude that hardly reflects the faith of the greatest religious
spirits." Zorach, 343 U.S. at 323. At best, Frankfurter was being condescending to religion, a topic
with which he was admittedly uncomfortable. See FELIX FRANKFURTER, FELIX FRANKFURTER
REMINISCES

289-91 (1960).

452. See Dallin Oaks, Separation, Accommodation and the Future of Church and State, 35
DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (1985) (recognizing that the Court, by limiting the definition of religion for
Establishment Clause purposes, has effectively banished theistic religion from the public square
"notwithstanding the comprehensive belief systems and the religious fervor of those who have
promoted secular humanism, environmentalism, behaviorism, or other theories of value or human
behavior.").
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fairness, and justice, but also nurtured in the hearts of people a love for
such foundations because they reflected the design of the Creator.
In his'letter to the Christians at Rome, the apostle Paul admonished
them to be subject to the government, not only out of fear of punishment,
but also as a matter of conscience."'
He thereby elevated civil
obedience to the level of a sacred duty.
Without this religious
foundation, obedience to governmental edicts will occur only to the
extent each person reasonably believes obedience is necessary to avoid
punishment or promote order. In any event, obedience will be voluntary
on the part of each person. Whether such a concept of volunteerism can
sustain a democratic society is an experiment the United States is in the
process of testing. In rejecting its religious heritage, American culture
has rejected its historic foundation and must create its myth and future
aspirations anew. Sooner or later the Constitution will cease to hold the
peoples' respect.
Religion, particularly Biblical religion, has played an integral part in
the development of a free society in the United States. Religion provides
a vital ingredient to law, without which law stagnates. This society is
bound together by a common set of religious understandings that must be
passed on to our children if our society is to maintain continuity with its
past. The public school system is the vital link in passing on the national
values and heritage to the next generation. The current Supreme Court
decisions make it impossible to use the school system to pass on the
religious aspect of this country's heritage. A solution is needed that
permits the majority culture to transmit its values without offending
cultural minorities or discouraging those minorities from propagating their
beliefs. One answer, proposed in this article, lies in a school system
which fosters understanding and respect for diversity in religion by
accommodating parentally controlled and authorized religious classes
during the school day. This answer requires a school system that teaches
respect for the differing views of others, including religious views,
instead of hiding behind the fiction that differing views do not exist or
cannot be expressed without offending others or dividing the population.
When Rabbi Gutterman uttered the words, "We must each strive to
fulfill what You require of us all: To do justly, to love mercy, to walk
humbly"4" 4 at a middle school graduation, he tripped over the
Establishment Clause. Justice Blackmun quickly saw the reference to the

453. See chapter Thirteen of St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans, in which he details the duties
of Christians to the government and suggests the parameters within which good government, from
a Christian perspective, operates. Romans 13:5-10 (King James).
454. Wiesman, 112 S. Ct. at 2653 (quoting Micah 6:8 (King James)).
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Biblical prophet Micah and concluded that the government was promoting
religion.455 Ironically, in 1630, while on board a ship en route to the
New World, John Winthrop, the leader of the Massachusetts Bay Colony,
admonished the people with the following words:
Now the only way to

.

. provide for our posterity is to

follow the Counsel of Micah, to doe Justly, to love mercy,
to walk humbly with our God. For this end, wee must be
knit together in this work as one man, wee must entertain
each other in brotherly Affeccion, wee must be willing to
abridge our selves of our superfluities, for the supply of
others necessities, . . . make others Condicions our owne,
456

Now, 350 years later, the teachings of Micah are banned from public
schools except as an example of literature. Micah's words must now be
treated like the inscriptions on an Egyptian pyramid rather than as an
instruction on how such words could create a great nation.

455.
456.

Id. at 2664 n.5 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Id.

